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 ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION 
 
 
 
 
HUSSERL’S DYADIC SEMANTICS 
 
Husserl’s Logical Investigations contain an apparent discrepancy in their account of 
meaning.  They first present meanings, contra psychologism, as commonly available, 
reiterable, invariant, possibly valid, and independent of our “acts of meaning”.  They then 
present meaning, almost psychologistically, as a kind of intentional experience on which 
all truths and other transcendent meanings depend.  I offer a critical developmental study 
of this problem within Husserl’s semantics.  I argue (a) that Husserl had reason to adopt 
his dyadic account of signification, (b) that this “two-sided” account shaped, and was 
reciprocally informed by, the two-step phenomenological method, and (c) that Husserl’s 
proposed resolution to the strain within his semantics, while driven by legitimate 
motivations, is precarious.   
 
(a) I begin with the Logical Investigations and their context.  I represent their two 
sets of semantic claims, recalling how the discord between claims of those sets 
would have been especially conspicuous when the Investigations were published, 
amid much debate over psychologism, in 1900-01.  I then show why Husserl 
embraced two discordant views of meaning.  I survey the 19th century sources for 
these views, confirming Jocelyn Benoist’s genealogical thesis that Husserl’s 
semantics took its psychological and logical sides primarily from Franz Brentano 
and Bernard Bolzano, respectively.  And I present the Bolzanian arguments and 
Brentanian descriptions that served as grounds for Husserl’s semantics, showing 
how these pieces of reasoning were appropriated, and weighing their strength.    
 
(b) Next, I trace how Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning, and its apparent 
incoherence, both inspired and determined the transcendental and eidetic 
reductions.  I then examine how Husserl subsequently used the phenomenological 
method to reinforce, to integrate, and to revise his theory of meaning.  And I 
address a methodological criticism that this circular development prompts.  
 
 (c) Finally, I assess Husserl’s attempt to explain the division within the phenomenon 
of meaning by reference to what he called “transcendental subjectivity”.  I 
consider two contrary objections to this explanation.  I indicate how Husserl’s 
explanation is responsive to the insight behind each objection, but contend that it 
is perhaps not adequately responsive to the insight behind either.   
 
KEY WORDS AND PHRASES:  Edmund Husserl, signification, intentionality, 
logical psychologism, “truths in themselves”. 
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 1 
Husserl’s Dyadic Semantics 
  
 
1: Introduction 
 
1.1: Subject and scope 
 
This dissertation addresses a division within the phenomenon of meaning.1  On 
one side of the division, meaning has appeared to be a kind of experience.  To mean is to 
engage in speech, or in writing, or in some other act of signification; we can intelligibly 
ask what a speaker or writer means for this reason.  While meaning has thus appeared to 
be a sort of experience, however, it has also appeared to be an objective field of which we 
can have experience.  This other side of meaning comes into view whenever we notice 
the “logical space” of reiterable, publicly available concepts and propositions.  When we 
observe, for example, that some identical judgment has been expressed at several times, 
with different words, by multiple thinkers, the signification thus expressed does not 
appear to be one of our experiences.  Such significations rather appear to have an 
endurance and universality that no passing experience can confine.  How, then, can 
meaning appear to be both — a type of transient mental event and the sum of semantic 
items that transcend such events?  That is the question at issue in this study.  
My attempt to address that question is part of an ancient and ongoing line of 
research.  Since Plato’s time at least, for well over two millennia, thinkers in the Western 
                                                 
1 The word “meaning” carries a wide range of connotations.  It can designate everything from significance, 
when someone talks about “the meaning of life”, to signification, when someone talks about a word or a 
speaker’s meaning.  In this study, “meaning” functions relatively narrowly, as an equivalent for 
“signification”.  I use “sense”, rather than “meaning”, as the general term that can designate any sort of 
experience or appearance; and I reserve “meaning” to denote the kind of sense that is specific to the level of 
active thought.  In making this terminological choice, moreover, I am roughly following Husserl’s practice.  
By no later than 1913, Husserl habitually distinguished the broader category of sense (Sinn) from the 
narrower category of meaning or signification (Bedeutung).  His category of “acts of meaning” (Akte des 
Bedeutens) includes “expressive acts” (ausdrückende Akte), along with experiences of reading, listening 
and otherwise silently thinking, and excludes acts of mere “sense-perception”.   
 2 
philosophical tradition have regarded the general topic of meaning as a distinctive and 
epistemologically important area of possible inquiry.  Consider, for instance, the section 
of Plato’s Theaetetus in which Socrates brings his young interlocutor to admit that we 
know more than we see and hear — that what is manifest in various experiences 
surpasses what is sensed.2  Socrates there asks: Does not the experience that we have of a 
bit of foreign speech differ significantly from the experience that those who know the 
language have of the same sounds?  And is there not, similarly, an essential difference 
between the reader’s experience of a page of text and the experience that someone who is 
illiterate has of the same page?  We, following Theaetetus, must reply that a difference is 
evident: When we hear or see some words, though we have not yet learned the language 
in which they are spoken or the letters in which they are written, “we know just so much 
of [those words] as we hear or see”.  When, in contrast, we encounter a piece of text in a 
language that we have learned to read, we experience more than the mere visual 
dimensions of the words that we see.3  When, likewise, we hear someone speak in a 
language that we also speak, we then experience more than so many sounds.  What 
appears when we reflect on these latter cases includes not only sights and sounds, but also 
meanings; it includes not only sensory modalities such as seeing and hearing, but also 
another structure of experience that we tend to take for granted; it includes that apart 
                                                 
2 Plato, Theaetetus, trans. Harold N. Fowler, 163b.  Socrates presents his several objections to Theaetetus’ 
claim that “knowledge is nothing other than perception [aisthesis]” (160d) between 161c and 164e, within a 
still broader discussion (between 151e and 183c) of Protagoras’ famous “dogma” (157d) that “man is the 
measure of all things” (152a).  The “metron anthropon” epistemological dogma, which is on trial 
throughout most all of the Theaetetus, is one response to the question that motivated this study — the issue 
of whether there are “truths in themselves”.  
3 When we read the words of a newspaper, for example, we experience something more than we would if 
we attended only to the sensuous dimensions of the font in which those words are written.  Notably, this 
“something more” need not consist in any confirmation, or even in any illustration, of the words’ joint 
signification.  We may understand those words without any images arising in our mind, and also without 
yet having any experience that either definitively confirms or discredits their report. 
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from which we could not speak and be understood, and apart from which we could not 
read and write.  It is an interest in this persistent structure of our experience, without 
which our discourse would not be possible, which motivates this study. 
 For meaning, while so familiar from our experience and necessary for our science, 
is also philosophically problematic.  We find when we consider meaning what Augustine 
famously noticed about time,4 and Plato earlier saw regarding being:5 we mention it 
easily and regularly, but stumble when we try to speak of it thematically; we seem to 
know what it is until we try to say what it is.  We consistently “live in” meanings, 
naturally looking through signs and immersing ourselves in significations,6 yet 
philosophical inquiry concerning meaning has historically unfolded as a series of 
contested attempts to come to terms with a stubbornly difficult subject matter.7  It has so 
proceeded from the ancient discussion of the eidetic, through the medieval dispute 
regarding universals and the modern controversy over the origin of ideas, and to more 
contemporary debates about naturalism and psychologism.   
 This study does not provide an encyclopedic history of the many theories of 
signification contained in that long procession.  Much less does it finally answer the 
                                                 
4 “What … is time?  Provided that no one asks me, I know.  If I want to explain it to an inquirer, I do not 
know” (Confessions, trans. Henry Chadwick, xi.xiv). 
5 “Do tell us plainly what you wish to designate when you say ‘being’.  For … whereas we formerly 
thought we knew, [we] are now perplexed” (Plato, Sophist, trans. Harold Fowler, 244a).  Compare also 
Merleau-Ponty’s parallel, less famous observation about the familiar but perplexing character of sensing: 
“We believed we knew what feeling, seeing, and hearing were, and now these words raise problems” 
(Phenomenology of Perception, trans. Colin Smith (London: Routledge, 2002) p. 12).  Along these same 
lines, Husserl more generally claimed that “… it is precisely behind the obvious that the hardest problems 
lie hidden”.  Philosophy’s “hardest problems” lurk “behind the obvious” so characteristically, according to 
Husserl, that “philosophy may be paradoxically, but not unprofoundly, called the science of the trivial” 
(Logical Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Routledge, 2001) Inv. IV, note 3, p. 76).  
6 Husserl often speaks of our “living in” significations, to indicate how in writing, reading, speaking, etc., 
we tend to be attentively immersed in the meaning rather than in the look or sound of words. 
7 In unison with the above comments about other philosophical basics, Husserl notes that while “what 
‘meaning’ is, is a matter as immediately given to us as is the nature of color and sound”, “[t]his is of course 
not the last word in the phenomenology of meanings.”  “[I]t is”, he says, “only its beginning” (Logical 
Investigations, Inv. II, § 31, p. 287). 
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question of what meaning is.  Its more limited task is to critically reconsider one of the 
more promising theories that have been presented within the history of meaning-
investigation, namely the one that Edmund Husserl began publishing in the first year of 
the last century.  I suspect that that theory of signification, to which the Logical 
Investigations were the “breakthrough”, remains broadly underappreciated, despite being 
variously appropriated, such that it can contribute importantly to our present 
understandings of signification.8   
 The present study accordingly approaches a fundamental philosophical issue by 
historical means.  I hope, by engaging with one of the more compelling accounts of 
meaning in the history of philosophy, to acquire a privileged point of access to its field.  
Such a historically indebted approach, to be sure, stands somewhat at odds with a primary 
methodological scruple of the Enlightenment: like any current philosophical study that 
operates on the basis of a historical inheritance, it invites the objection that it is 
constrained from the first by certain prejudgments, and that it thus relinquishes without 
resistance the intellectual freedom to which inquiry should aspire.  But I believe that this 
worry is wrong-headed, at least to the extent that it arises from a severely incomplete 
view of intellectual freedom as nothing but the (negative) freedom from heteronomous 
conditions.9  Apart from any such illusions regarding philosophy’s relation to history, it 
                                                 
8 Logical Investigations, foreword to the (1913) second edition, p. 3.  I hope to show that Husserl’s account 
in any case merits a more careful reading than we would be inclined to give it if we (a) regarded it as a 
merely regrettable step on the way to some later and greater phenomenology, or (b) if we dismissed terms 
like “phenomenology” and “transcendental” as too foreign or “spooky” to take the trouble to understand.   
9 On such a view, the judgments that we inherit from others only limit our understanding (or worse): only 
when we are “quite alone”, in the way that Descartes supposes himself to be at the beginning of his 
Meditations, would we be intellectually free (Meditations on First Philosophy, trans. Collingham, 
Stoothoff, and Murdoch, first meditation, first paragraph).  My way of proceeding indicates my assent to 
the contrary view, convincingly articulated by Hans-Georg Gadamer, according to which inherited 
judgments, while functioning as epistemic limits and often needing replacement or revision, also function 
often enough as necessary conditions for our understanding.  Inherited judgments would thus function both 
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remains true that a genuine inquiry, and likewise a genuinely Husserlian inquiry, cannot 
be dogmatically Husserlian.10  Yet for that reason, the task of this study is to provide a 
critical approach to a historical understanding — an approach that at once limits itself by 
following only Husserl’s leads “zu den sachen selbst” and also measures his claims 
against the things themselves. 
 By pursuing in this way only Husserl’s paths, one might still easily fall into a far 
more sprawling project than it is possible to undertake here.  A few further limits 
accordingly circumscribe the scope of my study’s attempted contribution to our 
understanding of meaning.  First, I exclude the majority of Husserl’s vast and largely 
unpublished philosophical output from the scope of this project.  I confine my exegetical 
attention to Husserl’s primary logical works, which in their richness and density warrant 
such an exclusive focus.11  Second, I also delimit my study of meaning by putting aside 
the related but enormous Husserlian topics of the living body, pre-significative sense, 
intersubjectivity, and temporalization, as topics that in their breadth and depth would 
require their own sustained treatments.  Finally, and most important, this study is also 
defined, because propelled forward, by the particular question I mentioned at the outset 
                                                                                                                                                 
as limits and conditions, in much the same way that adherence to a particular language’s grammatical 
structure both limits what a person can say, and is a condition of the possibility of human linguistic 
expression.  See Gadamer’s Truth and Method, especially the section titled “prejudices as conditions of 
understanding”, for his argument that “the fundamental [and self-defeating] prejudice of the Enlightenment 
is the prejudice against prejudice itself” (trans. Garrett Barden and John Cumming (New York: Seabury 
Press, 1970) pp. 239-40).   
10 I am here taking up the disparaging usage of “dogmatic”, to connote the idle, uninquisitive, and thus 
quickly belligerent possession of a belief.  Of course, if “dogma” merely denotes a belief that one takes to 
be and perhaps is committed to holding as true, disparaging dogmatism would amount to an incoherent 
because dogmatic opposition to dogma as such.  Given that less negative sense of “dogma”, being dogmatic 
appears to be a constant and ineradicable fact of human experience.  Yet, without any desire to overcome 
the kind of dogmatism that is a necessary condition of human understanding, one can nonetheless hope to 
overcome the glib, insufficiently self-critical possession of  beliefs.   
11 Husserl’s chief logical works are the Investigations of 1900-01 and Formal and Transcendental Logic of 
1929.  Also deserving of mention are Ideas I of 1913, because of its position as a turning point between the 
two chief logical works, and Experience and Judgment, published posthumously in 1939, because of its 
original connection with Husserl’s 1929 logical studies. 
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of this introduction.  The theme of this project, broadly speaking, is one that it shares 
with all other semantic inquiry;12 yet the present study’s theme, more precisely, is a 
problematically dyadic structure of signification.  Its theme is what Husserl once called 
“the essential ambiguity of meaning as an Idea”.13  
 This ambiguity appears in the way that the meaning of our discourse and silent 
thought transcends our experiences of meaning.  On the one hand, the signification of 
word and thought clearly seems to depend on the experience of speaking, thinking, or 
otherwise actively meaning: without such experience, which Husserl called “categorial”, 
how could there be significations?  Meanings do not sit around in the sensory world like 
mountains and trees do.  On the other hand, objective meanings also appear to outstrip 
our experiences of meaning: they remain the same no thanks to our fleeting grasp of 
them, and seem to hold as true (or not) independently of our realizing that they do.  That 
“the ten trillionth digit of pi is 7”, e.g., means the same whenever it is said, and whoever 
says it; moreover, that “the ten trillionth digit of pi is 7” holds as either correct or not 
prior to, and so independently of, our realizing that it does.  The meaning that we 
experience thus seems both to depend on, and to be independent of, the experience of 
meaning. 
 The purpose of my project is to critically follow Husserl’s display of, and 
response to, this problematic ambiguity.  If Husserl was correct, then we cannot 
                                                 
12 Semantics derives its name from the Greek verb seimaino (“I show by a sign”).  Despite trends in the 
philosophy of language, then, there is reason to take semantic inquiry to include the “pragmatics” that 
studies the active mental work of meaning, as well as the “semantics” that, disregarding the etymology 
behind its name, focuses exclusively on networks of word-meanings and sentence-meanings.  
13 Logical Investigations, foreword to the second edition, p. 7.  If “meaning as an Idea” is ambiguous, then 
the capacity of various expressions to carry multiple and indeterminate meanings would not be the most 
fundamental ambiguity that the philosophy of meaning has to face.  The basic term “meaning” would then 
be ambiguous too.  And if the ambiguity of meaning is an “essential” ambiguity, then this ambiguity would 
not reside, relatively harmlessly, merely in the way that we happen to use “meaning”, but in what meaning 
itself is. 
 7 
adequately grasp the nature of knowledge or judicative experience in general unless we 
understand this paradoxical “two-sided” structure of meaning; and an understanding of 
this semantic structure is in any case necessary if we are to achieve an appreciative and 
methodologically informed understanding of Husserl’s phenomenology.  For this 
ambiguity, which Husserl deciphered with difficulty through completing his 
“breakthrough” work, was then determinative of Husserl’s later philosophic trajectory, 
and lies at the heart of Husserl’s now peculiar but arguably fertile understanding of logic.  
It has, moreover, long been alluded to by phenomenologists,14 and has recently been 
pointed up as a “profound” and “productive duality” by Jocelyn Benoist.15  Because it is 
both “productive”, with respect to Husserl’s work and the subsequent phenomenological 
program, and “profound”, with respect to ancient and enduring philosophical questions, 
this purportedly essential ambiguity deserves a devoted study.   
 
1.2: Overview of chapters 2 through 7   
 My study basically consists of three parts.  Each part is focused primarily on a 
particular stage in the historical development that Husserl’s account of meaning 
underwent.  The first part critically considers that account’s origins and “breakthrough”, 
the second its consolidation and mature formulation, and the third its aftermath.  
                                                 
14 The first judges of the Logical Investigations, including Husserl himself, were quick to note the very 
different descriptions of meaning evident in the Prolegomena, on the one hand, and in the 6th Investigation, 
e.g., on the other hand.  Since then, many figures who are prominent in Husserl studies, including Martin 
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Jacques Derrida, Jitendra Mohanty and Rudolf Bernet, have echoed that notice.  
Derrida’s quick mention, in “Genesis and Structure”, that Husserl attempted to walk a line “between the 
Scylla and Charbydis of logical structuralism and psychologistic geneticism”, is a characteristic example 
(Writing and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978) p. 158). 
15 “Husserl’s Theory of Meaning in the First Logical Investigation”, Husserl’s Logical Investigations, ed. 
Dan Dahlstrom (Boston: Kluwer, 2003) pp. 18 and 33. 
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Together, then, the three core parts of this study compose a developmental analysis and 
assessment of Husserl’s semantics. 
 In the first and largest part of this study, I present Husserl’s view that meaning is 
problematically ambiguous, and show why Husserl initially came to hold that view.  In 
the second part, I indicate how Husserl’s initial view of signification shaped his method, 
and how that method then reciprocally informed his later view of signification.  In the 
third and smallest part, I weigh Husserl’s attempted explanation of meaning’s ambiguous 
character.  
 Each of these parts requires at least one chapter; the first task requires three.  In 
chapter two, in order to begin the first major task of this study, I simply represent the 
dissonance within Husserl’s early semantics.  I highlight two apparently opposed sorts of 
semantic claims that Husserl made in the Logical Investigations; and I recall how those 
kinds of claims were perceived when Husserl first published the Investigations, in 1900-
01, amid a controversy concerning the foundations of logic.  In chapter three, I begin to 
clarify why Husserl held the two dissonant views of meaning that he expressed at the turn 
into the twentieth century.  Through a kind of genealogy, I survey the many nineteenth 
century sources of Husserl’s two views of meaning, and sort those lines of influence that 
were primary for Husserl from those that were secondary.  Once I have identified the 
primary influence behind each of Husserl’s dissonant accounts of meaning, I then turn, in 
chapter four, to the rational grounds that those primary influences offered in support of 
their views.  I thus display the basis that Husserl’s two views of meaning arguably have 
in the phenomenon of meaning itself.  Chapters two through four thus show through 
largely historical means how Husserl’s theory of meaning is of more than merely 
 9 
historical interest.  They culminate in a case for considering the dialectical tension within 
Husserl’s dyadic semantics as a genuine and enduring philosophical problem.   
 Chapter five then takes up the second basic task of this study.  In that chapter, I 
trace the process by which Husserl advanced his account of meaning, and consider 
whether that process is trustworthy.  I examine how Husserl’s initial, problematic theory 
of meaning shaped his method; I depict how Husserl then used that method to 
substantiate, to revise, and ultimately to integrate, his initial theory of meaning; and I ask 
whether there is a vicious circularity in this development.  I ask if Husserl employed a 
warranted method, by which he was able to study structures that are evident within all 
human experience of meaning, or if his semantics was instead merely the result of an 
insufficiently critical inheritance.   
 After I have addressed these methodological questions, I then turn to the third and 
final basic task of this study in chapter six.  I there evaluate Husserl’s mature attempt to 
explain the dyadic appearance of meaning.  Taking up two objections from within the 
two-sided approach to signification that Husserl advanced, I ask: Is Husserl’s attempt to 
resolve the dissonance within his semantics too speculatively ambitious?  Or is it not 
ontologically inquisitive enough?   
 Finally, after the three core tasks of this study are completed — the first in 
chapters two through four, the second in chapter five, and the third in chapter six — I 
close with a very brief summary chapter.  I there offer a schematic account of the 
conclusions concerning Husserl’s thought and concerning meaning itself that my study 
implies.  And I identify the line of further inquiry that my conclusions motivate.   
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2: The Logical Investigations’ discrepant accounts of meaning 
2.1: An overlooked ambiguity 
 My aim in this chapter is to clarify the “ambiguity” that Husserl purported to 
detect in the nature of meaning.16  Ultimately, in this chapter and the two that follow, my 
task is to show how that two-sided structure is actually, as Husserl suggested, a 
philosophically significant “enigma”.17  As the first stage in that process, however, in this 
chapter I merely seek, through a return to a text and its historical context, to clarify how 
meaning might seem to be ambiguous.  I recall the discrepancy within Husserl’s 
discussion of meaning in the Logical Investigations, and I recount why that often-noted 
discrepancy was especially conspicuous for the many German philosophers who were 
involved, at the time when the Investigations were published, in a controversy concerning 
logic’s relation to psychology.  Once that is done, I can then, in the third chapter, confirm 
Jocelyn Benoist’s historical thesis that the discrepancy in Husserl’s 1900-01 take on 
meaning resulted from his appropriation of two conflicting 19th century views; I can 
indicate how those two threads woven through Husserl’s account of meaning are more 
basically constitutive of that account than are a number of other tributary strands.  
Finally, I can then also show, in the fourth chapter, how the discrepancy in the 
Investigations is not merely a historical curiosity.  For we should by then be in a position 
to discern the still experientially evident basis of those two views from which Husserl 
drew the most, and to disentangle the complex opposition between them.  By so returning 
to the particular intellectual context behind Husserl’s phenomenology, then, we should 
come to see the same enigmatic ambiguity that Husserl confronted in meaning. 
                                                 
16 Logical Investigations, foreword to the second edition, p. 7.  
17 Logical Investigations, introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions, § 5, p. 174.   
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2.2: Psychologism, logicism, and the Investigations’ middle way 
2.2.1: The early Husserl’s conflicted context 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, practitioners of many theoretical 
disciplines had staked competing claims to the field of meaning.  The emergence of the 
newly independent discipline of psychology, and fundamental development in the older 
disciplines of logic and mathematics, awakened the question of ownership: Whose 
theoretical province is meaning?  To whom does the subject matter belong?  What 
discipline is best suited to unveil what meaning basically is?  Then as now, different 
disciplines contributed to the discussion of what meaning is.  The field of study was 
already an interdisciplinary one, where varied research programs met.  But the field at 
that time was also the site of conflict, with advocates of different disciplines engaged in 
somewhat clannish behavior.   
 Though quite possibly no one side ever bears sole responsibility for initiating such 
conflicts, this particular turf war was arguably incited when certain psychologists began 
to contend that their group (alone) had primary ownership rights over the field in 
question.  These psychologists, who wanted to contribute to logic themselves, would of 
course gladly allow logic to continue its study of judgments, inferences, and laws of 
reasoning.  But they would require logic to rent its field out, so to speak, from 
psychology: the nature of meaning, and so of judgments and of the connections obtaining 
between judgments, would ultimately be determined by the psychologists.18  In defense 
of this apparently domineering stance, these psychologists could contend that meaning 
                                                 
18 Probably the most prominent psychologists advancing claims along these lines were J. S. Mill in England 
and Wilhelm Wundt in Germany.  The first volume of Husserl’s Logical Investigations provides an 
expansive survey of other literature expressing such views of logic. 
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plainly belongs to the realm for which psychology is to account — whether it is called the 
realm of the psyche or of experience.  Psychologists who embraced reductive forms of 
naturalism, noting that meaning cannot be straightforwardly dealt with by physics, could 
argue that psychology is the science best suited to account for whatever semantic residue 
is left over once the more obviously physical entities have been explained; the study of 
meaning, including traditional logic, would then be one of psychology’s offshoots, and 
psychology would be a branch of physiology, which in turn would stem from the trunk of 
physics.  Short of such metaphysical premises, however, and even short of the 
supposition that meaning belongs entirely to the animal experiences that psychology is 
able to investigate, a psychologist seeking ownership of the field of meaning could argue 
that meaning is only accessible for us, at any rate, within that sphere that psychology is 
entitled and obligated by its name to study as its own. 
 Not surprisingly, many other thinkers were not at all pleased with the prospect of 
such venerable disciplines as logic and mathematics having to rent out their fields of 
study from this young upstart discipline of psychology.19  In defense of their chagrin at an 
empirical, inductive science’s ambition to provide the ultimate explanation of what 
logical and mathematical objectivities basically are, these thinkers had their own 
arguments at their disposal.  Echoing Leibniz, logicians could note that the principle of 
non-contradiction and other like principles cannot derive the necessity they have for valid 
thinking from mere inductive generalization.  They could then note further that 
psychology is capable of no more than such generalization, in its establishment of 
                                                 
19 Psychology was young around 1900 in the sense that it was newly independent, though of course well 
over two millennia had then passed since importantly psychological investigations were presented already 
in Aristotle’s Peri Psyche (De Anima), various Platonic dialogues, and a multitude of non-Greek 
precedents. 
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principles that hold only probably or for the most part.  Philosophers of mathematics 
could reason similarly that (a) the properties of cardinal numbers and of Euclidean shapes 
do not appear to be merely contingent features of these objects, and that (b) psychology is 
constrained to establish only contingent facts, such that (c) psychology in principle 
cannot account even for the nature of a triangle or the number three.  Logicians and 
mathematicians could so argue that the elementary truths of their disciplines are 
incompatible with psychological reductionism.  To combat that psychological 
imperialism — in which whatever is semantic, including logical truths, would receive its 
primary explanation in terms provided by the inductive study of contingent animal 
experiences — they gave it a slightly (if only slightly) more wieldy title: psychologism.20 
 Among the opponents of the psychologistic tendency in logic were those who saw 
a complete about-face as the only appropriate alternative.  These more reactionary 
opponents of psychologism sought to ensure that logic was fully autonomous with respect 
to any discipline so much as resembling psychology.  On their view, all logical studies 
ought to acknowledge that their objects are independent of our thinking, and thereafter to 
more or less renounce any mention of subjectivity and subjective operations.21  After 
                                                 
20 Although the term “psychologism” had been in use for many years before Husserl began his 
phenomenology, Husserl’s evolving thinking contributed to the determination of its sense.  In the Logical 
Investigations, “psychologism” is first defined as the position that would make logic neither “formal” nor 
“demonstrative”, but instead a “technology dependent on psychology” (Prolegomena, § 3, p. 13); it is the 
position according to which “the essential theoretical grounds of the prescriptions of logic lie in 
psychology” (Prolegomena, § 21, p. 46).  After 1900, Husserl went on consistently using the term 
“psychologism” to denote the belief that all logical objectivities (including significations and the valid 
forms of argument employed by the sciences) are dependent on and determined by psychological laws.  His 
sense of the term nonetheless developed, but that development is a topic for further parts of this study.  
21 In order to combat psychologism, logicians would need to distinguish the quickly passing subjective 
occurrences of judging from the repeatable judgment and its reference.  Having drawn this distinction, 
however, resolutely anti-psychologistic logicians mostly avoided considering how what they so 
distinguished could be concretely related in our experience; i.e., they mostly avoided constitutional or 
transcendental questioning.  How can our thinking constitute an invariant thought such that it resides, if 
only for a moment, in the flowing stream of our thinking?  How is it possible that judgments transcend (are 
independent of) subjective events when it is subjects, in our judging, who achieve those stable, and perhaps 
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emphatically affirming that judgments, and their features and relations, are independent 
of our judging, logical research would then devote no attention to the question of how, 
say, the principle of non-contradiction, or a true judgment regarding some passing state 
of affairs, is independent of that experience in which it is articulated and in which its 
validity is realized.  Moreover, logic would even exclude such epistemological questions, 
regarding how the objectivity of judgments is transcendent of an experience within which 
it is available.  It would not only keep itself unfettered by nagging questions about how 
we as subjects reach objectivity, but would also censure those who consider such 
questions necessary.  This orientation in logical study, toward a rigorous fixation on 
objectivity and exclusion of subjectivity, was essentially a thoroughgoing opposition to 
psychologism.  The philosophy of logic that embraced its set of imperatives refused to 
grant any truth to psychologism, and was above all concerned to refute it on logical 
grounds.  This logical revanchism, or anti-psychologism on logical grounds, might be 
more briefly designated as logicism.22   
 Such were the most antagonistic tendencies (“-isms”) contesting the terrain within 
which Husserl ventured his Logical Investigations, at the time when he wrote and 
published them.  Amid this contest between psychologism and logicism, for the rights to 
determine the essence of meaning, Husserl took an “intermediary” path.23  While some 
                                                                                                                                                 
enduringly true, judgments?  The most hostile opponents of psychologism tended to dismiss such 
questions, even as they were not always able to entirely neglect them. 
22 I am thus using “logicism” to denote a position regarding logic’s relation to psychology, and not the view 
of logic’s relation to mathematics that often goes by the same name.  There seems to be some overlap 
between the two logicisms: Gottlob Frege, e.g., was adamantly, even uncharitably, opposed to 
psychologism, and also thought that mathematics could be reduced to logic.  Nonetheless I mean something 
different by “logicism” than historians of logic and mathematics often mean by the same term. 
23 Husserl himself characterizes the position he articulates in the Logical Investigations as an 
“intermediary” one, standing between psychologism and its thoroughgoing opposition.  He asks: “Is this 
not again a case where the truth lies in the middle?” (Prolegomena, § 20, p. 44; for Husserl’s 
characterization of his path as a middle way, see also Prolegomena, § 41). 
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sought to establish the invariant and regulative nature of logical objectivity, and others 
sought to trace out the subjective origin of the same, Husserl acted as though this what 
and whence could peacefully cohere in a harmonious theory.  But this attempt to cut an 
irenic route in the Investigations, which would pass through those whom Husserl 
regarded as proponents of one and the other agenda, was hardly enough to stave off an 
acrimonious reception.  The Investigations were attacked from several angles, and 
primarily on the two fronts that we would expect.24  First, many who were not logicists 
themselves berated the work, and especially its first volume, the “Prolegomena to Pure 
Logic”, for assaulting psychologism in what they said was a dogmatic and reactionary 
manner.  Second, the Investigations were also charged with being problematically two-
faced — with mounting innumerable objections against Husserl’s old psychologistic 
tendency,25 in one sweep, only to embrace the same tendency again in the next.  But was 
Husserl in fact both a champion of logicism and a “relapsed” advocate of psychologism 
in 1900-01?   
 Neither of these assessments is correct, and yet neither is wholly without basis in 
Husserl’s Investigations.  Broadly speaking, a paradoxical posture may indeed be seen in 
a contrast between the opening and concluding portions of the 1900-01 “breakthrough”.  
Husserl begins that work by arguing at length that the logical sphere of meaning cannot 
be sufficiently explained in psychological terms.  He then operates at later stages of the 
same work as though a discipline that he there calls “descriptive psychology” is the one 
                                                 
24 For a topical summary of a wide range of these criticisms, see the fourth chapter of Martin Kusch’s 
Psychologism, “The Criticism of Husserl’s Arguments Against Psychologism in German Philosophy 1901-
20”.  The chapter actually presents a broader group of criticisms than its title indicates, by mentioning the 
numerous critics (Kusch points to no fewer than 19) who accused Husserl of a “relapse into psychologism”. 
25 According to his own retrospective account, Husserl had harbored a psychologistic streak in his 
Philosophy of Arithmetic; though this tendency was far from determinative of the whole work, as Claire 
Ortiz Hill has argued (see “Frege’s Attack on Husserl and Cantor”, chapter 6 of Husserl or Frege? 
Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics), it was nonetheless operative in parts. 
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best able to determine what meaning basically is, and is one well-suited for fundamental 
investigations that he calls “logical”.26  These discrepant responses to the question of 
whether logic is importantly independent of psychology, when considered in some detail, 
should show us the breakthrough of the winding route that Husserl cut between logicism 
and psychologism.  They should thereby also provide us with an initial glimpse of the 
structural ambiguity — the “enigmatic double sense” — that Husserl discerned in 
meaning.27 
 
2.2.2: Logicist leanings: Husserl’s defense of “pure logic” and its ideal domain 
   We may look first at the textual basis underlying the suspicion that Husserl was a 
logicist.  Consider, to begin with, one of what Husserl calls “the most fundamental of 
epistemological distinctions”, and how it implies that logic is partly independent from 
(or, as Husserl sometimes puts it, “pure” of) psychology.28  In the Prolegomena, Husserl 
repeatedly distinguishes propositions and their parts, which he calls ideal, from our 
experiences, which he calls real.  He characterizes our real experiences — including our 
experiences of ideal units of meaning — as “facts” for psychology.29  They are “mental 
                                                 
26 Though Husserl would later regret using “descriptive psychology” as a label for his method, and with 
good reason (when speaking of “descriptive psychology”, he meant something quite different by 
“psychology” than most mean by the term), it was not entirely inaccurate: In the 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th 
Investigations, Husserl employs a descriptive, reflective approach to the experience of meaning and truth 
that resembles, in important respects to be mentioned later, a psychology of the Brentanian breed.  
27 Logical Investigations, introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions, § 5, p. 174.  The 
“enigmatic double sense” of meaning and the “essential ambiguity of meaning as an idea” (Logical 
Investigations, foreword to the second edition, p. 7) are, on my reading, two of Husserl’s names for the 
same dyadic structure that is the subject of this study. 
28 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, § 51, p. 119. 
29 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 46.  Husserl gives somewhat different senses, in the 
Investigations, to the German terms “real” and “reell”.  I am here articulating his sense of the “real” (which 
designates, roughly, the spatio-temporal; see Inv. II, § 8), rather than of the “reell” (which designates, 
roughly, the experientially immanent). 
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acts proceeding in time”,30 marked by their “transience”,31 and thus “determinate with 
respect to time”.32  They are “contingent” events,33 “having causes and effects”.34  
Whenever, for instance, I judge that this or that is “thus or so”, with more or less insight, 
my experience of judging is a fact for psychology: each such quickly passing experience 
appears to emerge from, and dissolve into, other such experiences, in “the tangled web of 
mental phenomena” that is psychology’s province.35  Over against these transient and 
contingent events, which seem so amenable to psychological study, Husserl characterizes 
ideal units of meaning as self-same and unchanging.  Ideal judgments would thus be 
distinct from our real acts of judging in much the same way that mathematical objects are 
distinct from the real acts that we perform in doing mathematics.  Much as “[n]umbers, 
sums and products and so forth are not such casual acts of counting, adding and 
multiplying etc., as proceed here and there”,36 so the singular judgment that “there are 
dragons” (to repeat Husserl’s example) would not be identical with any “one of the … 
acts” of judging that there are dragons.37  Different thinkers, in different times and places, 
could consider the same mathematical objects, and could regard the same judgment as 
either true or false.  It is this self-sameness that, according to Husserl, differentiates ideal 
entities from real experiences.  If each ideal unit of meaning is the same whenever, 
wherever, and by whomever, it is thought, then in this self-sameness it is invariant, 
distinct from the varying experiences in which it is thought.  Propositions and their parts 
                                                 
30 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 46, p. 109. 
31 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 46, p. 110. 
32 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 24, p. 55. 
33 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 39, p. 90. The content of my thoughts might have been different, 
and I might not have existed or thought at all. 
34 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 22, p. 49.   
35 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 21, p. 48. 
36 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 46, p. 109. 
37 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 47, p. 113. 
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would thus be removed from the web within which transient and contingent mental 
events arise out of and fade into other such events.  “Judgment” would not designate only 
the real acts of judging that are facts for psychology, and “meaning” more broadly would 
not refer only to transient phenomena.38  There would also be unchanging, reiterable 
significations that go by these names. 
   Now, if there is a class of judgments that is distinct from our experiences of 
judging, and psychology is the study of experience, then it would follow that there ought 
to be a discipline other than psychology to investigate that distinct class of judgments.  
On Husserl’s view, that discipline is “pure logic”.  To be sure, insofar as logic is a 
“technology of science”,39 which gives directives for any human thinking that seeks to 
craft scientific products, Husserl grants that it would need to prescribe (among other 
things) specifically “human devices for acquiring … truth”, and as such would involve a 
(psychological) investigation of “the peculiarities of human nature in general”.40  Husserl 
grants, i.e., that such a “technology of science” would need to consider the “methods, and 
… forms of exposition, [that] are adapted to the human constitution as it at present 
normally is”.41  But insofar as logic considers, with a theoretical interest, what is required 
in order for any judgment to be well formed and non-contradictory, it would not need to 
direct its attention to any such contingent constitution as that which is presently normal 
for human beings;42 its attention would then be directed instead to the class of ideal 
                                                 
38 Husserl states that all “logical terms”, i.e. all titles for subcategories within the broader category of 
meaning, “such as ‘presentation’, ‘concept’, ‘judgment’, ‘syllogism’, … ‘truth’, etc. … must be equivocal” 
(Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 46, p. 111). 
39 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 11, p. 26. 
40 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 42, p. 105. 
41 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 42, p. 105. 
42 For Husserl’s description in the Prolegomena of the “three tasks” that he thinks belong to pure logic, see 
§§ 67-70.  Along with the formal grammar and theory of inference I allude to above, Husserl also includes 
the “theory of possible forms of theory”, a logical (or “apophantic”) correlate to the theory of possible 
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entities that Husserl differentiated from our real experiences.  Husserl thus contends, in 
what he himself construes as a reactionary assault on psychologism,43 that the most basic 
element of logic is fully independent of psychology, and that this pure part of logic 
derives its right to independence from its orientation toward meanings that, as invariant, 
are essentially distinct from the experiences that fall within psychology’s scope.  On a 
superficial or partial reading of the Investigations, this conception of pure logic and 
concomitant conception of meaning might easily seem to constitute a decidedly logicist 
contribution to the psychologism-debate.44 
 For what might appear to be further evidences of a logicist agenda, consider the 
following claims, from Husserl’s Prolegomena, concerning the normative force of logical 
laws.  Consider, as the first among these claims, Husserl’s repeated suggestion that logic 
is the “theory of science”, tasked with investigating “whatever makes sciences into 
sciences”, and obligated as such to articulate the formal laws that constrain every 
science.45  To say that compliance with such formal principles is necessary for every 
science — that “each science is only a science in virtue of its harmony with logical rules” 
and so “presupposes those rules” — is not to say that proceeding logically suffices, 
within any given discipline, for enacting a genuinely scientific practice of that 
                                                                                                                                                 
manifolds or multiplicities that Husserl considered the highest goal of mathematics (or “formal ontology”).  
In all of these tasks, as also in the “logic of truth” that he would later (in Formal and Transcendental Logic) 
include alongside the theory of inference, Husserl believed that no reference to the contingent regularities 
of the human psyche was needed or permitted. 
43 “As regards my frank critique of the psychologistic logic and epistemology, I have but to recall Goethe’s 
saying: There is nothing to which one is more severe than the errors that one has recently abandoned” 
(Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, p. 3). 
44 One such “cursory reading”, according to Husserl, was given by Melchior Palágyi, one of the critics who 
accused Husserl of what I have called logicism (i.e., in Palágyi’s words, of wanting to “split the blanket 
between logic and psychology”, and of taking up “the warcry—‘Away from psychology!’”). Palágyi said 
“not a word”, according to Husserl, “of volume two” of the Investigations (“A reply to a critic of my 
refutation of logical psychologism”, trans. Dallas Willard, Husserl: Shorter Works, ed. Peter McCormick 
and Frederick Elliston (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press), pp. 152-153).  
45 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 5, p. 16. 
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discipline.46  It is to say, however, that each science is “theoretically incomplete” apart 
from logic, i.e. that each attempt to give an account of the psyche, or of life, or of human 
being, or of whatever, is regulated not only by its subject matter, but also by formal laws 
to which every real account is subject.47  In virtue of presupposing that certain 
combinations of concepts result in nonsense, that certain judgments necessarily exclude 
others, that certain moves in thinking preserve truth due to their conformity with valid 
forms of inferences, etc., each science would be regulated by logic.  And insofar as 
psychology functionally presupposes all this, with every other science, it too would rely 
for its justification on principles that belong to the domain of logic.   
 Consider, next, Husserl’s claim that many of these logical principles derive their 
normative force solely from a theoretical branch of logic, and not from psychology.  To 
the suggestion that psychology’s operation and justification depend on logic, the 
psychologistic retort was that the prescriptions of logic, while heeded by psychology as 
by the other sciences, have their sole theoretical basis in psychology.  (The normative 
force of logical principles might then derive solely from how naturally these principles 
are observed.  Proceeding logically might then amount to thinking in accord with a 
natural, psychological norm, with “custom, tradition, inclination and aversion” perhaps 
making up so many forces that lead to deviations from that norm.48)  Against this retort, 
Husserl suggests that psychology can only so claim to provide a complete foundation for 
                                                 
46 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 19, pp. 43-44.  A psychologist, e.g., must do much more than 
comply with logical laws in order to contribute to his or her discipline; but a psychologist can do no less, if 
the account that he or she produces is to be scientific.  
47 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, §§ 4-5. 
48 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 19, p. 42.  Husserl presents John Stuart Mill and Theodor Lipps 
as advocates of roughly this psychologistic retort. 
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the logical principles that supply its own grounds on pain of a vicious circularity.49  He 
claims, moreover, that there is another theoretical basis for the normative assertions of 
logic in connections that obtain among basic logical concepts and among ideal 
judgments.  The normative truth that “one ought not to affirm both ‘p’ and ‘not p’”, e.g., 
could thus derive its normative force from the theoretical proposition that “it is not the 
case that both ‘p’ and ‘not p’”; and many similar truths regarding how one ought to think 
could similarly have their basis in a sphere of pre-normative truths that belongs not to 
psychology, but to logic.  Husserl so presents ideal judgments not only as crucially 
distinct from our real experiences of judging, but also as in some cases carrying 
regulative implications for the judging that we do — as founding those directives that 
logic issues to the sciences and to all thinking that seeks to proceed logically.  In this 
postulate of an ideal realm of truths — a regulative “Idea of Science”, by means of which 
one might “measure the empirically given sciences” — and in the consequent liberation 
of logic from psychology, we may once again see strong indications of sympathy with 
logicism.50 
 Husserl’s reputation as a champion of the logicists was strengthened still more, 
and perhaps most of all, by his contention that psychologism is essentially a self-
defeating relativism.  Psychologism, under Husserl’s definition, may take different forms.  
                                                 
49 The psychologistic thinker would say, in effect: “my discipline is justified by its compliance with the 
principles of logic, and those principles in turn are justified by their foundation in conclusions arrived at by 
my discipline, which arrived at those principles by proceeding according to those principles, etc.”  Husserl 
contends that this line of thinking involves a vicious circularity in the third paragraph of § 43.  He suggests 
the same in the concluding paragraphs of § 19, and in the following statement from § 42, p. 103: “If … a 
logical technology is to be of real help in our scientific endeavors, it must not presuppose that full 
knowledge of the complete sciences which we hope to achieve by its means”.  For Husserl’s argument that 
the circularity involved in logic’s self-regulation is not similarly vicious, see the third paragraph of § 42. 
50 In § 11 of the Prolegomena, Husserl claims that “logic seeks to search into what pertains to genuine, 
valid science as such, what constitutes the Idea of Science, so as to be able to use the latter to measure the 
empirically given sciences as to their agreement with their idea” (p. 25). 
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It may take an “empiricist” shape, by attempting to base logic on empirical psychology; 
or it may take the “apriorist” shape of a “formal idealism”, by attempting to base logic on 
a “transcendental psychology” — an account of “consciousness as such”, in which 
“consciousness as such” is “conceived as generic (human) reason”.51  But, in either case, 
psychologism construes the truths that are logic’s interest as founded on the species 
whose passing experiences make up the subject matter of psychology.  It thus implies the 
“species relativistic” thesis of “anthropologism”, according to which “what we call truth, 
depends on the constitution of the species homo and the laws which govern this 
species”.52  And this thesis, according to Husserl, is “self-destroying”: “it goes against the 
evident conditions for the possibility of a theory in general”.53   
 While Husserl presents several arguments to this effect, in section 36 of the 
Prolegomena, a look at one of them should suffice to show a final reason why Husserl 
has often been perceived as a logicist.  The first among those arguments may be 
reconstructed as follows: 
• Suppose, with anthropologism, that the truth of propositions depends on the 
factual existence and particular constitution of that species for which they are 
true.   
• It follows that “the same proposition or content of judgment may be true for a 
subject of the species homo, but may be false for another subject of a differently 
                                                 
51 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 38, p. 83. 
52 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 81.   
53 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 32, pp. 75-76.  A theory destroys itself, according to Husserl, if 
and only if “the content of [its] assertions rejects what is part of the sense or content of every assertion” 
(Prolegomena, § 35, p. 78).  Husserl contends that a theory may so destroy itself either by explicitly 
denying that there is (a) “truth” or (b) “knowledge” (or “justification of knowledge”), or by “analytically 
implying” the negation of (a) the “laws [of truth] without which theory as such can have … no coherent 
sense”, or (b) the “ideal conditions [of knowledge] that lie in the form of subjectivity as such” 
(Prolegomena, § 32, pp. 75-76).   
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constituted species”.54  Anthropologism, then, does not merely carry the 
innocuous implication that the members of different species could have 
differently limited epistemic capacities; it carries also the stronger implication that 
the truth of propositions depends on those different cognitive constitutions, such 
that the truth value of a particular proposition might be differently (and, in each 
case, rightly) determined by differently constituted species.   
• But this latter implication conflicts with the principle of non-contradiction: by 
allowing that any ideal judgment might be true “for us” but false “for another 
species”, this implication allows that the same state of affairs, understood in the 
same respect, may be truly said both to have obtained and not to have obtained.  
In other words, it allows the possibility that truth and falsity are not mutually 
exclusive features of a proposition. 
• The principle of non-contradiction is a condition without which there can be no 
theory, i.e., without which “theory” can have “no coherent sense”.55 
                                                 
54 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 79. 
55 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 32, p. 76. Here are two lines of reasoning, partly based on 
Husserl’s claims in § 32 (pp. 75-76), that one might run in defense of this premise: (a) Suppose we 
determine that the principle of non-contradiction is false.  It should follow from our determination that the 
same principle, while purportedly false for us, might then be true for another species.  (For, if the principle 
of non-contradiction is false, there would no longer be any principle to prevent its also being true.)  But it 
turns out that this possibility is inconceivable.  For if the principle of non-contradiction were true for 
another species, then it would follow that the principle of non-contradiction itself could not be both true 
and not true, for that species (the principle of non-contradiction, if true, applies to itself).  Yet the same 
principle would then be both true and false, “for that species”, insofar as that species could truly recognize 
the principle as true “for them” but false “for us”.  This appears to be a reduction to absurdity: it shows that, 
once we negate the principle of non-contradiction, the same principle could not possibly be true — despite 
that it also follows from the negation of the principle of non-contradiction that the same principle could be 
true as well as false. (b) Every theory qua theory, according to Husserl, aims and purports to surpass 
“arbitrary, unwarranted assertion”.  Thus, if a theory “destroys the very thing that distinguishes it from 
arbitrary, unwarranted assertion”, it also denies the possibility of its implicit aim.  But the truth (non-
falsity) of a theory’s claims seems to be among the features that distinguish a theory from “arbitrary, 
unwarranted assertion”.  Thus, if a particular theory, by “the content of its assertions”, denies that truth and 
falsity are mutually exclusive features of a proposition, it would appear in so doing to negate “the very 
thing that distinguishes it from arbitrary, unwarranted assertion”.  One might so argue that a theory that 
negates the principle of non-contradiction thereby negates theory’s conditions.  
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• So, by supposing anthropologism, we are forced to negate what is necessary for 
all theory, and thereby to defeat the very theory that we are supposing.   
All of the arguments presented in section 36 are structurally like this first argument, in 
that they purport to derive an absurdity from anthropologism.  Each argument allegedly 
shows, i.e., how supposing that all truth essentially depends on “what very well might not 
have been the case” or “might have been different” (viz., that human beings exist and are 
constituted as they are) inevitably leads to a contradiction.56  By reducing the 
anthropologistic supposition to absurdity, moreover, these arguments would thereby 
demonstrate the truth of its contrary.  (If it is not the case that the truth of all propositions 
depends on our particular constitution, then the truth of some ideal judgments does not 
depend on that constitution.)  Husserl thus contends, by reductio ad absurdum, that the 
truth of at least some ideal judgments is independent of all that is contingent, including 
our real experiences of judging.  Having argued elsewhere, then, that the logical space of 
meaning is crucially distinct from our real experiences of meaning, and that this logical 
space consists partly of laws (and other truths) that have regulative implications for our 
real judgments, Husserl here argues that logic’s regulative ideal is not only distinct from, 
but also independent of, our real constitution and experiences.    
 In a cumulative case for reading Husserl’s “Prolegomena to Pure Logic” as a 
logicist work, the vehemently anti-psychologistic arguments of section 36 could provide 
a crowning piece of interpretive evidence.  By their conclusions, these arguments profess 
to offer another reason, in supplement to Husserl’s conceit that logical objectivities are 
ideal and therefore non-psychological, for granting the logicists that logic is at least partly 
“pure” of psychology: if logical objectivities are not only an invariant and regulative 
                                                 
56 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 37, p. 82. 
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aspect of our real experiences, but are also independent of those psychological items, that 
would be all the more reason for the discipline that investigates those objectivities to be 
independent of psychology.  Further, by their consistently severe tone, Husserl’s remarks 
about psychologism in and around section 36 seem to betray an almost logicist 
aggression — or at least would be likely to carry that acerbic ring in a psychologistic 
reader’s ears.  Psychologism is pronounced to be “logically absurd”;57 it allegedly stands 
“in conflict with its own sense”,58 which is to say that it is “self-cancelling”,59 which is to 
say that it “suffer[s] from the grossest absurdities conceivable in a theory”, etc.60  In both 
style and substance, Husserl’s lengthy castigation of psychologism as a self-defeating 
relativism reads almost like a logicist polemic.  
 Without exhaustively compiling the textual case for charging Husserl with such a 
hostile, dogmatic, and uncharitable reaction against psychologism, we have now seen 
some key facets of that case.  We have seen how Husserl, in his “Prolegomena to Pure 
Logic”, presents logic’s field of ideal meanings as distinct from our real experiences of 
meaning.  We have seen, moreover, his claims that the field of ideal meanings (a) 
contains normative laws by which our experiences of judging ought themselves to be 
judged, (b) circumscribes the theoretical foundations from which we can derive the force 
of those normative laws, and (c) contains laws and other truths that are independent of 
our experiences.  Despite Husserl’s defense of pure logic’s ideal realm, however, and 
despite how Husserl’s very talk of “pure logic” and the “pure laws of logic” might 
connote a correlated view of psychology as corrupt, the suspicion that Husserl was a 
                                                 
57 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 37, p. 82. 
58 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 79. 
59 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 37, p. 82. 
60 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 78. 
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logicist is ultimately incorrect.  “Pure logic” is in fact a title that Husserl utilized in order 
to articulate his “intermediary” view of logic’s independence, according to which part of 
logic does and should (contra the logicists) depend on psychology, even to the extent that 
the part in question is a kind of mixture of two disciplines, rather than strictly (or 
“purely”) logical.61  Still, with respect to the spectrum of views that one might take 
regarding the autonomy of logic and of the significations that it investigates, we have 
seen how certain defining features of Husserl’s Prolegomena put them much closer to the 
logicist extreme.  This first volume of the Logical Investigations consists almost entirely 
of an ardent and extended critique of psychologism; it consistently deploys, if in many 
guises, a widely questioned but supposedly self-evident distinction between the real and 
the ideal (or facts and truths, natural “laws” and logical laws, contingency and necessity, 
etc.) in order to clear a realm that would belong exclusively to logic; and it proceeds by 
reflecting primarily on logical objectivity, rather than on the experience of such 
objectivity.  In all of these ways, Husserl’s Prolegomena are much more logicist than they 
are psychologistic.  They thereby stand conspicuously at odds with much of the second 
part of the Logical Investigations.62 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
61 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 43, p. 106. 
62 When I speak of “the second part”, I am referring to the second part of the original edition, first 
published in 1901 and containing the six Investigations that follow the Prolegomena, rather than to the 
second volume of the 1970 and 2001 English editions, which contain only Investigations IV-VI.  
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2.2.3: Psychologistic regress?  “Descriptive psychology” and the source of signification 
 It is true that the second volume of the Investigations displays abundant evidence 
of a persisting resistance to psychologism.  In the first Investigation, Husserl again 
distinguishes ideal meanings from real experiences of meaning.63  He then, throughout 
much of the second Investigation, explicitly opposes the psychologistic view of universal 
concepts.64  He contends also, and more openly in the second volume than in the first, 
that there is an “ideally closed set” of “meanings in themselves”, which encompasses and 
surpasses all of the meanings that we have ever “thought” or “expressed”, and which as 
such is independent of our experiences.65  He claims, further, that this set of meanings 
contains a likewise independent subset of “truths in themselves”, which is partly reached, 
but also partly unreached, and perhaps partly unreachable, by the human scientific effort 
that essentially aims to disclose those truths.66  Husserl even goes so far, at one point in 
the first Investigation, as to set “the essence of meaning” over against the experience of 
meaning.67  He may well have included this last contrast among the “defect[s]” that he 
                                                 
63 Whereas meanings that are self-identical in reiterations are said to “neither arise nor pass away” (Logical 
Investigations, Inv. I, § 11, p. 195), the passing experiences in which “one and the same word”, or 
proposition, or syllogism, are reiterated are said to differ “greatly from one individual to the next, and for 
the same individual from one moment to another” (Inv. I, § 30, p. 228). 
64 Throughout the second Investigation, Husserl opposes the thesis that universal concepts are merely 
arbitrary devices that we have invented for handily “bundling” real individuals together (Logical 
Investigations, Inv. II, § 24, p. 277).  He claims that such a thesis psychologistically overlooks the ideal 
character of such concepts.  He suggests that those who take the signification of “the note C”, or of “the 
number four”, or of “the color red”, e.g., to be no more than our vague associations of so many real 
individuals (such as tones or groups or colors), thereby “misread the essence” of universal concepts and 
their universal referents (Inv. II, § 14a, p. 260, and introduction, p. 238).  For Husserl’s argument that this 
is so, see section 4.2.1 of the present work. 
65 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 35, p. 233.  For Husserl’s argument in support of this contention, see 
section 4.2.2. 
66 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223. Though Husserl indicates certain reservations regarding talk 
of an “in itself”, by placing his first uses of “in itself” and “in themselves” in brackets, he nonetheless 
utilizes these expressions in order to say that there are many truths that we do not, and might never, know.  
Husserl attempts to illustrate that there are such truths by reasoning that I reconstruct in section 4.2.3. 
67 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 30, p. 228: “The essence of meaning is seen by us not in the meaning-
conferring experience…”.  Looking back from his 1913 vantage point, Husserl instructs his readers to be 
wary of the “many important passages” in the first Investigation in which “the noematic concept [of 
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saw in the first Investigation by 1913, at which time he had long since decided that 
meaning is instead “essentially ambiguous”.68  Yet volume two of the Logical 
Investigations in any case, and in every edition, offers recurring defenses of an 
independent sphere of significations that psychologism rejects.  Any resurgence of the 
psychologism that Husserl had once displayed in his 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic, 
within volume two of the Investigations, would thus appear as a “relapse”, even by 
Husserl’s own lights: psychologism has been and remains excluded, so that there is no 
possibility of its returning triumphantly. 
 While the author of the Logical Investigations thus remains opposed to 
psychologism throughout that text, four of the six Investigations that follow the 
Prolegomena nonetheless also display a crucial shift in Husserl’s orientation.  Whereas 
the Prolegomena are devoted to showing how psychologism errs, and for that reason 
focus primarily on logical objects that belong beyond psychology’s borders, the 
subsequent Investigations focus more on the experience of logical objectivity.  In the first 
Investigation, Husserl’s focus is on the experience of “expression and meaning”; it is 
through descriptive analysis of such experience that Husserl gains the “foothold” insight 
that an expression only “means something” — and thus “relates to what is objective” and 
“is more than the merely sounded word” —69 thanks to “certain acts of mind” in which 
we intend (i.e., refer to) something that is more or less present to us.70  In the second 
                                                                                                                                                 
meaning] is principally [and one-sidedly] dealt with” because the “distinction and parallelism between the 
‘noetic’ and ‘noematic’” is not yet recognized (Logical Investigations, foreword to the second edition, p. 7).  
Any passage in which Husserl would exclude all reference to experience from the essence of meaning at 
least piques this awareness. 
68 Logical Investigations, foreword to the second edition, p. 7. 
69 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 9, p. 192. 
70 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 7, p. 189.  Those acts in which “a speaker produces [an expression] with 
the intention of ‘expressing himself about something’ through its means”, and in which “the articulate 
sound-complex, the written sign etc., first becomes a spoken word or bit of communicative speech” (ibid.), 
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Investigation, Husserl’s focus is again on logical experiences, as he contends that 
essences can and regularly do become the objects of our thought and knowledge, in 
mental acts of abstraction that we perform on the basis of some sensuously or 
imaginatively given thing(s).71  The third and fourth Investigations stand as exceptions to 
the general thrust of volume two: their studies of part-relations and meaning-
combinations, contributing respectively to objectively focused projects in formal 
ontology and formal logic, contain by themselves little cause of offence for the logicist, 
or at least little that would strike the logicist as a fall back into psychologism.  But, in the 
fifth and sixth Investigations, Husserl then returns his attention to experience, further 
elucidating the structure of thinking and knowing, and thereby identifying what he 
presents as subjective conditions for ideal meaning and truth.  Husserl’s focus thus drifts 
discreetly, in the Investigations of the second volume, away from logical objects and 
toward logical experience.  When considered with respect to the question of logic’s 
independence, moreover, this subtle shift amounts to a leap along the spectrum of 
possible responses.  For what place do descriptions of experience have within 
investigations that call themselves logical?  What reason could there be for the inclusion 
of such quasi-psychological researches within logic?  Already by their results, Husserl’s 
                                                                                                                                                 
Husserl calls “meaning-conferring acts” or “meaning-intentions”.  The intentional experience in which we 
express ourselves about something may or may not include “meaning-fulfilling acts”, which are “not 
essential to the expression as such”, but “which stand to it in the logically basic relation of fulfilling 
(confirming, illustrating) it more or less adequately, and thus [of] actualizing its relation to its object” (Inv. 
I, § 9, p. 192).  Moreover, though the speech-acts whose intentionality Husserl is here considering 
essentially involve an act of reference, and indeed have a kind of intentionality that appears to be 
equivalent with reference, it is important to note that many of the experiences that Husserl eventually 
classes as intentional involve no such act: intentionality is not equivalent to linguistic reference, for reasons 
I indicate below. 
71 Abstraction, for Husserl, is an intentional experience in which what we intend is an essence.  Abstraction 
builds upon founding acts in which sensuous or imaginary objects are intended.  It does so not by further 
attention to some aspect of a particular sensuously given or imagined content, but by a new kind of act 
directed toward an essence, of which a particular content may be an instance.  Starting from this piece of 
paper’s sensuously given shape, e.g., we may direct our attention to rectangularity in general, and consider 
what features any rectangle whatsoever must possess.    
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1901 studies of experience intimate that they were conducted in order to provide a 
foundation for (all of) logic.  For they purport to concretely clarify the concepts that are 
basic to pure logic, such as meaning and truth; and they inquire, through asking how our 
experience of logical objects is possible, into pure logic’s epistemological grounds.72  To 
a brief survey, then, the almost-logicist tact of the Prolegomena appears to be replaced by 
a more nearly psychologistic approach, with Husserl working as though logic depends on 
subjectively oriented studies.  
On a closer look, too, certain chief claims from the later Investigations might 
seem to constitute a textual case for charging Husserl with “backsliding” into the 
psychologistic view that he rejected.  Consider, as the first among these claims, Husserl’s 
repeated assertion that expressions derive their signification from acts of meaning.  This 
is to say that uttered sounds, e.g., only become carriers of signification — more than 
mere sounds like “bar-bar-bar” (to use the sounds that Plato alludes to by his mention of 
“barbarian” languages that we do not understand) and more than mere “parrot-talk” (to 
use the term that Husserl often invokes) — thanks to a conscious being meaning 
something by those expressions.  The term “dog”, e.g., would thus take its signification 
because we refer to some (perhaps non-existent) dog or dogs, with that expression.  To be 
sure, this does not imply that we, on a regular basis, arbitrarily create the significations of 
particular uttered sounds and written marks.  Husserl of course recognizes that we, for the 
most part, “confer” that signification on each particular term that the term has already 
been established as having within a linguistic community.  Yet to say that acts of 
meaning “confer” or “give” meaning to expressions might nonetheless suggest that 
                                                 
72 Compare Husserl’s remarks regarding pure logic’s basic concepts, and an “epistemological critique” of 
pure logic, in § 1 of his introduction to volume two.  
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signification, in general, has its origin in such mental acts.73  For it implies at least that 
there could be no signs at all — no marks that signify some object(s) by way of the 
significations they carry — if there were no acts of meaning.74  Still, there is more telling 
evidence that Husserl, by the end of the Investigations, took signification to depend on 
acts of meaning.  We may begin to discern this evidence by coming to terms with the 
character that Husserl ascribes to our acts of meaning.  
Consider, next, then, the claim that our experience of meaning is invariably 
“intentional”.  As already mentioned, Husserl initially discusses intentions in the context 
of a study focused on the signification of expressions (the first Investigation).  He there 
almost makes intentionality appear to be an exclusively linguistic phenomenon, i.e. a 
peculiar feature of speech acts.  For the “acts of mind” he there discusses are those in 
which one intends objects of thinking with signs that carry significations (as one would, 
e.g., in saying aloud, “there is a city on the other side of those mountains”), and those in 
which such intentions are frustrated or fulfilled (as the signification in question would be 
if the speaker made it through the mountains and found a city there).  At first, then, 
                                                 
73 Even if I have only ever given those terms that I use the same significations that others have already 
assigned to them, it seems that reflection on my experience of giving certain terms signification, while 
leaving other sounds and sights as being without signification, nonetheless shows that there could not be 
signification if there were not acts of meaning.  For reflection on this experience shows that expressions 
could have no signification for me if I had experienced them all merely as so many sounds and marks; and 
it at least suggests that there could be no expressions with signification at all (i.e., for anyone) were there 
not acts of meaning. 
74 Of course, if signification could be, in whatever way signification is, without any signs, then the 
dependence of signs on acts of meaning would not entail the dependence of signification on acts of 
meaning.  In postulating “meanings in themselves”, Husserl claims that not all significations are expressed 
significations.  “There is”, he writes, “no intrinsic connection between the ideal unities which in fact 
operate as significations, and the signs to which they are tied, i.e. through which they become real in human 
mental life” (Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 35, p. 233).  Even if not all particular significations are 
expressed, however, and even though particular significations seem to be expressible in various 
formulations (in various languages, e.g.), such that there is not a one-to-one correspondence between 
significations and expressions, this does not exclude the possibility that signification as such requires that 
there be some expression by some conscious being.  We need not here broach, however, the difficult 
question of whether signification could still be, in some sense, apart from any system of signs.  
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“intentionality” might seem to merely designate the fact that, because there are authors 
behind expressions, we may decipher an expression’s signification by determining its 
author’s original intent.    
Later, however, Husserl circumscribes a much more expansive range of 
experiences within his “intentional” category, and thereby clarifies how much more 
fundamental to experience he takes intentionality to be.  At this later point, not only are 
those acts “intentional” in which I intend something by speaking or hearing or seeing or 
silently thinking certain words (and in which some part of a particular system of 
signifiers is thus “actually present” to my mind), but so also are all of the “wordless” acts 
in which I am conscious of something.75  So also, i.e., is any act in which I expect or 
experience whatever it is that I am conscious of without the mediation of definite terms 
and their congealed significations.76  Moreover, the range of experiences that are 
“intentional”, in the later Investigations, extends also without regard for the “qualities” 
that partly constitute our living engagement with all that of which we are conscious.  
Intentional experiences, i.e., can be “merely presentative, judgmental, emotional, 
desiderative”, optative, interrogative, etc.;77 and whether an “act of mind” is one “of 
                                                 
75 Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, § 15, p. 223.  Husserl notes, in §§ 14-15, how “in the whole of [the] 
investigations up to [that] point” he had not yet distinguished “acts of meaning, sense-giving factors 
attached to expressions” (or “significative acts”), from a broader and more inclusive class of experiences in 
which we intend what is not yet present (which Husserl calls “signitive acts”).  Husserl’s view is that both 
significative and “wordless” signitive intentions can be fulfilled in “intuitive intentions” of their respective 
kinds, moreover, such that all experiences of meaning (i.e., of signification, whether empty or fulfilled) 
make up only part of a larger class of conscious experiences that Husserl uniformly labels experiences of 
“sense”.  
76 Husserl finds one example of such an act in the experience of a tool that we recognize even though “its 
name will not come back to us” (Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, § 15, p. 223).  For another example of 
such acts, he refers to “the perceptual or imaginative course of a melody, or of some other familiar type of 
event,” and specifically to “the definite or indefinite intentions and fulfillments which arise in such a 
course” (Inv. VI, § 15, p. 224).  Examples like these begin to betray just how ubiquitous pre-articulate “acts 
of mind” are within the flow of our conscious experience.  
77 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 20, p. 119. 
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judgment, joy, grief, love, hatred, desire … loathing”, or whatever, it is intentional.78  But 
what is common to experiences of such diverse sorts?  And what definition of 
intentionality allows the set of our intentional experiences to extend beyond the set of 
experiences in which we intend something via the signification of expressions (i.e., 
beyond the set of our “acts of meaning” — the set of our “significative acts”)?  The 
simple feature that Husserl identifies across all of the multifarious kinds of our conscious 
experiences is that in all of them we are conscious of something: “in perception 
something is perceived, in imagination, something imagined, in a statement something 
stated, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired etc.”.79  “Wordless” 
experiences are thus intentional too, no less than the acts of meaning in which we intend 
something with an expression, because they likewise involve a consciousness of 
something.  In short, then, Husserl presents being of as the essential feature of all 
conscious experience — claiming that to be conscious is to be conscious of — and uses 
the term “intentionality” to denote precisely this feature.   
Husserl’s so describing intentionality, and so describing conscious experience, 
has important implications for his view of signification.  First, this description makes 
being of into a differentiating feature of being conscious.  It identifies intentionality, i.e., 
as a distinctive feature of conscious beings, in virtue of which they must be distinguished 
from all beings that are not oriented toward an experiential field — from a table, e.g., 
which is not of anything.80  But, insofar as meanings too are essentially oriented toward 
objectivity — like our conscious experiences, and unlike trees, hills, and all other such 
                                                 
78 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 9, p. 95.   
79 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 10, p. 95.  However indeterminate the object of our desire, expectation, 
or other kind of conscious experience may be, our conscious experience is nonetheless intentional, in being 
of something indeterminate. 
80 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 9. 
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beings — this description hints that signification essentially bears the intentional 
signature of consciousness; for what it presents as the differentiating feature of 
consciousness is also, strikingly, a feature of signification.81  Further, Husserl’s 
description makes being of into the universal feature of being conscious.  It thereby 
implies that we as conscious beings are regularly and constitutively open to a given field 
of experience, indeed so regularly and constitutively that it might scarcely occur to us to 
notice and inquire into this openness, or to identify what in fact belongs to the intentional 
network of conscious experience as such.  It suggests, i.e., that we tend to overlook the 
intentional character of our experience, and that we are thereby inclined to see as fully 
“mind-independent” what actually could not be apart from an intentional setting.  But 
might not the logicist assertion that ideal meaning is independent of all subjectivity thus 
be just another manifestation of our tendency to neglect what is most constant to our 
experience?  The mere suggestion of this possibility would be enough to place Husserl’s 
later Investigations at a far cry from the anti-psychologistic ardor of the Prolegomena. 
Husserl does not only hint or suggest that signification depends on conscious 
experience, though; through the course of his own inquiries into the intentional character 
of consciousness, he also comes to quite explicitly present ideal meaning as a dependent 
aspect of his inquiry’s independent subject matter.  Consider, e.g., his claim that 
intentional experiences “alone …  furnish concrete bases for abstracting the fundamental 
notions that function systematically in logic … and that enter into [its] ideal laws”.82  The 
logician could thus only arrive at the notions of concept and of proposition, of inference 
                                                 
81 An argument along these lines appears to be the rational root of Husserl’s more psychological view of 
meaning.  I attempt a detailed statement of that argument, which Husserl leaves largely inexplicit, in 
section 4.3. 
82 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 9, p. 95. 
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and of truth, by finding what those notions refer to in the subjective events of conceiving, 
inferring, etc.  Logical laws could only be accessed through studies that abstract the 
forms of various concrete arguments, and our notion of ideal meaning more generally 
could only have been abstracted from the experience of meaning.  Crucially, moreover, 
Husserl’s assertion that ideal logical objects are abstract and that logical experiences are 
concrete is not meant to pertain only to how we happen to arrive at ideal meanings; it 
pertains also to what meaning is.  This becomes clearer when we read that it is in 
intentional experiences that “the supreme Genus meaning has its originative source”,83 or 
when we read that such experiences are “the “sources” from which the basic concepts and 
ideal laws of pure logic “flow” (entspringen)”.84  The experience of meaning is thus 
presented as the concrete origin of ideal meanings, and so as a condition necessary (at 
least at one point) for their being.  That Husserl so regards ideal meaning as essentially 
(and even always) dependent on the experience of meaning becomes clearer still when 
we read that reiterable significations are “nothing but ideally apprehended aspects” of 
“acts of meaning”.85  It is evident, then, that Husserl in the later Investigations presents 
                                                 
83 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, Introduction, p. 79. 
84 Logical Investigations, Introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions, § 1, p. 166.  The use of 
quotation marks in this text indicates that Husserl does not take acts of meaning to be the cause that has 
forced signification to spring forth in the same way that certain conditions of subterranean water are the 
cause that force a hot spring to flow. 
85 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, Introduction, p. 80.  Husserl is not claiming that acts of meaning are 
productive “activities”, from which all ideal meanings at some point in history first sprung into being; 
though he refers to our intentional experiences as “acts”, he expressly denies that he intends to thereby 
construe them as “activities” of an efficient-causal kind (Inv. V, § 13).  He likewise rejects the view that 
consciousness is a “doing” of each conscious agent, or “doer” (Inv. V, § 13, note 15).  Husserl instead 
recognizes relations of dependence that are not relations of cause and effect.  He recognizes, i.e., certain 
“founding relations” that obtain because of the essences of the founding and founded elements, such as the 
relation between color and extension, or between figure and extension (cf. Inv. III, § 4).  In all such cases, 
at least one term of the relation could not be, in whatever way it is, apart from the other.  And Husserl 
claims that the relation of signification to intentionality is just such a founding relation: while conscious 
experiences can be “intentional” without yet being articulate, “significative acts”, Husserl suggests that 
there could not be signification apart from the concrete intentional experience that he has begun to 
examine.  He contends that the specific essence of signification demands significative acts — that  
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acts of meaning not only as our sole mode of access to logical objects, but also as the 
concrete basis without which such objects could not be.86 
Here we find what appears to be an expression of a relapse into the psychologistic 
view that Husserl has repeatedly rejected.  We are offered the counterfactual claim that, if 
there were no intentional experience, there would be no signification.  At first glance, at 
least, this assertion appears to be incompatible with the earlier claim that ideal meanings 
are independent of our real experiences of meaning.  It appears to imply that there are no 
“meanings in themselves”.  But it thus also verges on psychologism.  For, insofar as 
Husserl’s later claim is that ideal meanings are dependent on the psyche, he thereby holds 
that the domain of logic is entirely constricted within that of psychology.   
For another, clearer, indication of the discrepancy between signification as 
presented in (a) the Prolegomena and (b) the later Investigations, consider also how the 
truth of significations is characterized in the two cases.  Recall that Husserl in the 
Prolegomena presented truth as a property of significations that is independent of all real 
experiences.  By the sixth Investigation, in contrast, truth appears as inseparably linked to 
(perhaps as residing within, perhaps as equivalent to) the experience of thought’s 
fulfillment in intuition, i.e. in the evident giving of something (Evidenz).  If it is true that 
it is raining, e.g., then Husserl in the sixth Investigation sees this truth to require both an 
act wherein one is intentionally directed to this state of affairs, and a further act in which 
                                                                                                                                                 
signification is only an aspect of, and is “unthinkable” without, intentionality.  For the descriptive grounds 
of this contention, see section 4.3 of the present work. 
86 Husserl’s view that acts of meaning are necessary for signification follows from his characterization of 
“acts” of meaning, wherein they appear not as efficient causes, but as concrete intentional experiences.  If 
(a) intentionality is in fact uniquely characteristic of concrete conscious experiences (and of their 
constitutive aspects) and (b) signification is essentially of objects, then it appears on that basis that (c) ideal 
meaning is an aspect of the concrete experience of meaning.  Thus, though we might speak and think of 
meanings without reference to any experience, we could only do so abstractly, because there can be no 
signification apart from some act(s) of meaning.  I present this line of reasoning in greater detail in section 
4.3.3.  
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this state of affairs is then fulfillingly given (perhaps in a “static unity” of the experience 
in which one is first directed to the rain and the intuitive experience “in which the things 
appear”, or perhaps in a temporally disjointed “dynamic identity” of a first empty 
significative act and a later confirming act).87  After this reflective insight into the 
structure of knowing, Husserl can speak of truth as the “ideal relationship … among the 
… essences of [these] coinciding acts”, and as “the rightness of [one’s] intention”, but he 
no longer speaks of truth or validity as a feature of certain ideal objects that pertains to 
them independently of all intentional experience.88  The truth or validity of significations 
is rather regarded as depending on the intentional experience of intuition.89  This might 
seem to count as yet another sign of a “backslide” into psychologism.  
Yet the strongest suggestion that Husserl, in volume two of the Investigations, 
reverted to a psychologistic view of logic, may be found in his original, 1901 introduction 
to that volume.  Husserl there identifies his program of subjectivity-research as a type of 
psychology (“Phenomenology is descriptive psychology”) and, admitting his 
presumption that his studies of experience provide a foundation for pure logic, concludes, 
“pure logic therefore … rests on psychology”.90  Reading this, we must ask, as Husserl 
                                                 
87 Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, §§ 6, 8. 
88 Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, § 39, p. 264.  Husserl does refer to a sense of truth as “the objective item 
corresponding to the act of Evidenz”, but he prefers to consider this as one sense of “Being”, and, more 
important, even this “objective item” or “state of affairs” is defined in the sixth Investigation as the 
“correlate of an identifying act” (Inv. VI, § 39, pp. 263-264). 
89 Cf. the following claim from the 1913 version of Husserl’s introduction to volume II, part I of the 
German editions of the Investigations: “Logical concepts, as valid thought-unities, must have their origin 
(Ursprung) in intuition; they must arise out of an ideational abstraction (ideierende Abstraktion) founded 
on certain experiences” (§ 2, p. 168). 
90 In Findlay’s translation, this and the subsequently quoted portions of the 1901 introduction to the second 
German volume are attached to § 6 of that introduction under the heading, “Translator’s Additional Note 
4”.  Despite trying to introduce his new research program of phenomenology by tying it to Brentano’s 
existing program of descriptive psychology, Husserl already in this 1901 introduction is quick to qualify 
any identification of the two: “it will be good if we rather speak of ‘phenomenology’ than of descriptive 
psychology”. 
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himself does, “what then is the point of the whole battle against psychologism?”91  In 
other words, why argue at length that pure logic is fully independent of psychology, if 
only to then presume that pure logic “rests on psychology”?  Are the Investigations in 
fact guilty of a constitutive incoherence?  Are they guilty, i.e., of first assailing and then 
operatively assuming a psychologistic view of logic?   
 The key to Husserl’s defense against such a charge, and the key to his middle way 
between logicism and psychologism, lies in his distinction of (a) the type of 
“psychological” research that he believes is needed for logic’s foundation from (b) 
psychology as it is generally practiced and understood; it is the latter that, according to 
Husserl, could only purport to provide foundations for pure logic on pain of 
psychologism.  But what is the difference?  Husserl claims that his own “psychological” 
research consists in “the purely descriptive examination of the knowledge experience, 
disembarrassed of all theoretical psychological interests” (such as the interests in the 
“genetic connections” between elements of animal experiences).92  But does any 
genuinely revealing theory not describe?  And is it possible to perform any description 
without some theoretical interests?  Given the stakes that ride on Husserl’s distinction 
between his own type of “psychology” and psychology as generally understood, he 
perhaps does not yet, in 1901, articulate that distinction crisply enough. 
 Indeed, Husserl by 1913 would regret labeling his study of experience as 
“descriptive psychology”, and would discard that label as misleading.  In the 1913 
introduction to volume two, Husserl instead exclusively refers to the research program 
that he enacts in that volume as “phenomenology”.  He thereby designates his program as 
                                                 
91 Logical Investigations, 1901 introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions. 
92 Logical Investigations, 1901 introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions. 
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an attempt to describe the essence of appearance.  For “phenomenology” names the 
attempt to say what appearance, of any sort, of anything, always is.  Phenomenology 
asks: How does anything appear, in any way?  What is essential to consciousness, and 
what kinds of consciousness (and, correlatively, appearance) are there?  Now, our 
practice of such a program would certainly be concerned with the experiences of a 
particular being in the world, and so with the same psyche that is at issue for empirical 
psychology — but only insofar as the latter serves as a “dative of appearance”.93  
Husserl’s research program, then, is not one of inductive generalization, seeking to reach 
regularities that hold, more or less, throughout the experiences of some real species.  It is 
instead one of describing what meaning, knowing, etc., essentially are, which considers 
the experiences of some real species only insofar as they are instances of what meaning 
and knowing are in essence (and so would be for any species).  It follows that Husserl’s 
research program could indeed differ from psychology in precisely the way that the 
Prolegomena prescribe: it could exclude the inductive study of real experiences from the 
foundation of pure logic (recognizing that such study cannot access the ideal field of pure 
logic), even while holding that subjective studies are necessary in order to fundamentally 
clarify pure logic; and it could deny that contingent human experiences are necessary for 
ideal signification (and its truth), even while it treats some act(s) of meaning as necessary 
for such signification (and truth).  Husserl could accordingly regard the accusation of a 
                                                 
93 In his 1913 introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions of the Investigations, Husserl uses 
“psychology” with “its old meaning” (§ 6, p. 175); that is, he uses it to name an empirical discipline that 
considers “the experiences of presentation, judgment, and knowledge” only as “classes of real events in the 
natural context of zoological reality” (§ 1, p. 166).  Psychology thus would be “the empirical science of the 
mental attributes and experiences of animal realities” (ibid., § 2, p. 169).  Within such a discipline, “All 
general statements have … a character of empirical generality: they hold for this nature” (ibid., § 6, p. 176).  
Husserl’s program, in contrast, does not aim to “discuss states of animal organisms”, but to describe 
“perceptions, judgments, feelings as such” (ibid.).  It is thus concerned precisely with what Robert 
Sokolowski (and, echoing him, many others such as Dan Zahavi and Evan Thompson) has called the 
“dative of manifestation”. 
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fall back into psychologism as a “grotesque reproach”, i.e. as a misreading or non-reading 
that fails to come to terms with the specificity of his project.94 
Even after Husserl realizes the dangers of associating his program with 
psychology, however, what comes to be called the phenomenological project remains 
strikingly similar to the psychologistic project.  The resemblance is not a mere accident 
of the insufficient methodological self-awareness, or insufficient caution, that led Husserl 
to depict phenomenology as a kind of psychology in 1901.  That resemblance rather if 
anything becomes more explicit in sections of the Investigations that Husserl “radically 
revised” in 1913.95  Husserl there contends again, as in 1901, that a study of intentional 
experiences is needed in order to clarify “the origin” of “concepts”, “laws”, and “valid 
thought-unities” that comprise logic’s field.96  But he also goes further in 1913 by 
suggesting that such researches are “especially needed” for pure logic because 
psychologism, while erroneous, has justified motives: the “temptation … to turn the 
logically objective into the psychological”, we are told, is “by no means chance”, but 
rather “rooted in grounds of essence”.97  Husserl thus continues to assert that signification 
and truth are essentially grounded in intentional experience, but also comes to recognize 
these “grounds of essence” as a rational motive underlying the psychologistic orientation.  
Whether in 1901 or 1913, then, Husserl advocates — contra logicism and in keeping with 
psychologism — that those who would clarify the entities of pure logic for that reason 
turn to human experiences that psychology also examines. 
                                                 
94 Logical Investigations, 1920 foreword to the second edition of volume II, part 2 of the German editions, 
p. 178. 
95 The sections in question, from which the following quotations are taken, make up the introduction to 
volume II, part I of the German editions of the Investigations,.  Husserl notes that they were “radically 
revised” in his 1913 foreword to the second edition (p. 6). 
96 Logical Investigations, introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions, §§ 1, 2, pp. 166, 168. 
97 Logical Investigations, introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions, § 2, p. 169.  
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2.2.4: A Sisyphean or Socratic “zigzag” 
  Were the Investigations then in some sense “guilty” as charged, of both 
psychologism and logicism?  We have now seen the discrepancy in their presentation of 
logic, a discrepancy that would have been especially glaring in the context of a raging 
psychologism-controversy: The Investigations appear to offer alternatively affirmative 
and negative responses to the question of whether logic is fully independent of 
psychology.  More exactly, they incongruously assert that pure logic (a) is independent of 
psychology but (b) depends on investigations that might (however misleadingly, still with 
reason) be construed as psychological.  We have seen also how Husserl’s discrepant 
stance with respect to logic’s independence manifests the deeper discrepancy in his view 
of meaning.  First, the Prolegomena, in their quasi-logicist reflection, present a basically 
binary situation in which invariant truths are realized in so many quickly passing acts.  
Within that reflection, “meaning” designates the “ideal” semantic items that hold (self-
same and perhaps true) throughout and beyond our passing (“real”) experiences of those 
items.  The field of meaning then consists of propositions and concepts, i.e. of the logoi, 
or logical objects, upon which the logician reflects.  Later, the different kind of reflection 
that emerges through Husserl’s “investigations into phenomenology and the theory of 
knowledge” (i.e., volume two) presents instead a basically unitary intentional situation, 
whose many dependent aspects include signification.  “Meaning” then refers primarily to 
the kind of experience that Husserl calls an “act of meaning”, and appears confined 
within the field of psychology.98  Though the Investigations cannot be justly charged with 
                                                 
98 There appear to be at least two reasons why Husserl, despite maintaining certain reservations about 
referring to intentional experiences as “acts”, nonetheless adopts this terminology. The first is that this 
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either psychologism or logicism, then, these charges do highlight the dual view of 
meaning that emerged through that 1900-01 work: On the one hand, Husserl looks out on 
meaning from a height also occupied by the logicists, far above psychologistic occlusions 
of the ideal character of conceptual and propositional constellations.  On the other hand, 
Husserl also takes an almost psychologistic perspective, contending that one can only 
clarify what meaning originally is by returning to intentional experiences.   
 Given this oscillation between more logicist and more psychologistic views of 
meaning, it is no surprise that Husserl would be received on both sides as a Sisyphean 
character.  He attempts to ascend to a point where he can establish that there is a realm of 
significations and truths independent of our experience, i.e. a realm of meanings and of 
truths “in themselves”; and he then descends to clarify a subjective origin of all meaning 
and truth, from which he claims no signification or case of validity is independent, by 
returning his attention to human experience.  For logicists, it is Husserl’s backsliding 
from recognizably logical insights into subjectively oriented studies of logic that is 
pitiable.  For psychologistic philosophers of logic, it is the vainglory of his attempted 
ascent, i.e. his presumption to be capable of showing that there are “meanings in 
                                                                                                                                                 
usage conforms to the then-prevailing psychological practice.  But the second, and more important, reason 
can be discerned from Paul Natorp’s suggestion, approvingly cited by Husserl, that our conscious 
experiences are act-like in the respect that they all appear to be “conative” (Logical Investigations, Inv. V, 
§ 13, note 15, pp. 353-354).  Our experiences of meaning would thus be called “acts“ not because they are 
productive “activities”, producing signification like a tree produces leaves, but because such acts are 
intrinsically oriented toward certain fulfillments.  Admittedly, our “acts of meaning” may appear almost 
like productive activities in that we are constantly choosing to center our attention on some thereby focal 
whole.  But we do not cause ourselves to be experientially open to a world within which we may attend to 
this or that.  Further, Husserl refers even to our experiences of backgrounds as “acts” or “intentional 
experiences” (at least in what he in §13 calls the “wider sense of intention”), though they do not involve 
even the minimal sense of activity that is involved in focusing one’s attention: “an intentional object need 
not … always be noticed or attended to” (ibid., §13, pp. 101-102).  So, our intentional “consciousness of” is 
of objects of both thematic and background varieties.  Non-focal or background-experiences — such as the 
experience one has of the ground beneath one’s feet, or of the sound of traffic passing outside on the street, 
while having one’s attention directed to some other focus — are nonetheless called acts because they too 
have content. 
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themselves”.  Husserl, not surprisingly, would come to portray his path somewhat 
differently: he envisages the double movement of his theory of meaning under a more 
Socratic figure, as a “zigzag” that is demanded by philosophical responsibility.99  
According to this Socratic self-portrait, the complete defeat of psychologism required not 
only an ascent to disclose a realm of ideas that is eclipsed by psychologistic 
“misconstructions and misunderstandings of the objects of logic”; it required also a 
returning descent to a more sympathetic encounter with those misunderstandings, which 
even appropriates the rational motives underlying psychologism as its own.100 
 But is the discrepancy in Husserl’s view of meaning of more than merely 
historical interest?  Or is that discrepancy’s heated reception (along with Husserl’s more 
charitable, defensive self-portrait) instead merely another case of clannish behavior by 
the adherents of different research programs?  Is it a case, i.e., that is interesting now 
perhaps for antiquarians and sociologists of science, but not of any further philosophical 
interest?101  We have seen enough of Husserl’s claims regarding meaning to tell that he 
did in fact espouse two discordant views, and we have seen how that discord would have 
                                                 
99 Cf. Logical Investigations, introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions, § 6, note 2, p. 175. 
100 Logical Investigations, introduction to volume II, part I of the German editions, § 2, p. 169.  Because 
Husserl sees phenomenology as the only research program that operates out of the rational motives at the 
root of psychologism, while managing to avoid psychologistic “misconstructions and misinterpretations of 
the objects of logic”, he concludes that “psychologism can only be radically overcome by a pure 
phenomenology” (ibid.).   
101 Husserl’s work is often taken today as a relic of an odd and bygone era, rather than as perhaps true.  For 
example, one of the more widely cited recent discussions of Husserl’s view of meaning and logic is Martin 
Kusch’s Psychologism, in which a “reconstruction of the psychologism debate in Germany [roughly 1866-
1930]”, focused largely on the controversy surrounding Husserl’s Investigations, is offered as “a case study 
in the sociology of philosophical knowledge” (pp. 14-15).  Kusch finds much of sociological interest in the 
psychologism debate.  Most interesting, for Kusch, is how the debate over the theoretical question of 
logic’s independence, between more psychologistic and more logicist elements, overlapped with a less 
ethereal conflict, between psychologists (who did not yet have departments of their own) and neo-Kantian 
philosophers, for posts in German philosophy departments.  What is noteworthy is that Kusch’s approach 
consists in principle (though not always in practice) of presenting views and their defenses, without 
evaluating either.  The interest that Kusch takes in Husserl’s view of meaning (and opposition to 
psychologism) thus appears not to indicate any interest in that view’s possible truth.   
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been especially resonant in an era when philosophers were intensely concerned with the 
legitimacy of the psychologistic enterprise.  But why did Husserl hold and espouse such 
discordant views of meaning?  This critical question remains to be answered.    
 
3: 19th century sources behind the 1900-01 semantics 
3.1: A network of influences 
 In order to see why Husserl would endorse the discordant views of meaning that 
he held in 1900-01, we may begin by considering how he came to be persuaded of those 
views.  That is, we may begin to uncover the reason that Husserl had for holding his 
paradoxical pair of views by turning to the sources from which he derived them.  Of 
course, Husserl’s “breakthrough” work was not merely the effect of so many intellectual 
“impulses” that had been conducted to him through lectures that he attended or books that 
he read.  It is not a mere aggregate of so many thoughts transmitted from others; it is a 
piece of original thinking.  Yet the originality of Husserl’s 1900-01 work does not 
diminish its historicity.  The Investigations originated within a dense network of 
historical influences, and many of its original claims may be best understood in light of 
that historical origination. 
 What principal influences, then, do we have to thank — or to blame — for 
Husserl being able to arrive at the discordant accounts of meaning offered in his 
Investigations?  We have seen how, in his Prolegomena, Husserl moved away from 
certain psychologistic beliefs that he had earlier espoused, in an almost logicist reaction.  
We have seen also how Husserl’s 1901 work involves a seemingly contrary move back 
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toward a more nearly psychologistic position.  What influences helped to inspire this 
oscillation, with its two turns? 
 If we are to discern the thinkers who most influenced Husserl’s 1900-01 
conception of meaning, we must pick them out from the complicated web of intellectual 
exchange that stands behind his “breakthrough” work.102  Like most writing that is done 
today, that work of 1900-01 is indirectly a product of its author’s teachers, critics, and 
colleagues, and of other writers whose texts its author had read.  Unlike most writing that 
is done today, it is also a product of Husserl’s distinctively wide-ranging academic 
training as a student of mathematics, of logic, and of psychology; it is a product of an age 
in which sciences that are now severed from one another existed in a dynamic interplay.  
Many were then seeking new foundations for mathematics and logic.  At the same time, 
psychology was in the turmoil of defining itself as a separate science, and consequently 
had significantly more fluid boundaries than it does at present — boundaries so fluid that 
they could even be taken to include the foundations of logic and mathematics.  In the 
context of such inquiry into disciplinary foundations and limits, Husserl’s developing 
thinking was cultivated within multiple disciplines, and often by thinkers who themselves 
were working or had worked in multiple disciplines. 
                                                 
102 It is important to note that the following map of influences, disparate as its members are, comes nowhere 
near to encompassing the still-wider web of figures who importantly influenced Husserl’s view of meaning 
by the end of his life.  My list here importantly excludes, for example, Wilhelm Dilthey; all of the neo-
Kantians with whom Husserl corresponded; Eugen Fink, Heidegger, and others who once served as 
Husserl’s assistants; and more historically removed antecedents, such as Plato, Augustine, Leibniz, Hume 
and Kant.  Already by 1900, in fact, Husserl’s thinking about meaning had probably been influenced by a 
great many philosophers; though he apparently considered himself “ein krasser Anfänger in der 
Philosophie” when he began his habilitation in 1886, he no doubt had amassed considerable exposure to the 
Western philosophical tradition by 1900, after adding over ten years of teaching (including classes on the 
history of philosophy and seminars concerning works of Descartes, Locke, Hume, Kant, Mill, and 
Schopenhauer) to the courses in philosophy he took as a graduate student between 1884 and 1887 (Karl 
Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik: Denk- und Lebensweg Edmund Husserls (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1977), pp. 
17, 32-59).  The following list is only intended to include the most historically proximate of those major 
influences on Husserl’s thinking in 1900 who also had a broad enough impact on the history of ideas to still 
be widely remembered today. 
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 One set of Husserl’s pre-1900 influences worked largely in psychology, in one or 
another of the forms that science had prior to its split from philosophy.  Early in his life, 
e.g., Husserl attended lectures by Wilhelm Wundt, who famously fathered the more 
exclusively experimental approach that prevails within psychology today and, in addition 
to his pioneering experimental work, also wrote extensively on the subject of logic.  
Wundt did not prompt Husserl, who was then in his first two years of university study 
(1876-78) at Leipzig, to pursue psychology as a primary subject; the influence appears to 
have been largely negative, inspiring more reaction than continuation.  But neither did 
Wundt keep Husserl away from psychology.  Instead, Husserl later, in 1884, began what 
would be two hugely formative years of study under the psychologically oriented 
philosopher Franz Brentano.103  Brentano had by then long been reconsidering the 
prospects for an Aristotelian science of the psyche, and was working on his own 
particular brand of psychology, viz. the attempt to account for “intentional phenomena”.  
And Husserl entered into that work himself.  He attended lecture courses that Brentano 
offered on an array of topics, notably including one extended course on “psychological 
questions” (mainly regarding perception and imagination), and another on “elementary 
logic and its need for reform”, which “treated fields [within logic] systematically linked 
to a descriptive psychology of the intellect”.104  Then, because Brentano’s professional 
situation would not allow him to direct the final stage of Husserl’s education, Husserl 
followed his mentor’s advice to move from Vienna to Halle, so that he could complete 
his habilitation there with another, older one of Brentano’s students.  Husserl thus 
                                                 
103 Husserl began his devoted study of philosophy only months after his father died.  Husserl said regarding 
these years, “me totum abdidi in studia philosopha duce Francisco Brentano” (K. Schuhmann, Husserl-
Chronik, p. 13). 
104 K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 14-16. 
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became a “listener and friend” to Carl Stumpf, under whose guidance Husserl completed 
his habilitation dissertation in 1887.105  Stumpf, who helped to launch Gestalt psychology 
by creating the Berlin Institute of Psychology and by working to show (against 
reductively mechanistic approaches within psychology) how perception involves more 
than so many discrete impressions, taught courses that Husserl took on logic and on 
psychology.106  Thus, three prominent figures in the history of 19th century psychology 
appear to have played important roles in the early Husserl’s intellectual development, and 
possibly in the conception of meaning that Husserl reached at the turn into the 20th 
century.  On the one hand, Stumpf and Brentano each exercised a significant and positive 
influence on the younger Husserl’s thinking: Husserl dedicated his first book to Brentano, 
and his second book to Stumpf, and even named his first child (Elisabeth Franziska 
Carola Husserl) after each of them.  On the other hand, Husserl was also, if somewhat 
less gratefully, influenced by Wundt: Husserl’s first lecture, to the faculty at Halle, 
concerned the viability of Wundt’s psychological method; and Husserl criticized Wundt’s 
view of logic, in 1900, as a popular instance of the psychologism that he claimed we 
ought to avoid.107 
  A second set of Husserl’s nineteenth century influences were responsible for 
significant developments that were taking place in mathematics during that century.  One 
of those influences was Karl Weierstrass, whose attempts to clarify certain fundamental 
mathematical concepts and to more solidly establish existing results in calculus made him 
                                                 
105 K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik,, p. 17.  
106 K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik,, pp. 17-19. 
107 According to K. Schuhmann, the lecture that Husserl gave in order to obtain his teaching license posed 
the question of whether a Wundtian method of experimentally controlled “self-observation”, or instead a 
more physiological method of “psychophysical experiment”, should serve as the ground of psychology 
(Husserl-Chronik, p. 20).  It is noteworthy that Husserl’s attentions were thus focused on questions 
regarding Wundt’s method at the beginning of his philosophical career.  For Husserl’s opposition to 
Wundt’s psychologism in the Prolegomena, see § 23, p. 51 and § 38, p. 83. 
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the “founder of modern analysis” and a “model of rigor” in his time.108  Husserl studied 
under Weierstrass in Berlin for three years (from 1878 through 1880), completed his 
dissertation under one of Weierstrass’ students, Leo Königsberger (in 1882), and finally 
briefly served as Weierstrass’ assistant (in 1883).  After leaving Berlin and his primary 
concentration on mathematics, Husserl was later also influenced by Georg Cantor, whose 
discoveries opened up the field of set theory.109  Cantor served on the committee for 
Husserl’s habilitation dissertation in 1887, and was then one of Husserl’s colleagues and 
closer friends at Halle for over ten years.110  Finally, and in part through Weierstrass and 
Cantor, Husserl was also influenced by the mathematical work of Bernard Bolzano 
(1781-1848), a Bohemian polymath who, despite laboring in relative obscurity, 
anticipated or initiated significant advances both in mathematics and in logic, including 
discoveries of Weierstrass and of Cantor.111 
 Bolzano was also a dominant influence, and perhaps the chief influence, behind 
Husserl’s 1900-01 view of logic.  In an appendix to chapter 10 of the Prolegomena, 
                                                 
108 Mirja Hartimo, “Mathematical roots of phenomenology: Husserl and the concept of number”, History 
and Philosophy of Logic, 27.4 (2006) pp. 319-24.  According to Felix Klein, Weierstrass’ work quickly 
made “Weierstrassian rigor” into a “catch-phrase for mathematical deduction”, and led to Weierstrass being 
“regarded throughout the scientific world as an incomparable authority” (Development of Mathematics in 
the 19th Century, trans. M. Ackerman (Brookline, MA: Math Sci Press, 1979), pp. 266-267).  At the least, 
Weierstrass was clearly one of the main reasons that Berlin was a center of mathematical study in the late 
19th century and attracted students like Husserl.   
109 Though Cantor was hardly the first to think about sets, his researches did demonstrate the value of such 
thinking.  By showing, e.g., that an infinite set can have greater cardinality than other infinite sets, and that 
the power set of a set is always greater than that set, and that (for these reasons among others) there even 
appear to be an infinity of greater and lesser infinities, Cantor effectively refuted the notion that truths 
regarding sets cannot comprise a field broad enough for study.  
110 Malvine Husserl, Edmund’s wife, wrote that “in Halle Husserl is friends with Carl Stumpf, Hans von 
Arnim, Georg Cantor and Hermann Grassmann” (K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 22). 
111 In The Search for Mathematical Roots, 1870-1940, Ivor Grattan-Guinness notes how Bolzano was a 
“co-pioneer of mathematical analysis” (and thus helped to disclose a conceptual horizon that Weierstrass 
would profitably pursue), how Bolzano’s Paradoxes of the Infinite comes “to the edge” of Cantor’s 
discoveries, and how Bolzano’s logic too was prescient in its relatively extensive use of symbolism, its 
concern with mereology, and its discussion of the difference between the psychological data of judgments 
and the logical data of propositions “in themselves” ((Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) pp. 73-
74).   
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Husserl acknowledges this significant debt to Bolzano.  Husserl even goes so far, in that 
appendix, as to claim that Bolzano’s large logical-epistemological work, the Theory of 
Science, “far surpasses everything that world literature has to offer in the way of a 
systematic sketch of logic”, and to grant that his own Prolegomena ultimately aim at no 
more than expressing the boundaries of a territory that Bolzano’s work had already 
delimited in a less explicit way.112  Husserl first encountered Bolzano’s writings no later 
than during his time with Weierstrass,113 then engaged in an extensive study of Bolzano’s 
Paradoxes of the Infinite while studying logic with Brentano, and later, in 1896, also 
gave a series of lectures on Bolzano’s Theory of Science that would eventually become an 
important component of the Prolegomena.114  But Bolzano was not the only influence 
behind Husserl’s conception of logic.  Husserl once wrote, to the contrary, that he was 
only able to come to terms with Bolzano’s Theory of Science, and to appreciate its 
insights, through the influence of another philosopher’s logic.  That philosopher was 
Hermann Lotze, a major figure on the 19th century German intellectual scene, who was a 
sort of academic grandfather to Husserl in the sense that he directed the graduate study of 
                                                 
112 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, appendix following § 61, p. 142.  Husserl would later stress just 
how gushing this tribute was meant to be, writing that his recognition of Bolzano’s precedent in that 
appendix is unlike anything “either in earlier times or contemporary”, both with respect to the “detail” and 
the “emphasis” of its praise  (“Reply to a Critic”, p. 154). 
113 Dermot Moran, Edmund Husserl: Founder of Phenomenology (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), p. 87, and 
Introduction to Phenomenology  (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 70.  While Moran suggests that Husserl 
first encountered Bolzano’s work through Weierstrass, Robin Rollinger has noted that Husserl, along with 
others who attended “gymnasia throughout the Austro-Hungarian Empire”, was “initiated in philosophy” 
by a textbook, Robert Zimmerman’s Philosophische Propädeutik, that effectively promulgated “Bolzanian 
doctrines” (Husserl’s Position in the School of Brentano (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), p. 69); accordingly, 
Zimmerman’s textbook may have provided Husserl’s first exposure to Bolzano’s work.  
114 The lectures in question are now published as Husserl’s Logic: Vorlesung 1896, ed. Elisabeth 
Schuhmann.  There is some question as to whether, per Husserl’s retrospective account, “the Prolegomena 
in all arguments, even down to the crucial formulations, are actually just a cleaner elaboration” of these 
lectures (K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 46).  But the lectures in any case appear to have been an 
important step in the construction of the Prolegomena, especially given that they stand between a prior 
summer of lectures on Mill’s logic and a subsequent year of work on “a larger writing, which [was] 
directed against the subjectivist-psychologizing logic of [the] time” (K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 
49).   
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Husserl’s teacher, Stumpf.  In 1902, Husserl attributed to Lotze items of no less import 
for his philosophy of logic than his use of the adjective “ideal”, and even his “concept of 
‘ideal’ signification” itself.  He wrote that “Lotze’s reflections about the interpretation of 
Plato’s theory of forms” had a “profound effect” on him, and acknowledged that he could 
not have grasped “the treasures of [Bolzano’s] Wissenschaftslehre” without the influence 
of Lotze’s logic.115  Husserl thus credits Lotze, along with Bolzano, as a logician by 
whom his Investigations had been “crucially stimulated”.116  Finally, Husserl’s 
understanding of logic in 1900 had also been shaped by an exchange with Gottlob Frege, 
the famous forefather of contemporary symbolic logic and analytic philosophy who was 
additionally, although less famously, another student of Lotze.  Husserl corresponded 
with Frege via private writings and published works, most notably through a public 
exchange of criticisms: Husserl criticized aspects of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic in 
his 1891 Philosophy of Arithmetic, and Frege then in 1894 produced a review of the 
Philosophy of Arithmetic in which he attacked the tint of psychologism in Husserl’s 
earliest published work.  Some of the key figures behind 19th century advances in logic 
thus directly contributed, along with several central innovators in 19th century psychology 
and mathematics, to Husserl’s intellectual development in the years leading up to 1900.   
 But which of these figures were most responsible for the discrepancy in Husserl’s 
1900-01 view of meaning?  Who persuaded Husserl to make a middle way in the late-19th 
century turf-war between psychology and logic?  Would we be correct to suspect that the 
influence of a particular mathematician or logician lurks behind the almost-logicist view 
of meaning contained in the Prolegomena, and that a certain one of Husserl’s 
                                                 
115 “A Reply to a Critic”, p. 154. 
116 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, appendix to chapter 10, p. 142. 
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psychologically oriented teachers inspired the more nearly psychologistic account of 
meaning offered in the six subsequent studies?   
 
3.2: A genealogical thesis 
 Jocelyn Benoist has recently suggested that the “duality” in the Investigations’ 
theory of meaning is in fact a “synthesis” of two such earlier views, viz. one from 
Bolzano’s logic and another from Brentano’s psychology.117  It is these views that, 
according to Benoist, together served as the driving influences behind Husserl’s theory of 
meaning, despite standing in “a number of tensions”.118  On the one hand, Husserl’s 
persistent investigations of “acts of meaning” would thus be due to his being “a 
psychologist who issues from the school of Brentano and who thinks in terms of 
intentionality”.119  The thematic emphasis that Husserl places upon the subjective 
dimensions of meaning, together with his understanding of meaning as an enacted 
orientation toward an object, would be traceable to the thesis of Brentano, fundamental 
for his particular brand of psychology, that the mental differs from the physical precisely 
in virtue of its being directed, or open, to an experienced world.  On the other hand, 
Husserl’s less verbal and more nominative understanding of meaning, according to which 
                                                 
117 “Husserl’s Theory of Meaning in the First Logical Investigation”, p. 18.  Though I attribute this 
suggestion to Benoist, it is worth noting that various others have expressed much the same opinion.  
Heidegger, for example, acknowledging the tie between “Bolzano’s theory of the proposition” and 
Husserl’s Prolegomena, contrasted the semantics contained in those “critical prolegomena” with Husserl’s 
“positive phenomenological interpretations” of meaning and truth, and added that the “positive 
phenomenological” descriptions of meaning “are quite different from Bolzano’s theory” (Being and Time, 
trans. Joan Stambaugh (Albany: SUNY Press, 1996), p. 407, footnote 34).  More recently, Denis Fisette 
edited a series of essays, collected under the title Husserl’s Logical Investigations Reconsidered, which are 
premised partly on the notion that Brentano and Bolzano were the primary influences upon Husserl’s 
Investigations.  And, more broadly, there is a consensus within Husserl studies that (a) volumes I and II of 
the Logical Investigations express markedly different orientations and that (b) Brentano and Bolzano are 
among the influences most important for Husserl’s thought in general and for the Investigations in 
particular.   
118 Benoist, “Husserl’s Theory of Meaning”, p. 18. 
119 Benoist, “Husserl’s Theory of Meaning”, p. 18. 
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there are ideal and potentially valid significations that we can reiterate or have “in mind” 
in different instances, would be primarily due to the influence of Bolzano’s logic.  All 
Husserl’s talk of “meanings in themselves” and “truths in themselves” would historically 
derive primarily from Bolzano’s contentions, that there are propositions distinct from our 
various acts of speaking and thinking, and that some of these propositions are truths that 
we may never express or realize.  Indeed, on this picture, Husserl in 1900 was to Bolzano 
almost what Zeno was to Parmenides: the whole anti-psychologistic thrust of the 
Prolegomena would have been an attempt to destroy the contraries of the position for 
which Bolzano had already presented a more straightforward and positive, less 
dialectical, case.  Thus, according to Benoist, the “duality” we find in Husserl’s work is 
the product of his understanding meaning as a transcendent object, with Bolzano, and his 
taking meaning as a kind of intentional “act”, following Brentano.  The Investigations’ 
theory of meaning would amount to “the ideality of meaning plus intentionality”, where 
Bolzano’s logic had provided the content of “ideality”, and Brentano’s psychology had 
shown the significance of “intentionality”, such that it was left to Husserl’s 
phenomenology to work out their sum.120  
 Does this equation stand up to scrutiny?  It is plain at least that Husserl’s 
conception of ideal meanings resembles Bolzano’s notion of presentations and 
propositions “in themselves”.  Ideal meanings, like Bolzano’s propositions “in 
themselves”, are logical objects, distinct from their varying sensuous expressions and 
confirmations, commonly available and reiterable, invariant, subject to grammatical and 
logical laws, and incompatible with the treatment foisted on them by psychologism.  On 
the other side, Husserl quite explicitly derives from Brentano his understanding of 
                                                 
120 Benoist, “Husserl’s Theory of Meaning”, p. 18. 
 53 
meaning as an intentional experience.  Husserl’s depiction of acts of meaning as the 
concrete origin of ideal meanings, and as reflectively accessible parts of a whole stream 
of experience, rings with echoes of Brentano’s psychology.  
 We may find some further confirmation for Benoist’s equation in the broad 
outlines of the intellectual struggle that Husserl underwent in the years leading up to 
1900.  It is apparent, historically, that Husserl’s study of intentionality under Brentano 
left him dissatisfied with any proposals he encountered for founding mathematics solely 
on the basis of another calculative, if non-quantitative, discipline.  Deriving the 
foundational objects of mathematics, such as numbers, from the notions of an objective 
logic, did not yet address the question regarding the grounds of mathematics and logic 
alike that arises in Brentano’s “psychology”:121 no one of the deductive systems that 
Husserl encountered in logic or mathematics could tell him how their objectivities are 
available to us, i.e. how we can understand such objectivities.  It is clear, too, that when 
Husserl alternatively sought origins for all “formal, deductive systems” through 
psychology, and again found his road blocked, it was blocked by a distinction that 
Bolzano had stressed, between the “psychological connections of thinking” and the 
“logical unity of the thought-content”.122  Thus Husserl was led, thanks to insights 
inherited from Brentano and Bolzano, to a position on logic and meaning that could seem 
at once psychologistic and logicist.  Thanks to Brentano, Husserl refused to leave the 
sphere of significations that logicians analyze without any explanation; he had developed 
too great a sensitivity to what he called epistemological concerns.  But, thanks to 
                                                 
121 On this point, compare Husserl’s statement 1900 statement that “logic left me in the lurch whenever I 
hoped that it would give me definite answers to the definite questions that I put to it” (Logical 
Investigations, foreword to the first edition, p. 2). 
122 Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, p. 2. 
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Bolzano, Husserl also rejected the opinion that the valid connections between 
propositions have their only ground in “psychological connections of thinking”; he had 
become too sensitive to the ways in which the principles of valid inference differ from 
the contingent patterns that empirical psychology detects in the mental processes of a 
species.  Understood through this history, Benoist’s equation neatly captures the motives 
behind Husserl’s theory of meaning. 
  We might object, though, that what I have called “Benoist’s equation” appears 
perhaps too neat — too tidy an account of what is actually an exceedingly messy 
intellectual inheritance.  Can such a binary and broad-brushstrokes picture begin to 
capture all of the complexity behind the theory of meaning that Husserl propounded in 
1900-01?  Should we not see Lotze or Frege, or Weierstrass or Cantor, or Stumpf, as 
exerting an influence on that theory no less decisive than that of Brentano or Bolzano?  
Does not Husserl himself refer or allude to such a broader variety of influences?   
 There is some basis for this objection, which we would do well to consider if we 
are to clarify how Husserl came to his 1900-01 understanding of meaning.  Consider first 
Lotze’s most major contribution to that understanding.  We have already noted that 
Husserl cites Lotze’s work as the means by which he came to appreciate Bolzano’s 
insights, and even as the source behind the Investigations’ talk of “ideality” and “ideal” 
meaning.  Now, to be more precise, what Husserl gained from Lotze’s logic in particular 
was the realization that accepting ideality requires no more metaphysical speculation than 
does accepting specificity.  Lotze helped Husserl to see that, while the term “ideal” may 
carry various metaphysical resonances, it is clear apart from any very controversial 
speculations that various acts of speaking or thinking may share the same meaning: there 
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is some meaning held in common, e.g., by any two people who understand what each 
other are saying, or in any two temporally separated experiences of a single individual 
realizing the truth of the same proposition.  Husserl thus took from Lotze (as well as from 
one of Lotze’s predecessors, Johann Herbart) the view that each ideal meaning is a 
specific semantic content, which differentiates a number of real experiences (e.g., of 
saying or hearing the same statement) from all other real experiences.  
 In this way, Lotze not only contributed a positive view about the nature of 
meaning to the Investigations, but also altered Husserl’s relation to Bolzano.  Upon first 
encountering Bolzano’s logic, Husserl had been unable to come to terms with the notion 
that there are propositions “in themselves”, which propositions do not exist.  Perhaps 
Husserl had been concerned that this thesis of Bolzano’s was self-contradictory; perhaps 
he had been worried that its apparent incoherence was only a cover for a “Platonic” ultra-
realism regarding meanings.  But in the Lotzean understanding of each ideal meaning as 
a species of so many actual and possible experiences of that meaning, Husserl found 
some intuitive support for Bolzano’s theory.  For if an ideal “meaning is related to varied 
acts of meaning … just as Redness in specie is [related] to” so many existing or imagined 
things that “all ‘have’ the same redness”, one could intuitively say that there are 
“propositions in themselves” even though such propositions do not exist — no less than 
one could say that there is a certain kind of redness, even though it does not exist in the 
way that patches of color having that kind of redness do, and even if nothing that “has” 
that specific type of redness had ever physically existed.123  An ideal proposition, Husserl 
came to see, need not be a supposedly real existent, dreamed up by metaphysical 
speculation, and famously vulnerable to third-man arguments.  It could simply be that 
                                                 
123 Husserl, Logical Investigations, Investigation I, § 31, p. 230. 
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which is common to the various, otherwise different experiences of stating or silently 
thinking the same proposition.  Lotze’s understanding of the ideal as the specific was thus 
crucial for Husserl: besides giving Husserl a way to conceive of ideal entities, this 
understanding also enabled Husserl to accept key elements of Bolzano’s conceptual 
vocabulary (above all the concepts of pure logic and of truths in themselves).  Lotze’s 
explanation of ideal meanings as species must accordingly be counted as a historically 
important condition for the view of ideal meanings defended in the Prolegomena and into 
the later Investigations.124  
 However, despite that Lotze thus truly was a “crucial stimulus” for the 
Prolegomena, Husserl from the beginning had deep reservations regarding the 
understanding of being and of knowledge that permeates Lotze’s logic.  Various 
indications of these reservations add up to show that Lotze’s influence was less primary 
than Bolzano’s.  Here is a first indication: when acknowledging later in his life how 
Lotze’s “Platonism” had attracted him and spurred on the development of his own 
thinking, Husserl immediately adds that nonetheless Lotze’s “theory of knowledge and 
metaphysics always repelled me”.125  Whereas Husserl’s training under Brentano had left 
him in a position to appreciate the critical distance from Kant and outright opposition to 
Hegel that he found in Bolzano’s work, it had left him equally ill-disposed toward 
Lotze’s attempt at extending the German idealist tradition.  Husserl did not appropriate 
Lotze’s metaphysical idealism, according to which what is consists ultimately of persons 
                                                 
124 Indeed, although by speaking of “Benoist’s equation” I have suggested that Benoist views Husserl’s 
inspiration as two-pronged, with only one thinker on either side, Benoist has in fact, along with others, 
recognized the influence that Lotze’s view of ideal meanings as species had on Husserl’s view of meaning.  
(See the 8th paragraph of his short article, “Husserl and Bolzano”, Phenomenology World-Wide, ed. Anna-
Teresa Tymieniecka (Dodrecht: Kluwer, 2002) p. 98.)  
125 K. Schuhmann, , Husserl-Chronik, p. 26. 
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and of teleological mechanisms; nor could Husserl go along with Lotze’s epistemological 
separation of appearances from the things themselves.  Two further indications of the 
limits of Lotze’s influence lie (a) in the fact Husserl had once planned to attach a full 
appendix to the Prolegomena criticizing Lotze’s epistemology, and (b) in the assertion 
most critical of Lotze that Husserl did include in the Prolegomena, viz. that Lotze’s logic 
is “a jarring mixture of psychologism and pure logic”.126  Finally, and perhaps most 
tellingly, Husserl soon after 1900 also scrapped the species component of his view of 
meaning that he inherited from Lotze, even as he retained the determinations of meaning 
that Bolzano had reached before him.  So, cumulatively, it appears that Husserl quickly 
left behind the foremost of his doctrines regarding meaning for which Lotze, and not 
Bolzano, had been particularly responsible, and that Husserl’s enduring debt to Lotze is 
due most of all to the latter’s help in establishing Bolzano’s influence.  
 We may safely conclude, then, that while Lotze’s influence was important 
especially for helping Husserl to appreciate Bolzano’s insights, it was less basically 
constitutive of Husserl’s theory of meaning than Bolzano and Brentano’s influences 
were.  Yet while Lotze’s work has been widely forgotten, and there has been little 
attempt to show that Husserl depended heavily on Lotze’s direct influence, Lotze’s 
student Frege has had a lasting and broadly appreciated effect on the contemporary 
philosophical scene, and several contemporary thinkers have been quick to suspect that 
Frege was chiefly responsible for whatever is valuable in Husserl’s understanding of 
logic.  These philosophers, who often enough are indebted for their own philosophical 
method to Frege’s insights, and who greatly appreciate the symbolic turn that Frege 
helped to achieve in logic, cannot help but to be struck by extensive similarities between 
                                                 
126 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 59, p. 138. 
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the groundbreaking account of logic and meaning that Frege began publishing in 1879, 
on the one hand, and the anti-psychologistic view of meaning that Husserl advocated in 
1900, on the other hand.127  If they witness, e.g., Husserl’s attack on John Stuart Mill’s 
attempts to undercut the a priori, these philosophers are likely to be reminded of Frege’s 
similar opposition to the same Empiricist philosopher in the Foundations of 
Arithmetic;128 or, if they see Husserl’s anti-psychologistic pronouncement that “the 
number Five is not my own or anyone else’s counting of five”,129 it will likely call to 
their minds Frege’s similar assertion that “number is no whit more an object of 
psychology or a product of mental processes than, let us say, the North Sea is”;130 or, 
upon observing that Husserl affirms a “homogeneity” between logical “theories of 
inference”, “on the one side”, and number-theory, set-theory, and other divisions of 
mathematics, “on the other side”, they may detect certain similarities with Frege’s thesis 
that arithmetic can be reduced to logic; and so on.131  But it is not only a resemblance 
among theories that is striking.  Frege’s admirers are struck also by the order of events 
within the contemporaneous developments of Husserl and Frege’s theories of meaning.  
For Husserl had, by his own account, in some respects belonged to the psychologistic 
                                                 
127 Most striking are the similarities of Husserl’s work to The Foundations of Arithmetic (Die Grundlagen 
der Arithmetik) of 1884, the article often translated as “Sense and Reference” (“Sinn und Bedeutung”), 
from 1892, and the two-volume The Basic Laws of Arithmetic (Die Grundgesetze der Arithmetik) that 
Frege published in 1893 and 1903.  Husserl no doubt would also have appreciated the Leibnizian motives 
behind Frege’s Concept-Script of 1879, although Husserl is not supposed to have appropriated as slavishly 
from that work as from the others mentioned. 
128 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 13, p. 29, and §§25-26; Foundations of Arithmetic, §§ 7-9, 25. 
129 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 46, p. 109. 
130 Frege, Foundations of Arithmetic, trans. J. L. Austin (Evanston: Northwestern, 1974) § 26, p. 34. 
131 Husserl’s suggestion that pure mathematics and logic are two “homogenous” sides of formal science – 
one focused on “formal objective categories” such as those of “unity, plurality, number, relation, etc.” and 
the other focused on “formal meaning categories” such as “concept, proposition, truth, etc.” – is contained 
in §§ 67 and 68 of the Prolegomena.  Most all of Husserl’s comments regarding the relation between 
mathematics and logic in the Investigations, including his defense of “mathematical theories of inference” 
(presumably including the one which Frege formulated in his Concept-Script), may be found in chapter 11 
of the Prolegomena; see especially §§ 67-71.   
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movement at the time when he wrote his first book and therein criticized Frege’s 
Foundations of Arithmetic.  Yet by the time of writing his second book, after being 
chided in Frege’s “Review of Dr. E. Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic”, Husserl’s 
defense of pure logic was no less fiercely opposed to psychologism than Frege had 
been.132  Moreover, Husserl in his Prolegomena admits the influence of Frege’s Basic 
Laws of Arithmetic, acknowledges that his reading of Frege’s Foundations of Arithmetic 
had been “stimulating”, and renounces his earlier opposition to Frege’s anti-
psychologism.133  This admission of influence, together with the extensive similarities 
between Husserl and Frege’s views of logic, and the fact that Husserl published his more 
logicist account of meaning after being chastised by Frege’s criticisms, has led many 
Frege scholars to believe that none other than Frege must have been the party primarily 
responsible for prompting Husserl to turn away from psychologism in a logicist direction.  
On their view, the chief merit of Husserl’s account of logic would be that its author 
heeded Frege’s rebuke, and its fatal flaw would be that Husserl refused to heed that 
rebuke consistently enough, instead allowing subjective investigations within logic and 
giving rise to that strange alternative to analytic philosophy that is called 
phenomenology.134 
                                                 
132 Frege’s used his review of Husserl’s work as an opportunity to “gauge the devastation caused by the 
influx of psychology into logic” and to attack that “widespread philosophical disease” (Review of Dr. E. 
Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic, trans. E. W. Kluge, Mind, 81 (1972) [1894], p. 337).  He there mocked 
Husserl for believing that we abstract number from collections, joking that, for Husserl, our sense of 
number seems to be merely the result of “cleansing” away so many irrelevant features of collections “in the 
psychological wash-tub” (ibid, pp. 323, 332).   
133 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, note 6, on p. 318, to § 45, p. 109. 
134 Guillermo Rosado Haddock helpfully lists several of the more prominent statements of this 
“historiographical myth”, including those of Dagfinn Føllesdal and Michael Dummett (“To Be A Fregean 
or To Be A Husserlian?”, Husserl or Frege?: Meaning, Objectivity, and Mathematics (Open Court: 
Chicago, 2000), p. 191).  The myth, in Rosado Haddock’s telling, is basically that “Husserl was [once] a 
very naïve philosopher who … propounded an extreme form of psychologism”, that “Frege’s ‘devastating’ 
critique” then led to “Husserl’s abandonment of psychologism in the first volume of his Logische 
Untersuchungen of 1900/01”, and that Husserl then “fell once more out of grace and into psychologism in 
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 However, putting aside for the moment any questions regarding the viability of 
Husserl’s view of logic, we may easily dispel the narrative that Husserl’s theory of 
meaning was a poor parasite that leached all of its value from Frege’s and then turned 
upon its host; for the extent to which Husserl developed his almost-logicist view of ideal 
meaning independently of Frege is readily apparent.  We may begin with the clue that 
Husserl barely mentions Frege in the Investigations, and does so once in order to voice 
his disapproval of Frege’s concept of Bedeutung.135  When Husserl does mention the 
claim that mathematics is a wing of logic, moreover, he consistently attributes it to Lotze 
rather than to Frege, despite that it was one of Frege’s central contentions.136  Husserl 
thus appears to regard Frege’s work, if “stimulating”, as less “crucially stimulating” than 
that of Frege’s teacher (and Husserl in any case regarded pure mathematics and logic as 
formal sciences “parallel” to one another, rather than regarding arithmetic, with Frege 
and Lotze, as a dependent discipline that extends pure logic).  Yet more persuasive than 
these clues is the body of evidence that has been assembled within recent scholarship 
showing how Husserl’s quasi-logicist streak was developing prior to Frege’s biting 
review.137  It suffices to consider only a few pieces of the evidence that Guillermo 
Rosado Haddock has gathered in order to demonstrate that Husserl was in fact already 
opposed to psychologism before Frege’s review.  Consider, first, that the psychologistic 
                                                                                                                                                 
the second volume of Logische Untersuchungen and never again freed himself from such a pernicious 
addiction” (ibid). 
135 In § 15 of Inv. I (pp. 201-02), Husserl argues that Frege is wrong to construe Bedeutung as reference 
rather than as signification.  
136 See Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 21 (p. 47) and § 45 (p. 108). 
137 Guillermo E. Rosado Haddock appears to have been the first to have made this case, in a 1973 
dissertation, part of which was then published as “Remarks on Sense and Reference in Frege and Husserl” 
in Kant-Studien in 1982 (Kant-Studien 73.4 (1982): pp. 425-439, reprinted as chapter 2 of Husserl or 
Frege?), the same year that Mohanty’s Husserl and Frege advanced the same case.  Since then, various 
scholars who have devoted attention to Husserl’s early works (e.g., Dallas Willard, Claire Ortiz Hill, and 
Ivor Grattan-Guinness) have arrived at similar conclusions.  
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elements of the book that Husserl published in 1891 may be attributed to his reiterating 
most all of his 1887 habilitation thesis there, so that the Philosophy of Arithmetic not 
surprisingly “contains mostly Husserl’s conceptions before 1890”; consider, next, that 
Husserl attributed a major turn in his thinking to “his reading of Bolzano, Lotze, and 
Hume in the years 1890 and 1891”; consider, also, that there are “manuscripts by Husserl 
on the philosophy of mathematics written before 1894 … which contain essentially the 
same conceptions on these matters that will be presented much later in the Logische 
Untersuchungen”; and consider, finally, that Husserl had already made the distinction 
between “ideal” signification and reference, the same distinction that Fregeans have said 
Husserl took from their master, in a paper that Husserl published and sent to Frege in 
1891 (which was, incidentally, the same year in which Frege published “the first work … 
in which he [himself] explicitly establishes the distinction between sense and 
reference”).138  While Husserl no doubt was one of the closer early readers of Frege’s 
Foundations of Arithmetic,139 then, and was surely “stimulated” by Frege’s work, per his 
own testimony, we do not have reason to think that Frege was the primary inspiration 
behind Husserl’s turn against psychologism.  On the contrary, there is overwhelming 
reason to believe instead that Husserl and Frege, in their perhaps somewhat mutually 
informative work on shared subjects, were alike influenced by certain elder statesmen in 
their fields such as Lotze and Weierstrass, as well as by earlier thinkers including 
Bolzano, Kant and Leibniz.  The thesis that Frege’s “review quite transformed poor 
                                                 
138 Rosado Haddock, “Remarks on Sense and Reference in Frege and Husserl”, Husserl or Frege?, pp. 30-
32.   
139 Claire Ortiz Hill notes that Husserl’s Philosophy of Arithmetic “cites Frege more often than any other 
author”, and that “[i]n a letter Frege himself once acknowledged … that Husserl’s study [of the 
Foundations of Arithmetic] was perhaps the most thorough one that had been done up to that time” 
(“Husserl and Frege on Substitutivity”, Husserl or Frege?, p. 4).  
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Husserl’s philosophy”, then, as Ivor Grattan-Guinness has said, “refers far more to the 
false than to the true”.140     
 There is much better reason to suspect that Weierstrass was Husserl’s primary 
inspiration in logic and mathematics.  At Husserl’s 70th birthday party, in 1929, it was 
Weierstrass whom, along with Brentano, Husserl singled out and thanked among his 
teachers.141  It was Weierstrass to whom Husserl attributed “the ethos of [his] academic 
efforts”.142  And it was Weierstrass who Husserl said “aroused” his “interest for a radical 
foundation of mathematics”,143 the very interest that Husserl credited with placing him on 
the path to the Prolegomena.144  Thus one might argue, as Mirja Hartimo has, that it was 
Weierstrass’s “ethos” of scientific responsibility — his attempt to attain clarity regarding 
the basic concepts of his discipline, and to then take justified steps on their basis — that 
“motivated … Husserl’s search for intuitively evident foundations for mathematics”.145  
One might argue that Weierstrass thus also prompted Husserl’s broader concern with the 
“insight” at work in the formal sciences, and so prompted Husserl’s inclusion of 
seemingly psychological researches within logic.146  One might even infer, following 
                                                 
140 The Search for Mathematical Roots, 1870-1940, p. 204. 
141 K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 345. 
142 That Edmund Husserl thus attributed his ethos is according to Malvine Husserl (K. Schuhmann, 
Husserl-Chronik, p. 7). By the end of his life, according to Claire Ortiz Hill, Husserl “would say that he 
had sought to do for philosophy what Weierstrass had done for mathematics” (“Did Georg Cantor Influence 
Edmund Husserl?”, Husserl or Frege?, p. 139). 
143 K. Schuhmann, Husserl-Chronik, p. 7. 
144 In the foreword to the Logical Investigations, first edition, pp. 1-2, Husserl recalls that it was his search 
for “a philosophical clarification of pure mathematics”, in On the Concept of Number and The Philosophy 
of Arithmetic, that confronted him with the problems of the Logical Investigations: his study of the 
“expositions of the traditional logic, so often reformulated”, which “should have succeeded in providing us 
with an intelligible and perspicuous account of the rational essence of deductive science”, instead “left all 
of these things problematic and obscure”.     
145 “The Development of Mathematics and the Birth of Phenomenology”, Phenomenology and 
Mathematics, ed. Mirja Hartimo (Dordrecht: Springer, 2010) p. 119. 
146 “The Development of Mathematics”, p. 120.  It is because of Husserl’s Weierstrassian concern with 
clarifying fundamental concepts, and his “demand for justification” (p. 108), according to Hartimo, that 
“the investigation of evidences has to be included”, for Husserl “into the domain of logic” (p. 119). 
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Hartimo, that Weierstrass was then in some measure responsible for both sides of 
Husserl’s theory of meaning.  On one side, the “model of rigor” made Husserl susceptible 
to Brentano’s approach, by inspiring Husserl’s desire to clarify the origins of formal 
deductive systems, of meaning, and of truth.147  On the other side, Weierstrass through 
two years of instruction naturally made Husserl as his student familiar with a multitude of 
theorems that do not admit of psychologistic interpretations.148  Of course, Weierstrass 
was not concerned with devising a philosophical theory of meaning himself.  However 
much his intellectual ethos led Husserl to appreciate the motives behind psychologism, 
and however many contents of the science he practiced cannot be sufficiently explained 
by psychologism, Weierstrass did not produce the arguments by which Husserl became 
persuaded that logicist and psychologistic accounts of meaning are inadequate.  Thus, if 
we are to find the pieces of reasoning that might substantiate Husserl’s dual view of 
meaning, we must look elsewhere.  Still, Hartimo has made a cogent case that 
Weierstrass was a crucial contributor to both of the streams of influence behind that dual 
view. 
 Weierstrass’ student Cantor was another arguably vital force behind Husserl’s 
theory of meaning.  He was also a mathematician who, unlike his teacher, made regular 
                                                 
147 In “Mathematical Roots of Phenomenology”, Hartimo suggests that Husserl’s “Weierstrassian 
inheritance” prepared him to appreciate  Brentano’s program because “Brentano attacked philosophical 
problems with the same spirit [with which] Weierstrass attacked … mathematical problems” (p. 325): both 
of the teachers whom Husserl remembered most gratefully were seeking reform of formal disciplines 
through the clarification of fundamental concepts (a desideratum that can also be seen beneath the 
psychologistic impulse). 
148 According to Hartimo’s “The Development of Mathematics and the Birth of Phenomenology”, Husserl 
“does not postulate the realm of abstract entities”, but “rather describes what mathematicians show us there 
to be” (p. 119).  Hartimo thus traces Husserl’s almost logicist tendency back to his encounter with 
mathematical objectivity.  Moreover, Husserl would have encountered such objectivity under Weierstrass.  
Although Hartimo notes that Husserl gave up Weierstrass’ program of seeking a solid foundation for 
mathematics through “arithmetization”, and opted instead for “axiomatization”, i.e. the “more abstract 
approach” of David Hilbert, the same non-psychologally-reducible field of objectivities or “structures” is 
evident given both approaches to mathematics. 
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forays into philosophy.  Cantor’s mathematics by itself was philosophically provocative: 
his novel work on a domain of transfinite numbers put him in the dock for thinkers who 
maintained the old philosophical opposition to the notion of actual infinity, and 
additionally made him a target for mathematicians who were suspicious of new number 
ranges (above all a target for Leopold Kronecker, who was then arguing against Cantor 
that the positive integers are the only numbers that exist).  But Cantor was also, despite 
being a mathematician by trade, quite eager to advocate specifically philosophical 
contentions.  If he was compelled to think philosophically by external attacks, he appears 
to have been autonomously driven too, by his own intellectual disposition, to engage with 
metaphysical and epistemological questions;149 for he engaged with such questions to the 
point of inciting more skepticism toward his strictly mathematical ideas than they might 
have otherwise received.150  And Husserl was among those who found Cantor’s work to 
be charged with philosophical problems and possibilities.  Did Cantor then supply any of 
the arguments that persuaded Husserl to adopt the Investigations’ two-pronged theory of 
meaning?   
 Claire Ortiz Hill has delineated three crucial aspects of Husserl’s theory of 
meaning that appear to carry traces of Cantor’s influence.151  One is Husserl’s concept of 
                                                 
149 In Georg Cantor: His Mathematics and Philosophy of the Infinite (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton 
University Press, 1990), Joseph Dauben has documented how Cantor’s upbringing encouraged an unusual 
depth and breadth of research interests.  Citing certain letters to Georg Cantor from his father that display 
his father’s intense religious devotion and strenuous work-ethic, Dauben shows how Georg’s father spurred 
his son toward studying diverse fields of inquiry at some length, and perhaps encouraged his readiness to 
discuss topics such as the relation of numbers to “the Divine Intellect” (e.g., in a letter cited in “Did 
Georg”, p. 149).  
150 At least one mathematician communicated to Cantor that his mixing philosophy with mathematics might 
prove rhetorically problematic: Claire Ortiz Hill refers to an 1885 letter to Cantor from Gösta Mittag-
Leffler, in which Mittag-Leffler “warn[ed] Cantor that his new terminology and philosophical way of 
expressing himself might be so frightening to mathematicians as to seriously damage his reputation among 
them” (“Abstraction and Idealization in Husserl and Cantor”, Husserl or Frege, p. 116). 
151 Hill’s focus is not on the topic of meaning.  However, her attempts to show how “Cantor’s work 
embodied many of the very problems Husserl found so distressing” in the 1890s, and how 
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empty, symbolic meanings.  Hill has shown that Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers, 
particularly in its reliance on the notion that there are sets whose members we can never 
(in principle) “collect all … together one by one”, precipitated or strengthened Husserl’s 
concern to differentiate symbolic meanings, which we could never find evidently 
confirmed, from meanings that can be intuitively fulfilled.152  Cantor’s conceptual 
framework faced Husserl with a body of symbolic meanings that were used “for scientific 
purposes, and with scientific success”, even though they were bereft of the kind of 
intuitive fullness that is possible when dealing with smaller countable numbers.153  A 
second aspect of Husserl’s theory of meaning in which we might see Cantor’s influence 
is in the former’s understanding of a particular kind of abstraction.  Hill has established 
that Husserl’s view of how we abstract number concepts, in particular, was close to 
Cantor’s: both men contended that we arrive at the concept of a number, say at the 
concept of five, on the basis of a given collection, such as that of “all the fingers of my 
right hand”; they both contended that we do so by abstracting away from the features and 
order of the collection’s members, and focusing our attention on the specific type of 
multiplicity that the collection has — the specific type of multiplicity that the collection 
of fingers on my right hand, e.g., has in common with other collections of five things;154 
and they both thus elicited Frege’s scorn, and were charged by that logicist with 
psychologistically attempting to link the concept of number to acts of meaning.155  
Finally, Hill has also suggested that Husserl’s attempt to understand “how the human 
                                                                                                                                                 
“phenomenology, while not being Cantorian, distinctly bears Cantor’s imprint”, carries several implications 
for Husserl’s phenomenology of meaning (“Abstraction and Idealization”, p. 132).  
152 “Did Georg”, pp. 146-47, 149. 
153 “Abstraction and Idealization”, p. 127. 
154 “Did Georg”, pp. 141-43. 
155 “Abstraction and Idealization”, p. 114. 
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mind interacts with the world of numbers” —156 and, more specifically, how our 
experiences of meaning relate to the signification of number-terms — was partly 
motivated by inadequacies that Husserl saw in Cantor’s effort to account for the same.  
Cantor repeatedly attempted to explain how our acts of abstraction are related to ideal 
meanings by alluding to the famous notion of recollection; he claimed, e.g., that in such 
acts, “the concept number which was slumbering within us first comes into existence”; 
and it is likely that Husserl would have seen a glaring deficiency in such attempts at 
epistemology.  Thus, given that Husserl came to be troubled, during the years of his close 
contact with Cantor, by questions regarding the relation between acts of meaning and 
their contents, such allusions to recollection may well have pushed Husserl to find a more 
sufficient explanation of the fact that ideal meanings are available to us.  However pivotal 
in Husserl’s intellectual development Cantor’s account of abstraction and theory of 
transfinite numbers were, then, we may see, following Hill, that their influence consisted 
at least partly in the fact that they contained problems that Husserl felt pushed to solve.  
Further, however positive or negative Cantor’s overall influence was, in inspiring the 
Husserlian account of our access to ideal meanings, it in any case built onto a quasi-
psychological concern with acts of meaning that had been imparted to Husserl by his 
principal influence(s) in psychology. 
 But was Brentano the only such principal influence?  We have seen, now, how 
Cantor and Weierstrass and Frege and Lotze were so many secondary influences on 
Husserl’s theory of meaning; yet we still have not excluded Stumpf from the role of a 
principal influence.  That Husserl dedicated the Investigations to Stumpf is surely some 
reason to suspect, instead, that Stumpf may have played a primary role in its account of 
                                                 
156 “Did Georg”, p. 148. 
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meaning; and there is a further case to be made in defense of that suspicion.  Above all, 
we must consider the possibility that Stumpf, through his somewhat philosophical and 
somewhat psychological endeavors, was importantly responsible for the Investigations’ 
distinctive account of how we know — and thereby for its view of meaning.     
 First, consider the distinctiveness of that account of knowledge.  Note that Husserl 
did not, following “Empiricism”, trace all ideas that accurately represent the world back 
to sensory experience and to reflection on our own mental operations; nor did he opt for 
the “Rationalist” contention that an important plurality of such ideas are innate.  Like 
Kant, Husserl rejected the notion that our valid judgments accurately represent a world in 
itself, and do so either by resulting from impressions or by arising from a dormant state in 
a mind that natively corresponds with that separate world.  Husserl instead recognized 
with Kant that all of our valid judgments must have been actively formed according to 
categories of judgment.  But Husserl also, unlike Kant, took the experience that we have 
of such judgments being confirmed to show that intuition can be categorial — that 
intuition is not exclusively sensuous.157  How should we understand this thesis, which 
differentiates Husserl’s interpretation of knowing from Kant’s?   
When Husserl first carefully describes categorial acts in the later Investigations, 
he presents them as acts that are founded on simpler, purely sensuous acts.  According to 
this account, there are at bottom the “straightforward” experiences of mere “sense-
perception”, “in which sensuous concreta and their sensuous constituents are presented as 
                                                 
157 Cf. Husserl’s comment from the end of the section in which he first presents categorial intuition, 
provocatively entitled “Sensibility and Understanding”: “In Kant’s thought categorial (logical) functions 
play a great role, but he fails to achieve our fundamental extension of the concepts of perception and 
intuition over the categorial realm…” (Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, § 66, p. 318).  
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given”.158  We sensuously intuit, e.g., this white paper; we see these aligned, curved, 
black marks; we see as a dog might see.  There are then acts of understanding, “built 
upon [this] sensibility”, in which we categorially form wholes that are not merely 
sensuous.159  On the basis of our sensation of this page and its parts, e.g., we might 
constitute several complex objectivities.  We may differentiate the parts of this page from 
the whole page and then articulate their relations, judging e.g. that this page has a white 
border and a central body of black marks; we may regard each of these parts as a whole 
and consider its relation to its own aspects, judging e.g. that the group of marks on a page 
is aligned and black; we may constitute any number of collections, mentally holding 
assorted pages and parts of pages together as members of a group; &c.160  Moreover, we 
can confirm such judgments.  It is possible, e.g., for us to form the judgment, “these 
marks are black and aligned”, and to have that judgment confirmed by the (constituted) 
state of affairs that these marks are black and aligned.161  In this sense, then, we have 
                                                 
158 Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, § 47, p. 283.  On this lowest level, we are told, “the ‘external’ thing 
appears ‘in one blow’, as soon as our glance falls upon it” (ibid).  Of course, Husserl in his analyses of pre-
predicative perception will differentiate several aspects of such “simple” sense perceptions; such perception 
is here depicted as simple and direct only by contrast with categorial perception. 
159 Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, § 48, pp. 287-89. 
160 One distinction of the categorial level is the greater flexibility (or “spontaneity”) that we experience in 
our constitution of objectivities there.  For there we can constitute different syntactic arrangements on the 
basis of a single sensuous intuition, while we do not have the same freedom to vary our sensation of an 
individual: whereas we can only sense this same page when we direct our gaze to it (albeit from different 
sides, under different lights, etc.), we can constitute innumerable categorial objectivities on the basis of 
what we thus sense.   To take Husserl’s example, even the categorial act in which we judge that “A … has 
α” and the very closely correlated act in which we judge that “α is in A” constitute different categorial 
objectivities upon the same underlying sensuous material (Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, § 48, pp. 287-
89). 
161 “In the case of a perceptual statement”, such as ours regarding the marks, as Husserl says, it is “not only 
the inwrought nominal presentations that are fulfilled”, i.e. not only marks and black and alignment that are 
seen.  Instead, “the whole sense of the statement finds fulfillment through our underlying percept” (Logical 
Investigations, Inv. VI, § 40, p. 271).  This is more clearly seen in an example that Rosado Haddock has 
raised.  Take the two expressions he offers to demonstrate that intuition is not exclusively sensuous: “‘John 
and Peter are in the park’ and ‘John or Peter is in the park’”.  These statements cannot be confirmed 
through merely sensuous perception, because “the formal constituents of [those] statements”, including 
“’is’, ‘and’, [and] ‘or’”, “do not have any direct counterpart in sensible perception”.  Yet statements with 
various formal constituents (such as ‘and’ and ‘or’ in our present pair) can clearly have “different truth 
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intuition not only of sensuous individuals and their features, but also of complex 
objectivities involving copulative, conjunctive, and other formal relations.  We are 
intuitively given syntactically formed wholes that could not be apart from categorial acts; 
our “categorially structured meanings”, and not only our pre-predicative sensuous 
anticipations, “find fulfillment”.162  Now, this thesis that we have categorial intuition, 
which for Kant would have amounted to a contradiction in terms,163 Husserl presents as 
the result of a successful description of what “no previous critique of knowledge has 
made tolerably clear”.164  And the many phenomenologists who have since revered it as a 
crowning achievement of the Investigations, whether or not they and Husserl are correct 
in their assessment, at least indicate thereby how distinctive the thesis is supposed to be.  
Yet a very similar thesis can be found in Stumpf’s work.  
Before Husserl produced the Investigations, Stumpf had already forged their not 
quite Kantian path between Empiricist and Rationalist understandings of knowledge.165  
In particular, as Dallas Willard has highlighted, Stumpf had already affirmed the 
possibility “that out of two presentations a third and new one should arise, which in no 
                                                                                                                                                 
conditions” (as our pair do), and can clearly be confirmed or refuted.  There thus must be some “fulfillment 
of the meanings of such formal constituents of statements” (“Husserl’s Epistemology of Mathematics”, 
Husserl or Frege?, pp. 222-223).  
162 Logical Investigations, Investigation Vi, § 45, p. 280. 
163 When Husserl introduces “universal intuition”, one type of categorial intuition, in the sixth 
Investigation, he similarly notes that this “expression … no doubt will not seem better to many than 
‘wooden iron’” (§ 52, p. 292). 
164 Logical Investigations, VI, § 53, p. 295. 
165 One initial clue of this lies in Husserl’s attribution (to Stumpf) of his third Investigation’s basic 
distinction, viz. the distinction between dependent and independent parts.  (Husserl recognizes his debt for 
this distinction on the opening page of the third Investigation; for the original, see Stumpf’s Über den 
Psychologischen Ursprung der Raumorstellung, §§ 5-6 of chapter 1.)  Husserl’s recognition of the formal 
relations that obtain between certain parts, which he calls “moments”, pushes him to posit objectivities that 
are themselves categorial or ideal; and such objectivities would be capable of fulfilling categorial — as 
opposed to pre-syntactic, purely sensual — intentions. Husserl’s inheritance of a mereological thesis thus 
leads to his inheritance of a thesis regarding knowledge.   
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wise is the mere sum of the earlier ones”.166  That is, Stumpf had noticed that certain 
conscious acts (or “functions”, to use his preferred term) emerge on the basis of 
sensations to which they nonetheless cannot be reduced; and he had suggested that 
complex objects emerge with these complex acts, and can be presented within such acts.  
Stumpf had thereby anticipated three of Husserl’s crucial contentions: he had, before 
Husserl, appropriated Brentano’s thesis that all conscious experience is intentional, and 
more specifically the contention that every presentation is constitutively a presentation of 
something to someone;167 he had argued that there are various, increasingly complex 
types of presentations, distinguishing sensations from judgments and abstractions;168 and 
he had beat Husserl to the punch by thus suggesting that increasingly complex types of 
objects must be presented within our increasingly complex types of presentations.   
By thus preparing the way for Husserl’s distinctive account of knowledge, Stumpf 
also functioned as a necessary condition in the development of Husserl’s theory of 
meaning.  For the two sides of that theory of meaning are each intimately related to the 
thesis that some intuition is categorial.  On one side, the thesis of categorial intuition 
                                                 
166 Stumpf, Über den Psychologischen Ursprung der Raumorstellung (Leipzig: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 
1873), p. 5, quoted by Dallas Willard on p. 34 of Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge (Athens: Ohio 
University Press, 1984).  I slightly modify Willard’s translation, with “presentation” rather than 
“representation” for “Vorstellung”.   
167 This is obvious already in Über den Psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung.  See also 
Stumpf’s 1906 essay titled “Erscheinungen und psychische Funktionen”.   
168 More precisely, Stumpf makes three distinctions among types of presentations, on pp. 3-4 of Über den 
Psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung.  He first distinguishes “sensations”, such as I would have 
if someone “played [me] a tone”, from “phantasy-“ and “memory-presentations”, in which I imagine or 
remember a tone “without it being played”.  He then distinguishes “concrete presentations”, such as those 
that occur in sensing and imagining, from “abstract presentations”, such as I might have if, having “heard 
many sounds”, I “speak generally of a tone”.  And he finally distinguishes the “simple presentation” of 
sensed, imagined, or abstract individuals, from “complex presentation”.  It is this last distinction (which, 
along with the others, so formed the fabric of Husserl’s thinking that he adopted them into his writing 
almost without explanation) that provides the chief prelude to Husserl’s claim that some intuition is 
categorial.  It tellingly occurs in a section in which Stumpf, defining his fundamental terms, invokes the 
term “presentation” as a means of avoiding a false choice between Kantian and Empiricist epistemological 
frameworks. 
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serves to define what Husserl considers the space of the ideal, i.e. the domain of meaning.  
Roughly that kind of sense is ideal, according to Husserl, which arises from categorial 
acts.169  Signification proper is distinguished from pre-syntactic sense by belonging 
exclusively to the sphere of acts and objects that are categorial: an act of meaning is 
nothing more nor less than a categorial act, and categorial objects are those that require 
acts of meaning for their constitution.  Insofar as Stumpf was responsible for the 
differentiation of categorial acts from other acts, then, he was thereby also responsible for 
providing Husserl with an initial specification of the nature of meaning: he helped 
Husserl to specify the sphere of the ideal.  On the other side, and more important, 
Stumpf’s division of “complex” acts and objects also functioned as an inspiration behind 
Husserl’s search for the origin of objective signification.  When Husserl writes of such an 
“origin”, we should notice, he is referring to the acts that are structurally necessary for 
that which is originated on their basis: he is referring to (a) whatever kinds of (complex) 
acts are necessary for the meanings that are originated (which acts cannot in their turn be 
reduced to their simpler constituents), as well as to (b) the kinds of simple acts on which 
those complex acts are based.  Thus, as Willard has indicated, Husserl’s sustained search 
for the origins of meanings (whether, early on, for the “psychological origin” of the 
concept of number, or, later, for the “phenomenological origin”, of signification more 
broadly) appears to have taken its shape from Stumpf’s prior discussions of 
“psychological origins”.170  For Husserl does not follow the empiricist program of 
                                                 
169 See Logical Investigations, Inv. 6, § 46, p. 282.  Husserl there begins to use “categorial” and “ideal” as 
roughly equivalent terms.  The terms may remain only approximately equivalent insofar as certain acts of 
pre-syntactic “simple recognition” already involve ideal concepts but are not yet categorial.   
170 Logic and the Objectivity of Knowledge, pp. 31-33.  Early on, when Husserl was attempting to present a 
“psychological origin” of meaning, he was careful to specify that in so doing he was nonetheless engaged 
in a “descriptive” rather than a “genetic” psychological project.  Later, when Husserl had established a 
greater distance between the character of psychology and that of his own research, and chose to apply the 
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seeking an efficient cause when he seeks an origin; he does not, e.g., attempt a physio-
psychological reduction of mental phenomena to stimulations of the nervous system.  
Instead, Husserl’s inquiry into origins has the same style as Stumpf’s: “the question of 
the origin of a presentation leads [him] to the several act-parts of which that presentation 
is composed and teaches [him] … about precisely their contents”.171  It is for this reason 
that, when Husserl seeks the source of significations, he arrives at intentional 
experiences, and specifically at acts that cannot be reduced to mere sense-perceptions: 
seeking the origin of meanings leads Husserl to acts the contents of which cannot be 
reduced to the contents of sense-perceptions.  Thus Husserl shows by Stumpfian means 
that sense-perceptions alone cannot serve as the source of meaning; and he also 
concludes by these means that other intentional experiences, irreducible to sense-
perceptions, are necessary for signification and for its fulfillment.  It is by following in 
Stumpf’s footsteps, then, that Husserl arrives at his crucial and seemingly psychologistic 
claim that signification has its source in certain kinds of intentional experiences. 
That Husserl so adopted Stumpf’s not quite Kantian or Empiricist approach to the 
origin of ideas is hugely important for the former’s theory of meaning.  Yet, despite that 
Stumpf was such a vital source for Husserl’s claims about the source of signification, we 
still would be mistaken to portray Stumpf as the primary influence behind Husserl’s more 
nearly psychologistic view of meaning.172  For, to the extent that Husserl did inherit an 
almost psychologistic direction from Stumpf, Stumpf in turn had appropriated that 
                                                                                                                                                 
“genetic” title to certain investigations of his own, the genesis that he sought to trace again was not of an 
efficient-causal kind. 
171 Über den Psychologischen Ursprung der Raumvorstellung, foreword, p. 5. 
172 We would be mistaken in part because Stumpf in fact took an intermediate stance on the question of 
what psychology can contribute to logic, like Husserl would after him, rather than simply pushing his 
student toward psychologism and away from logicism.  Cf. Stumpf’s 1891 essay “Psychologie und 
Erkenntnistheorie”. 
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tendency from Brentano.  Stumpf arrived at his seemingly psychologistic insight that 
certain mental functions are necessary for complex objectivities thanks to the descriptive 
type of “psychology”, with its analysis of intentional experiences, which he inherited 
from Brentano.  While a sine qua non, his influence on Husserl’s work was secondary.  
We are led back once more to find that Brentano was the primary source behind 
Husserl’s almost psychologistic tendency, much as Bolzano was the primary source 
behind Husserl’s more logicist tendency.  
We must face but one more lingering challenge to the view that Brentano and 
Bolzano, alone, were the primary sources behind the Investigations’ theory of meaning.  
It is presented by a brief depiction that Husserl offered of that work’s many influences.   
In the foreword to the first edition of the Prolegomena, Husserl writes the following:  
“The course of my development has led to my drawing apart, as regards basic 
logical  convictions, from men and writings to whom I owe most of my 
philosophical education, and to my drawing rather closer to a group of thinkers 
whose writings I was not able to estimate rightly … ”.173 
Reading this, we should be struck by the categories in terms of which Husserl acted out 
and understood his own history.  First, it is notable that Husserl presents himself as 
having oscillated between two modes of understanding logic.  Having begun with “the 
assumption that psychology was the science from which logic … had to hope for 
philosophical clarification”, Husserl then “became more and more disquieted by doubts 
of principle, as to how to reconcile the objectivity of … all science in general, with a 
psychological foundation for logic”.174  Husserl thus moved, by his own lights, from the 
                                                 
173 Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, pp. 2-3. 
174 Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, p. 2. 
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more psychologistic view of logic that he appears to attribute to Brentano, Stumpf, and 
others “to whom [Husserl] owe[d] most of [his] philosophical education”, into the more 
logicist understanding conveyed by writings, such as those of Bolzano and Frege, that he 
did not at first “estimate rightly”.  Second, it is striking that Husserl depicts himself as 
having moved between two groups that are divided by their understanding of the 
meanings at issue in logic: he refers to multiple influences behind both his more 
psychologistic and his more logicist trajectories, and he does so without naming any 
singular thinker(s) as especially influential.  Should we not take this as a warning against 
overstating the importance of any two such figures?   
While Husserl’s terse intellectual autobiography should preclude all attempts to 
conceive of any two individuals as solely responsible for his theory of meaning’s zig and 
zag, we by now have a basis for according Brentano and Bolzano first or primary status 
among Husserl’s many non-equal influences.  For we have seen how the network of 
influences behind Husserl’s 1900-01 theory of meaning, while complicated, is 
nonetheless binary: we have confirmed the two-pronged explanation of that theory that 
Benoist, among others, has sketched, while adding some finer details to its broader 
brushstrokes.  Indeed, whereas Husserl laments, in his brief account of his development, 
that he “unfortunately [had] to abstain from any … insertion of comprehensive literary 
and critical references”, the most major of those connections that Husserl left cryptic we 
can now see.175  
According to Husserl’s account, it was first of all “questions regarding the origin 
of the basic concepts and insights of mathematics”, along with “difficult questions of 
mathematical theory and method”, which set him on the path toward the Logical 
                                                 
175 Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, p. 3. 
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Investigations.176  Having seen something of Husserl’s history, we may now safely 
surmise that Husserl took over these questions from Weierstrass, before receiving any 
very direct exposure to either Brentano or Bolzano.  For, with the academic “ethos” that 
Husserl inherited from Weierstrass, he thereby also received the beginnings of a double 
orientation toward logic and meaning: he was motivated toward recognizing the 
irreducibility of ideal formations and, at the same time, toward clarifying their origins.  
He was “pushed”, i.e., “toward general reflections on the essence of logic, and on the 
relationship, in particular, between the subjectivity of knowing and the objectivity of the 
content known” — toward reflections on the relationship that is at issue in the 
Investigations.177  
In order to consider whether our experience of meaning founds the objectivity of 
meaning, however, Husserl was forced to move beyond the scope of Weierstrass’ work.  
Husserl thus became, per his own record, chiefly indebted to several thinkers who 
belonged either to one more logicist group or to another more psychologistic group.178  
Beyond noting Weierstrass’ contribution, we have now identified many of these other 
influences to whom Husserl alludes (in his brief account of the path by which he arrived 
at the Investigations), and have sorted their contributions as more logicist or more 
psychologistic.  We have seen, moreover, how these multiple influences’ varied 
contributions to Husserl’s 1900-01 theory of meaning built onto or buttressed a 
framework that was inherited primarily from two thinkers.  On one side, we have seen 
how Bolzano was chiefly responsible for Husserl’s view of meanings and truths “in 
themselves”: Lotze enabled Husserl to accept Bolzano’s view of independent logical 
                                                 
176 Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, p. 1. 
177 Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, p. 2. 
178 Logical Investigations, foreword to the first edition, pp. 2-3. 
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objects, by arguing that such meanings could be understood as the species of so many 
actual and possible acts of meaning, but Husserl regarded Lotze’s own logic much less 
highly than he did Bolzano’s.  Frege’s criticisms of Husserl’s more psychologistic early 
views regarding the objects and truths of mathematics functioned as defenses for 
Bolzano’s view, and may have sharpened or served to further substantiate Husserl’s 
already burgeoning anti-psychologism, but Frege’s criticisms did not create Husserl’s 
opposition to the relativizing fallout of psychological reductionism.  Lotze and Frege thus 
served primarily to make the Bolzanian view of ideal significations that Husserl accepted 
more palatable and more defensible (respectively).  On the other side, we have seen how 
Brentano’s psychology was primarily responsible for Husserl’s view that a kind of 
intentional experience is necessary for objective significations: Stumpf precipitated 
Husserl’s understanding of categorial intuition, and thus specified a kind of intentional 
experience by which we have epistemic access to categorial objectivities, but this 
specification was a development within Brentano’s mode of reflection on acts of 
meaning.  Cantor helped Husserl to develop and refine his understanding of how we 
abstract mathematical concepts, yet Husserl’s whole view of abstraction was but one 
component built into his view of categorial acts, which was in turn a component built into 
his view of intentional experience.  It is quite possible, then, that, without Stumpf and 
Cantor, Husserl would not have been as able to recognize several tiers of intentional 
experiences, nor to reach clarity about the types of sense that are correlated with those 
tiers: Stumpf assisted Husserl in distinguishing mere sensations from categorially formed 
significations, and Cantor contributed to Husserl’s distinction between those categorially 
formed significations that refer partly to sensuous materials and those that (like the 
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concepts of numbers) require no such reference.  Yet these distinctions were achieved 
within a framework provided by Brentano’s descriptive psychology, and they acquired 
their significance for Husserl’s theory of meaning from Brentano’s suggestion that 
signification essentially belongs within the context of certain kinds of intentional 
experiences.    
What I have called “Benoist’s thesis” regarding Husserl’s development is thus 
confirmed.  That thesis, according to which the Investigations’ two-sided theory of 
meaning is a “synthesis” of two earlier thinkers’ treatments of meaning, prompts 
numerous objections; but I have now considered and largely deflected the most 
prominent of those possible objections.  To wit: I have granted that Husserl’s oscillation 
between conflicting views of meaning was inspired by multiple influences on both sides; 
I have granted too that some of those influences contributed to both of the opposed 
orientations present within Husserl’s logical studies; and yet Bolzano and Brentano, 
respectively, still appear to have been the two primary sources behind Husserl’s more 
logicist and more psychologistic views of meaning.  Of course, I can readily grant also 
that the historical reality of philosophical influence behind Husserl’s theory of meaning is 
much more complicated than the picture that I have constructed: I expect, e.g., that 
Bolzano’s logic and Brentano’s psychology had their own historical roots, and that it 
would be possible to follow the two streams in Husserl’s theory of meaning back to 
partial sources in the logic of Leibniz and the psychology of Hume, and back much 
further still to the logic and psychology of Aristotle.  Yet the history so far uncovered 
allows us to see this much: Husserl in 1900-01 understood meaning as an act primarily 
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because of Brentano, and at the same time viewed meaning as a set of transcendent 
objects chiefly because of Bolzano.   
We can now proceed with a sense of the important components within Husserl’s 
theory of meaning that were built onto that partly Brentanian, partly Bolzanian base, and 
with an awareness of the sources behind those important secondary components.  But, 
most important, we can now sensibly narrow our focus onto the reasons that Brentano 
and Bolzano offered in support of their views, in order to understand why Husserl came 
to hold his own, discordant account of meaning.  We can turn to those arguments that 
Bolzano devised within his account of logic, and to those descriptions that Brentano 
articulated within his psychology, and expect to find the grounds by which Husserl 
became convinced of his two conflicting views of meaning.  
 
 
4: The evidentiary basis of Husserl’s dyadic semantics 
 
4.1: Two opposing persuasions 
 
 In this chapter, I present the Bolzanian and Brentanian lines of reasoning that 
constitute the grounds for Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning.  Beginning with 
Bolzano’s work before turning to Brentano’s, I distill the relevant arguments and 
descriptions, weigh their strength, and indicate the way in which Husserl adopted these 
pieces of reasoning within his own theory of meaning.  I thus seek to show how Husserl 
was compelled toward a synthesis of logical and psychological accounts of meaning by 
the things themselves.  Finally, I highlight the problems inherent in any effort to reconcile 
Bolzano’s well-founded conclusions about objective meanings with Brentano’s insights 
concerning acts of meaning.  
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4.2: Meaning as transcendent object: arguments from Bolzano’s logic 
 
4.2.1: A meta-scientific logical persuasion 
 
 Like Husserl would after him, Bolzano affirmed that certain semantic formations 
are independent of our passing experiences.  Also like Husserl, Bolzano included the 
conceptual parts of propositions among these formations, along with all whole 
propositions in general and “truths” (i.e., true propositions) in particular.  In what follows 
I reconstruct some of the better arguments that Bolzano offered in defense of his claims 
that there are “ideas in themselves”, “propositions in themselves” and “truths in 
themselves”, and show how Husserl appropriated these arguments in the Logical 
Investigations.  I aim to thus clarify why, and in what sense, Husserl was convinced that 
such meanings are “objects” that transcend “being thought” and “being expressed”.179 
 
4.2.2: Concepts as objects 
 For a point of departure, we may turn our attention to a few terms and their 
significations — apart from the propositional contexts in which those terms may occur.  
To take a few of Husserl’s favorite examples, consider the noun phrases “the color red”, 
“the note C”, “the number four”, and “triangle”.  On the view that Bolzano proposes in 
his Theory of Science, “what is designated” by these and all significant terms is 
“objective ideas” (objektiven Vorstellungen), or, as Bolzano also calls them, “ideas in 
                                                 
179 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 35, p. 233. 
 80 
themselves”.180  On this view, there are objective unities of sense that we call to mind by 
the particular linguistic signs we choose to employ: There is an idea of the color red, 
which idea may itself become the object of our thought, and which is distinct from the 
several individual presentations, or “subjective ideas”, that we each may have of red.  
There is an idea of the note C that cannot be localized to a particular time, as the several 
soundings and our several lived experiences of the note C can.  There is likewise an idea 
of four that cannot be reduced to any individual’s passing notions of four.  Bolzano does 
not contend, then, that we all have the same mental experience when we understand the 
word “four”, or that each individual always has the same subjective idea in mind when 
speaking of the color red or the note C.  Nor is it Bolzano’s view that we all always have 
the same idea, psychologically speaking, when thinking of a triangle.  Perhaps a first 
person has in mind a clear image of an equilateral triangle, a second person an image of a 
right triangle, and most others no image at all; and, in any case, each of our thoughts 
occurs at a particular moment within the stream of a particular psyche, belongs to an 
individual history with its patterns of association, recognition, and so on, and in this way 
is somewhat different from the other thoughts that someone might have of a triangle.  
Bolzano’s contention, instead, is that each of these “subjective idea[s] is the occurrence 
in the mind of an objective one”, such that there is, for example, an objective idea of a 
triangle shared by our different “subjective ideas”, through which shared and objective 
idea we can jointly arrive at certain intersubjectively available truths.181  His view is that 
there is, in the case of each of our “subjective ideas”, and in the case of each “subjective 
                                                 
180 Bolzano, Theory of Science: Attempt at a detailed and in the main novel exposition of logic with 
constant attention to earlier authors, trans. Rolf Georg (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972), § 
48, p. 61. 
181 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 52, p. 66. 
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idea” that someone might have but we do not, a “certain something which constitutes the 
immediate matter (Stoff) of [that] subjective idea, and which is not to be found in the 
realm of the real” — an objective idea that remains the same even though there may be 
various “corresponding subjective idea[s]” in our different instances of thinking.182  
Bolzano emphatically denies that these objective ideas exist; thus, none of his objective 
ideas is a literal “something”; he is adamant that such ideas do not have a spatially 
definite and temporally unfolding (i.e., thing-like) being.  Yet he affirms that each 
objective idea “subsists”, in some sense — “even though no thinking being may have 
it”.183  In short, then, Bolzano articulates the following schema: for each objective idea, 
there may be a word or words that we use to express that idea; there may be some 
subjective idea(s), i.e. some occurrence(s) in one or more minds of that objective idea; 
there is the objective idea; and there may be one or more objects (whether “existing” 
individuals or non-existing ideal objects) to which we can refer by way of the objective 
idea.184  Bolzano knew in advance that “many philosophers” would reject his “concept of 
an idea in itself” — he anticipated being “told how curious or even nonsensical it is to 
speak of ideas which nobody has” — yet he was convinced, for several reasons, that he 
was “justified in asserting that this concept has reference”.185 
                                                 
182 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 48, p. 62.  The word “something” here is somewhat deceptive: although 
Bolzano affirms that each objective idea “subsists … as a certain something even though no thinking being 
may have it“, he emphatically denies that such ideas exist, i.e. that they have a spatially definite and 
temporally unfolding being. 
183 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 48, p. 62. 
184 As an example of this schema, Bolzano bids his readers to consider the expression, “Greek 
philosopher”.  In this case, there is of course the written or sounded set of letter signs — “a physical object” 
that “exists at a certain time and in a certain location”; there is then my present understanding of the term, 
“Greek philosopher”, and the somewhat different understandings of that term which other thinkers have 
had and do have; there is then a shared but single (however complex and vaguely delimited) objective idea 
of a Greek philosopher, which idea does not exist in space and time, and does not pass as our developing 
understandings do; and there is, finally, “Socrates, Plato, and others”, the (in this case, now or once 
existing) objects of the idea (Theory of Science, § 49, pp. 62-63).   
185 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 50, p. 64. 
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Husserl became largely persuaded by these reasons while involved in a similar 
dispute.  Husserl saw his contemporaries, like those before them, asking what status to 
accord to the significations of terms such as “red”, “the note C”, “four” and “triangle”.  
Are such significations objective, and even no less transcendent of our passing thoughts 
than things such as seas and stars are, or are they instead merely functions of our passing 
mental acts?  Husserl framed this dispute as one between “idealism” and “psychologism”.  
The position that Husserl in this context calls “idealism” consists in “defending the 
intrinsic right of specific (or ideal) objects to be granted objective status alongside of 
individual (or real) objects”.186   This idealism, then, is “not a metaphysical doctrine”; at 
any rate, it is not the metaphysical doctrine often connoted by “idealism”, according to 
which everything is mind-dependent.187  For it is psychologism, instead, that regards all 
significations (and all other ideal objects) as essentially dependent on the passing 
processes of our minds.  It is the psychologistic thinker who regards the idea of a triangle 
as a human invention, which was created and is presently sustained only by contingent 
mental processes.  Now Husserl, like Bolzano, opposes this latter view.  He characterizes 
the psychologistic viewpoint as one that “altogether fails to grasp what is specific”, i.e. as 
one that is not able to recognize that some possible objects of our thought are not 
individuals, and that further portrays its “inability to do so … as a virtue”.188  Husserl 
opts instead for an idealist view of ideas that approximates Bolzano’s, according to which 
                                                 
186 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, Introduction.  Husserl offers an alternative, more epistemological, 
definition in the same place: one is an “idealist” if and only if one “recognizes the ‘ideal’ as a condition for 
the possibility of objective knowledge in general, and does not ‘interpret it away’ in psychologistic 
fashion” (ibid.).  
187 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, Introduction. 
188 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, Introduction. 
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the meanings of “four”, “triangle”, “red”, and the like, can be objects of our thinking and 
are independent of our thinking.189  
What basis for this view did Bolzano give to Husserl? What reasons did Bolzano 
provide in support of the idealist position, and against the psychologistic position, 
regarding the meaning of terms?  We may extract Bolzano’s reasoning, and the seeds it 
contains of an argument that Husserl would later make, from the beginning of the second 
book of Bolzano’s Theory of Science.  In that second book, Bolzano attempts to clarify 
the “elements” out of which any science, or “aggregate of truths of a certain kind”, is 
composed.190  He begins the book with the pieces of an argument that Husserl would later 
develop — a case that there are objective ideas distinct from our subjective ideas. What 
reasons did Bolzano thus provide for thinking that there are objective ideas?  
Broadly speaking, the thrust of Bolzano’s argument consists in directing our 
attention to the smallest units within the enduring fabric of science, and in seeking to 
show that these logical units must be invariant through psychologically diverse 
reiterations.  His focus, i.e., is on the ideas that the words in scientific literature call to 
mind — the ideas out of which science is built. His claim is that these ideas may be 
presented by several numerically different subjective ideas, and that each such “objective 
idea” remains identical throughout those several subjective presentations.  Each 
“objective” idea, he contends, “is not multiplied when it is thought by one, two, three, or 
more beings, unlike the corresponding subjective idea, which is present many times”.191  
In support of this assertion, he directs his readers to take “any word” as a test case: 
“unless it is ambiguous”, he writes, each word “designates only one objective idea” — 
                                                 
189 See below for remarks on Husserl’s view of the concept-object relation. 
190 Bolzano, Theory of Science, Introduction, § 1, p. 1. 
191 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 48, p. 62. 
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while conversely “there are innumerable subjective ideas which [this same word] causes, 
and their number grows with every moment it is in use”.192  In order to follow Bolzano’s 
instructions, let us consider the term “dementia”.  In contrast to ambiguous terms, which 
have multiple, plainly separate meanings, non-ambiguous words such as “dementia” have 
single (even if complex) meanings that we could begin to determine without first having 
to specify in which separate sense we are using the word.193  That is, terms such as 
dementia each have a unified (though perhaps broad and somewhat contextually 
dependent) meaning.  Indeed, our whole body of scientific literature, by which 
individuals have successfully passed on purported knowledge for generations, 
presupposes that we regularly understand one another’s uses of terms like “dementia” — 
that we successfully grasp the same meaning when the sign is used.  For example, 
medical texts that discuss dementia, identifying its symptoms and differentiating the 
dementia associated with Alzheimer’s disease from other forms of dementia, presuppose 
that “dementia” can have the same general meaning for multiple readers.  To be sure, this 
hardly entails that a word like “dementia” consistently conjures up the same 
connotations.  On the contrary, the expansiveness of the word’s extension and the 
diversity of our experiences make certain that it will not.  But the fact that we can and do 
achieve a shared understanding, in and through multiple different processes of thinking, 
seems to require a distinction: we thus seem required to distinguish between a kind of 
idea in virtue of which we may understand each other’s uses of a term, and a set of 
variable “subjective ideas” that each of us, while drawing from our variable experiences, 
                                                 
192 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 48, p. 62. 
193 If we were composing a dictionary entry for dementia, we might need to distinguish subtypes, such as an 
Alzheimer’s disease type and a non-Alzheimer’s disease type, yet any broadness and vagueness would 
inhere in a single meaning; if we were composing an entry for “bear”, by contrast, we would presumably 
have to begin by separating the verb (as in “bear the weight”) and the noun (as in grizzly bear). 
 85 
associate with that term.  Numerous “subjective ideas … occur in the minds of 
[Bolzano’s] readers when they see” any strictly non-ambiguous word from one of his 
writings — and yet the existence of the scientific enterprise presupposes that these 
readers can nonetheless reach a joint understanding.194  On this basis, Bolzano concludes 
that there must be objective ideas, distinct from our subjective presentations insofar as 
they are invariant and commonly accessible across psychologically different 
presentations. 
Husserl adapts this inferential move in the second of his Logical Investigations.  
There he, following Bolzano, appeals to the reiterability of invariant concepts in order to 
establish the objectivity of concepts.  If the basic units of signification are “self-identical” 
across different acts of understanding, the reasoning runs, then they have no less claim to 
objectivity than subsisting material things. 
Husserl’s deployment of this reasoning differs from Bolzano’s in its details and 
scope but is continuous with Bolzano’s in its general direction.  It begins very much like 
Bolzano’s, with Husserl utilizing a direct and descriptive approach akin to that which 
Bolzano employs.  More specifically, Husserl begins his straightforward support for the 
thesis of conceptual objectivity by focusing on our experience of understanding nouns.  
In our significant use and understanding of all nouns, Husserl contends, there is a 
conceptual dimension that must be distinguished from the physical elements of 
expression and the psychological aspects of our experience.  For while our acts of 
speaking and silently understanding, with their psychological and physical parts, quickly 
pass by — like all else in “the domain of real [realen] being, the sphere of temporality” 
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— the meanings of the nouns that we use cannot be similarly fixed to spatial and 
temporal locations.195  Here is the case as Husserl makes it: 
“If we understand a name — whether standing for what is individual or general, 
physical or psychic, existent or non-existent, possible or impossible — … then 
what [that] expression says — the meaning which forms its logical content and 
which, in contexts of  pure logic, is called either an idea or a concept — … is 
nothing which could, in a real [realen] sense, count as part of our act of 
understanding”.196 
We are forced into “the distinction … between the psychological and logical content of 
our expressions and expressive acts”, then, because the logical or conceptual dimension 
of our understanding of nouns cannot be a mere moment of a temporal (or realen) 
thought process.197  For while “the psychic stuff … involved” in our experience of 
understanding nouns “is well known to be vastly manifold, varying greatly from one 
individual to the next, and for the same individual from one moment to another”, this 
“multiplication of persons and acts does not multiply … meanings”.198  However many 
thinkers use a non-ambiguous term, in numerous instances and with varied associations, 
there stands out against this varied multiplicity a single and self-same meaning of that 
term.  And while the same noun or other term may of course acquire novel meanings 
through our stipulative and playful uses of old terms, these meanings can only be novel 
with reference to the self-same meaning(s) previously attached to the same term.  Our 
capacity to endlessly re-make language by ascribing new senses to old symbols and 
                                                 
195 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 31, p. 230. 
196 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 30, p. 228. 
197 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 31, p. 229. 
198 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 31, p. 229. 
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sounds, far from exposing an essential variability of concepts themselves, rather only 
further exposes the distinction that Husserl seeks to draw: the endless variability of our 
associations, whether in associating different images and feelings with an unambiguous 
word or in annexing novel meanings to a consequently ambiguous word, stands out in 
relief from a stable conceptual background, viz. the invariant meaning that we once used 
(and may still use) the word to carry.  We are able to discern the variability of the 
associations that we tie to an unambiguous word partly because, “over against this 
unbounded multiplicity of individual experiences, is the self-same element expressed in 
them all”; we are able to detect when a word becomes equivocal through the attachment 
of a novel meaning because the word’s old meaning remains the same.199 
 In this direct stage of his support for conceptual objectivity, then, Husserl in effect 
simply prompts his readers to examine their own experience of understanding nouns to 
see if they do not find what he does.  “I see”, he writes, “that in repeated acts of 
presentation … I mean, or can mean, the same concept”.200  He points up several ways in 
which this appears to be so: he contends that each concept “can be compared with other 
meanings and distinguished from them”, that each “can be an identical subject for 
numerous predicates, an identical term in numerous relations”, that each “can be summed 
together with other meanings and counted as a unit”, and that each “can in its turn serve 
as the basis for many new meanings”.201  And indeed, we appear to at least act as though 
concepts can be treated in these ways.  Take, for instance, the concept of red.  We invoke 
this concept, when we use the word “red”, as though we can share and repeat it; we speak 
as though we can group it with and distinguish it from other objects, such as the other 
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color concepts; we act as though we can make predications of it as a subject, as we might, 
for example, in stating that “the concept of red requires a material basis in a way that the 
concept of four does not”; and so on.  Husserl’s contention is that we could not act in 
these ways, as though concepts were “self-identical”, if they were not: “A meaning can 
be treated as self-identical only because it is self-identical”.202  This self-identity of 
concepts in their reiteration is the first reason Husserl offers for thinking that concepts are 
objective.  
 While Husserl argues, in this Bolzanian way, that concepts can serve as stable 
objects of thought, he is not satisfied with such straightforward support for conceptual 
objectivity. Though he appropriates Bolzano’s reason for thinking that there are objective 
ideas, in other words, he is not satisfied with the bare derivation of conceptual objectivity 
from conceptual reiterability.  He also bolsters Bolzano’s argument in two indirect ways.  
First, he seeks to elucidate how concepts are objective, by taking efforts beyond those 
Bolzano had made toward describing the complex concept-object relation.  Second, he 
also bolsters his conclusion by attacking the contrary view that individuals alone possess 
objective status, and by undermining prevalent arguments against the objectivity of 
concepts.  In order to appreciate how Husserl appropriated Bolzano’s quasi-logicist view 
that concepts are objective, then, we should consider in turn these two indirect defenses 
for his Bolzanian view. 
 As a first indirect means of support, Husserl seeks to preemptively deflate 
objections that would arise from the failure to understand his conclusion.  He is cautious 
to delimit what he takes himself to have shown — to clarify what it means to have 
concluded that concepts are objective.  For, given certain approaches to concepts that 
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were prevalent within modern philosophy, we might expect the conclusion that concepts 
are objective to mean that the objects of our thinking are typically or even exclusively 
concepts — and Husserl emphatically denies this.  Again and again, he opposes the 
conflation of meanings with the objects that we intend in acts of meaning, much as he 
opposes the conflation of sensations with a sensed object.203  Instead, he emphasizes how 
our encounter with the objects that we intend through significations has a tripartite 
structure. The structure of this encounter is such, according to Husserl, that significations 
first of all serve as the means whereby our categorial acts intend categorial objects, and 
only then can become objects of our thought, in second-order acts.  It is almost a maxim 
for Husserl: we may speak of meanings, but at first we speak by way of meanings, and 
not of meanings.204  So, at what is the first level in this context, we direct our attention to 
states of affairs and abstracted objects, for which certain propositional meanings or 
concepts serve as presentations, i.e. as more or less adequately fulfilled intentions; only 
on that basis can we then turn our attention to concepts and propositions themselves.  I 
might say to my wife, for example, that the door is locked, and thereby direct our focus, 
by way of my expression’s meaning, to the state of affairs that the door is locked (or not).  
She might then, perhaps while wondering to which door I was referring, turn her attention 
to the meaning of my statement, taking that signification as the object of her thought — 
                                                 
203 Husserl regards the view that ideas are the typical objects of our sensation and thought as a slight but 
crucial error that infected much of modern philosophy: “even those who would refuse to say with 
Schopenhauer that ‘the world is my idea’,” he writes, “are accustomed to speak as if apparent things were 
compounded out of sense-contents”; and Husserl “often stressed” his contrary view that “it does not do to 
confuse a color-sensation with an apparent bodily coloring, the sensation of form with bodily form etc.” 
(Logical Investigations, Inv. VI, appendix 5, p. 343).  WIth objects that are merely sensed and objects of 
categorial acts, for Husserl, we must distinguish our “intentional experience [from] the apparent object (the 
subject of the objective predicates)” (Inv. V, § 7, p. 90). 
204 Take, as just one example, the following assertion from the end of Logical Investigations, Inv. I (§ 34, p. 
232): “If we perform the act [of meaning] and live in it, as it were, we naturally refer to its object and not to 
its meaning. … Logical reflection [then] sets in at later stages, and an identical propositional meaning is 
continuously meant in it, … and thought of as one and the same.” 
 90 
but we can only thus take a statement’s meaning as an object in a secondary act.  Or, in 
order to familiarize my young nephew with the number four, I might say, “one more than 
three”, perhaps while counting the members of various collections.  In so doing I would 
use a certain concept of four to direct his attention to the number four itself: employing 
the concept that I express by “one greater than three”, I would turn his focus to a member 
of the number series that is not comprehensively presented by the concept that I have 
employed.205  I would turn his attention, i.e., not to the concept that I employ, but to a 
member of the number series that may be accurately presented by various other concepts 
and propositions.206  Still I could also, in secondary acts, reflect on the concept expressed 
by “one greater than three”.  I can reflect, e.g., on how that concept differs from other 
concepts with the same referent of four, such as those expressed by “second smallest 
even number” and “square root of sixteen”.  While concepts can serve as stable objects of 
our thought, then, we may so take concepts (and any other significations) as objects only 
on the basis of first-order acts in which concepts function as intermediaries, rather than 
end-points, of reference.  Husserl takes pains to clarify precisely this complexity of the 
concept-object relation that Bolzano had left less clear.207 
                                                 
205 It is perhaps necessary to note here the breadth that Husserl attributes to the class of concepts.  On his 
view, there are not only concepts expressed by common nouns such as “red” and “triangle”; there are also 
concepts expressed by the nominalizations of statements, such as “that red, triangular figure” (where the 
pre-nominalized, full statement would have been, “That figure is triangular and red”), as well as by all 
other phrases, such as “one greater than three”.  
206 In Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 33 (pp. 231-32), Husserl suggests that the general objects of 
mathematics, color theory, &c., would remain distinct from our concepts of those objects, even if our 
concepts were to exhaustively present their objects: “the meaning in which an [general] object is thought, 
and its object, the species itself, are not one and the same. … The generality that we think of, does not … 
resolve itself into the generality of the meanings in which we think of it” (editing Findley’s translation to 
maintain “general” as a consistent equivalent for allgemeinen, while leaving “universal” as an equivalent 
for universelle, in light of Husserl’s distinction between specificity and universality in Inv. II, § 2).    
207 For Bolzano’s intimations of the concept-object relation’s complexity, see his brief discussion of 
objective ideas whose objects do not exist, in Theory of Science, § 48, on p. 62. 
 91 
 Beyond thus seeking to deflect potential misunderstandings of the claim that 
concepts are objective, Husserl further reinforces his conclusion by offering a lengthy 
attack on a widely held and contrary thesis.  Husserl devotes a whole Investigation, in 
fact, to his assault on the contrary notion that there are no ideal objects at all.  That is the 
task of the second Investigation, where Husserl goes about “defending the intrinsic right 
of specific (or ideal) objects to be granted objective status alongside of individual (or 
real) objects”.208  Now, the notion that there are no ideal objects at all is more 
comprehensive than the notion that there are no objects of a conceptual nature: if there 
are no ideal objects in Husserl’s sense, then there would not only be no objective 
concepts, but also no objective propositions, no states of affairs, and no specific objects 
of the sort that the number four, the color red, and the note C are.  But while the defense 
of conceptual objectivity is not the sole reason for taking up the task of the second 
Investigation, Husserl’s strike at the denial of ideal objectivity is aimed, in part, to strike 
at a common presupposition behind the denial of conceptual objectivity.209  For it was, in 
Husserl’s time, and is now, a prominent belief that there are no specific objects, that the 
real things of the sensory world are all that is, and that talk about a dimension of the ideal 
is no better founded than talk about a region of ether.   
                                                 
208 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, Introduction, p. 238.  As noted in section 3.2 (pp. 50-53), Husserl was 
able to appreciate the force of Bolzano’s case for ideal objectivity in part thanks to Lotze’s suggestion that 
ideal meanings are species. 
209 Husserl makes clear that this is among the purposes of the second Investigation when he explains why 
he is including so much regarding “the ideal unity of the species and modern theories of abstraction” in a 
work about logic and meaning.  First, he acknowledges once again that the general objects, or “species”, 
constituted by abstraction are distinct from the significations on which the logician reflects.  The opposition 
between the concepts expressed by proper and common nouns “corresponds to”, rather than being identical 
to, “the opposition between individual and general objects”.  But then, having acknowledged this, he 
stresses that the class of meanings belongs within that class of general objects from which it is distinct, and 
that as such every denial of general objects includes the denial of semantic objectivity: “meanings as such, 
i.e. meanings in the sense of specific unities, constitute the domain of pure logic, so that to misread the 
essence of the Species must be in every case to strike at the very essence of logic” (Logical Investigations, 
Inv. II, Introduction, pp. 237-38). 
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 Against this belief Husserl presents a two-pronged attack.  He begins with the 
contention that “we cannot at all help distinguishing between individual singulars, like 
empirical things, and specific singulars, like the numbers … of mathematics”.210  Each of 
the numbers, for example, is surely a possible object of speech and thought.  Yet numbers 
are not sensible individuals; “the number two” is “not any group of two individual 
objects”.211  Similarly, we may see that several red houses have redness in common, and 
that several gable roofs have triangularity in common.   There is apparently that in virtue 
of which these sensible things — and, more narrowly, their individual, sensible 
properties, such as this and that red or this and that triangular shape — are alike.212  Thus 
it appears that what Husserl calls species, such as the species of triangularity and the 
species of redness, have a kind of objectivity, even though it is assuredly not the 
temporally and spatially located existence of sensible individuals and their parts.  But this 
prompts the question of what basis there can then be for the contrary view that 
individuals alone are objects.  For many philosophers who acknowledge that we speak 
about the color red, and who grant that red houses are (specifically) alike with respect to 
their redness, might nonetheless smirk at the notion that there is a species of redness, and 
would rush to deny that there are ideal objects.   
 Accordingly, the second prong that Husserl uses to prod those who deny the 
objectivity of the ideal is a demeaning assessment of that denial’s historical basis.  Per 
this genealogy of nominalism, the primary reason for denying that there are ideal objects, 
historically speaking, has been one or another pervasive straw man of the claim denied.  
                                                 
210 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, § 2, p. 240, modifying Findley’s translation of “empirischen Dinge” to 
more accurately render that original text. 
211 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, § 2, p. 240. 
212 Husserl offers a more confident formulation of the same claim: “no interpretive skill in the world can in 
fact eliminate ideal objects from our speech and thought” (Logical Investigations, Inv. II, § 8, p. 250). 
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For critics have often equated the affirmation of ideal objectivity with what Husserl calls 
“the metaphysical hypostatization” of the same — i.e. with the dogma that ideal 
objectivity “really exists externally to thought”, such that redness and other ideal objects 
would be individual entities existing in some ethereal space — and on that basis have 
concluded that the only sensible position is the rejection of ideal objectivity.213  At other 
times, critics have identified the affirmation of ideal objectivity with “the psychological 
hypostatization” of the same — i.e., with the view that ideal objectivity “really exists in 
thought”, such that triangularity and other ideal objects would be individual, recurring 
pieces of our real experiences — and on that basis have again concluded that there cannot 
be ideal objects.214  In essence, then, the mass of thinkers who deny that there are ideal 
objects has mocked those who affirm the same on the basis of a dichotomy: “you must 
either subscribe to a Platonism and suppose that there is an individual called redness 
floating in some unseen space”, the group scolds, “or follow Locke in thinking that there 
is an individual called redness floating in our minds — an individual object that is a real 
component (or what Locke called a “simple idea”) of every red thing (or “complex idea”) 
that we perceive”.215  But this is a false dichotomy.  As Plato had already indicated in his 
Parmenides, the view that there are ideal objects hardly entails the extreme realist stance 
that ideal objects possess a thing-like existence outside of the mind.216  Just as little does 
it entail the Lockean doctrine that ideal objects exist as individuals in the mind.  On the 
contrary, while metaphysical commitments to an extreme realism regarding universals or 
                                                 
213 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, § 7, p. 248. 
214 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, § 7, p. 248. 
215 In Logical Investigations, Inv. II, §§ 9-11, Husserl presents several persuasive objections to the idea of 
ideas that plays a central function in John Locke’s An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
216 Via the character Parmenides in the dialogue of the same name, Plato suggests that there is a need to 
affirm that “there are” ideal objects and that they are “always the same” (135b-c) while fully understanding 
that these ideal objects do not have a thing-like existence that is subject to division into pieces (cf. 131c).   
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to a Lockean psychology may have driven some to believe that ideal objects are also real 
objects, Husserl begins his Bolzanian support for ideal objects by distinguishing them 
from real entities — both from those that exist “outside” and “inside” the mind.217  To 
suppose that Husserl must have pictured ideal objects either as real “external” things or as 
pieces of real “internal” events, then, is to neglect what is his view from the beginning, 
and to build a false dichotomy on the basis of certain mistakes that were conspicuous in 
the course of medieval ontology and modern psychology; to equate the ideality that 
Husserl affirms with a strange kind of reality is to construct a straw man on the same 
basis.218 
  Once Husserl dismisses the fallacies that have been recited by many who deny the 
objectivity of the ideal, and once he undermines the notion that all objects of thought are 
real individuals, he is then satisfied to let the evidence for conceptual objectivity stand on 
its own.  Concepts are invariant and reiterable, and they serve as enduring objects of 
thought.  Without grounds to the contrary, this is sufficient reason to conclude that 
concepts possess objectivity of the important, abstract (i.e., second-order) type that 
Husserl specifies.  Of course, the conclusion that concepts possess such objectivity does 
not entail, on its own, the further conclusion that concepts are independent of our 
thought.  In this subsection I have not yet sought to clarify why Bolzano and Husserl 
affirmed that there are “ideas in themselves”.  To appreciate the full argument to that 
                                                 
217 Husserl notably presents his clearest definition of the term “real” — which term occurs with great 
frequency and plays an important function across the Logical Investigations — in that part of the second 
Investigation where he begins his genealogy of nominalism (§ 8, pp. 249-50).  At that point Husserl can no 
longer proceed without asserting that “what is real (real) is the individual with all of its constituents”, that 
“it is something here and now”, that “for us temporality is a sufficient mark of reality”, and that “for us 
what is ‘inside’ of consciousness counts as real (real) just as much as what is ‘outside’ of it”.   
218 Cf. Husserl’s overarching explanation of the reason why many adopt reductive nominalism: “The 
excesses of conceptual realism have led men to dispute, not merely the reality, but the objectivity of the 
Species.  This is certainly quite wrong” (Logical Investigations, Inv. II, § 2, p. 240). 
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effect, we must turn from a narrow focus on concepts to a broader view of truth.  For the 
case that there are significations (including ideas and propositions) in themselves hinges 
mainly on the supposition that truth is independent of our thought.  
 
4.2.3: Propositions as objects 
 
 As a next step toward clarifying the case that there are semantic objects in 
themselves — and, more immediately, in order to indicate the connection that Bolzano 
and Husserl draw between signification and truth — it is important to briefly survey the 
view of propositions, and the reasons for holding that view, which Bolzano passed on to 
Husserl.  First, then, what is Bolzano’s account of propositions?  In short, Bolzano holds 
that propositions are to acts of assertion what concepts are to the use of solitary terms.  
When we use some term that does not, by itself, assert anything, we convey by that word 
or those words a concept that could be conveyed at different times and by different signs; 
in much the same way, when we use an organized set of words to assert that something is 
the case, our “speech act” expresses a proposition that can be commonly realized by 
many “speech act[s]” and “act[s] of mind”.219  Bolzano thus takes propositions to be ideal 
in the same way that he supposes concepts are.  Further, he takes propositions to be 
composed out of concepts.  The proposition that I express by saying, “those birds are 
chirping”, e.g., plainly appears to include as a constituent the concept of chirping.  But it 
is not in virtue of this complexity that propositions differ from concepts.  For there are 
complex concepts, i.e. concepts composed of other concepts, which retain a non-
propositional nature; the complex concept of chirping birds, e.g., is no proposition.  
Propositions rather differ from concepts, according to Bolzano, in virtue of their 
                                                 
219 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 19, p. 20. 
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assertoric character, i.e. their being “either true or false”.220  Whereas the concept of birds 
chirping, e.g., by itself contains no pretensions to truth, the proposition I would express 
by saying, “those birds are chirping” (about certain birds, at a certain time), essentially 
purports to state how things stand.  Bolzano thus presents propositions as the kind of 
complex significations that can be true or false, i.e. as ideal bearers of truth and falsity 
that are commonly accessible, no less than their conceptual constituents are, to various 
acts of speech and thought.   
 It is no surprise, then, that Bolzano attributes to propositions the same degree of 
objectivity and independence of our thinking that he ascribes to concepts.  He does not 
only opine that propositions are among the objects of logic, or aver that there are 
propositions that we might never articulate; he reaches the logicist extreme of claiming 
that propositions are independent of any thinking whatsoever, defining a proposition as 
“any assertion that something is or is not the case, whether or not somebody has put it 
into words, and regardless even of whether it has been thought”.221  He not only 
distinguishes propositions from the “judgment[s]” that are “present in the consciousness 
of a thinking being”; he also denies that the etymologically apparent relation between 
propositions and some act(s) of proposing is anything more than a “figurative 
association”.222  He suggests that we would be entirely mistaken to suspect that 
propositions “presuppose the existence of a being that does the proposing”.223  
                                                 
220 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 19, p. 20. As Bolzano notes, he thus follows the old Aristotelian practice 
in regarding the character of “being true or false” as the distinctive feature of propositions (ibid, § 23, p. 
27), although he also, unlike Aristotle, regards prima facie non-assertoric statements such as questions and 
wishes as disguised assertions (ibid., § 22, pp. 24-25). 
221 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 19, pp. 20-21, my italics. 
222 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 19, p. 21. 
223 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 19, p. 21. 
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 Husserl expresses a more measured edition of Bolzano’s view.  Like Bolzano, he 
portrays propositions as transcendent bearers of truth or falsity.  Moreover, he even 
seems to echo Bolzano’s claim that there are propositions in themselves: much as 
Bolzano proclaims that propositions need not be “put … into words” or “thought”, 
Husserl states toward the end of the first Investigation that “being thought or being 
expressed are alike contingent” features of propositions.224  Yet he only follows Bolzano 
to a point; the brackets that Husserl regularly places around his mentions of meanings “in 
themselves” imply an important distance between his own view and Bolzano’s.  This 
distance consists in the fact that, while both may sincerely say that there are objective 
propositions, they can do so just in case they interpret that “are” differently.  For Husserl 
refrains from some of the ontological-metaphysical speculation underpinning Bolzano’s 
view of propositions, and thereby tempers the logicist tendency of the view that he 
appropriates.   
 In this respect, it is above all important to notice how Husserl qualifies his 
seemingly logicist statement that propositions need not be “thought” or “expressed” by 
immediately amending the following explanation: “there are … countless meanings 
which … are never expressed, and [which] can, owing to the limits of man’s cognitive 
powers, never be expressed”.225  From this explanation, we can see how Husserl frames 
the transcendence that he ascribes to propositions in epistemological terms and, more 
exactly, with reference to our limited understanding: he takes talk of propositions in 
themselves to have an important reference just insofar as propositions have a being that is 
not restricted within the limits of our thought.  While Husserl’s talk of such 
                                                 
224 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 19, pp. 20-21, and Husserl, Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 35, p. 233. 
225 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 35, p. 233. 
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transcendence may have metaphysical overtones and implications, then, and while it at 
points inevitably verges upon ontological issues, it belongs within the theory of 
knowledge.  His claim is that propositions and their truth are transcendent precisely with 
respect to our powers of articulation and confirmation.  The type of transcendence that 
Bolzano ascribes to propositions, in contrast, explicitly presupposes a particular ontology 
and metaphysics: Bolzano’s theory of propositions includes a contentious ontology 
according to which we ought to affirm that propositions are but deny that they have any 
kind of being (whereas Husserl does not artificially differentiate his position that there 
are propositions from the view that propositions have a kind of being).226  And Bolzano 
makes the metaphysical claims that “every … proposition … is at least thought and 
represented by God” and that propositions are nonetheless independent of all thought, 
whereas Husserl does not pronounce his views, or presuppose any advance agreement 
from his readers, on such metaphysical issues.227  These important differences, however, 
only modify a more basic continuity.  Despite his disagreements with his more 
metaphysically inclined mentor, Husserl still agrees that propositions transcend our 
thinking in crucial respects.  He claims that propositions do not depend on our grasping 
them in thought or expression.  Moreover, and most saliently in the context of the present 
subsection, Husserl can clearly follow Bolzano at least to the point of attributing to 
propositions the same abstract, second-order type of objectivity that we have seen he also 
attributes to concepts.   
                                                 
226 Bolzano denies not only that propositions have Dasein, Existenz, and Wirklichkeit, but also that they 
have Sein at all (Theory of Science, § 19, p. 21; Rolf George provides the German terms that Bolzano 
originally used to claim that propositions lack any kind of being, and not only existence and actuality, on p. 
xxx of his editor’s introduction); Husserl is quick to clarify that propositions have only the ideal being of 
the specific, rather than real existence, but he can readily interpret the “are”, in “there are propositions”, as 
meaning that propositions have some kind of being. 
227 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 19, p. 21.  
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 Why, then, think that propositions have this objective character?  Bolzano 
bypasses any explicit argument on this point and moves directly into the more 
contentious case that there are propositions in themselves.  In order to see why Bolzano 
and Husserl ascribe objectivity to propositions, though, we need only revisit the 
considerations they offer in defense of conceptual objectivity.  Taking the predications 
that Husserl and Bolzano make of concepts, and applying them to propositions, we can 
extrapolate that the reasoning in support of propositional objectivity runs as follows: 
First, propositions, like concepts, are reiterable.  It is a commonplace occurrence that 
multiple individuals, in a variety of contexts, make the same assertion, often even with 
differently worded sentences.  The same proposition that I express by saying, “The sky is 
blue”, e.g., others might express in a different context by saying only, “It is blue”, or “El 
cielo es azul”.  Second, propositions, again like concepts, regularly serve as stable objects 
of reference within scientific discourse and everyday conversation.  Our casual 
conversations often concern what other speakers have said, and our academic discourse 
often refers to this or that hypothesis; we ask whether some hearsay is true, or consider 
whether a purported corollary actually follows from a given thesis, and thereby direct our 
attention at least in part to those propositions.228  Surely propositions’ capacity to thus 
serve as objects of reference, taken together with their identity through reiterations, is 
enough to establish their possessing objectivity of the broad (i.e., not necessarily real) 
sort that Husserl clarifies.   
                                                 
228 Again, as Husserl emphasizes, this does not imply that meanings such as propositions are primarily 
objects of our speech and thought.  For propositions serve in the first instance as our means of presenting 
categorial objects, and only on that basis then become objects of our attention in secondary acts.  Still, they 
thereby serve as self-same objects no less than material things do. 
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 Yet that line of reasoning almost reduces to a tautology.  Of course it is not 
especially controversial to conclude that meanings are objective on the grounds that they 
(a) are reiterable and (b) can fill an objective role in our speech and thought, if we have 
stipulated that objectivity involves little more than (a) subsistence and (b) the capacity to 
function as a referent.  To conclude that there are propositions which are independent of 
human thought is another matter. For propositions might be genuinely distinct from our 
individual acts of thinking, and occasionally serve as objects of thought, and have an 
enduring character, but nonetheless depend on the mental life of our species.  In other 
words, we could both grant that propositions are objective and deny that there are 
propositions in themselves, without falling into incoherence.  Why should we not 
suppose, then, that the objectivity of propositions is a function of the human community?  
Why not suppose that propositions derive their apparent endurance from the human 
species’ intergenerational activity of thinking, and possess a seemingly timeless historical 
longevity only because the course of human intellectual activity, so far, has been left off 
by each elder generation only after it has been taken up by some younger one?  Why not 
suppose that there are propositions because we exist, that there never would have been 
meanings of any sort if we did not exist, and that anyone claiming otherwise is engaged 
in groundless metaphysical speculation?  Husserl found his response to these questions in 
reasoning that he garnered from Bolzano’s discussions of truth. 
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4.2.4: Truth’s independence 
 
According to the definition(s) that Bolzano accepts, a truth is a proposition that 
“states something as it is”; truth is just that character, which distinguishes such 
propositions from all else; and “the truth” is a title we can use for collections of such 
propositions.229  “Truth” could thus be said, and said properly, in many ways, but the 
primary sense of “truth”, or what Bolzano calls the “concrete objective sense”, would be 
that which is in play when we speak of this or that truth.230  So, in the discussions of truth 
at the center of his Theory of Science, Bolzano focuses above all on particular true 
propositions.  In one crucial example, he refers to a proposition that states, as it is, “the 
number of blossoms that were on a certain tree last spring”.231  In another, he alludes to a 
proposition that states, again “as it is”, “the number of wineberries which grew in Italy 
last summer”.232  Now, what Bolzano contends with respect to these two propositions that 
he mentions, and with respect to all other truths, is that they are independent of our 
discovery of the matters that they concern.  Even if nobody has ever known, or even said 
or considered, the number of blossoms that were on a certain tree during a certain spring, 
there is a proposition that states this number as it is, which someone might express; and, 
though presumably nobody can say how many wineberries were grown in Italy last 
                                                 
229 Bolzano introduces these related definitions in a section on the “several senses of the words ‘true’ and 
‘truth’” (Theory of Science, § 24, p. 31). The first primary source for Bolzano’s theory of truth is Book One 
of the Theory of Science, the “theory of fundamentals”, in which he argues, contra skepticism, that there are 
truths and that we are cognizant of some of them.  The second is the “theory of elements” (Book Two of 
the Theory of Science), in which Bolzano seeks to clarify the nature of truths and of objective meanings 
more generally. 
230 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 24, p. 31.  Truth considered as a property of propositions would be 
secondary to the truths of which it is the differentiating feature (the abstract is secondary to the concrete) 
and truth as a name for groups of propositions would be secondary to the particular truths from which we 
might form many different collections.   
231 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 25, p. 32. 
232 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 48, p. 62. 
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summer, there is a truth about this number.233  Indeed, there are countless truths beyond 
the horizon of insights that we as a species have historically achieved, which may remain 
permanently beyond that horizon: truths need not be discovered by us.   
Such is Bolzano’s view; but what is its warrant?  If we grant that a truth is a 
proposition that “states something as it is”, perhaps allowing this as a correct though less 
than comprehensive characterization of truth, still we might ask with some skepticism 
whether there are any truths beyond those that we have “recognized or thought”.234  For 
we might hold that the statements that we have considered make up all of the 
propositions there are.  And on that basis we might say, in Quine’s language, that there 
are only as many truths as there are statements in our webs of belief facing sufficiently 
minimal resistance from the data that we encounter.  Why, then, posit that there are any 
true propositions apart from those that we have realized are true?  Why go still further 
and posit that there are some propositions that we have never even spoken or thought, 
much less confirmed with insight, which in spite of all this are true?   
Before considering Bolzano’s efforts toward justifying his view that truth is 
independent of our thought, it is important to note two points.  The first is that Husserl, as 
we have already seen, endorses this same quasi-logicist view in the Logical 
Investigations.235  The second is that this view of truth carries implications regarding the 
status of propositions and their conceptual parts.  If Bolzano is correct that truths need not 
even be articulated, much less grasped to be true, in any passing act of thinking, then this 
independence that he attributes to truths applies by extension to propositions and ideas.  
                                                 
233 In Bolzano’s words, these numbers are “stateable, if unknown” (Theory of Science, § 25, p. 32).  Putting 
aside issues of vagueness, there is nothing in principle to keep someone from articulating a sentence of the 
form, “There were x blossoms on that tree last spring”, and inserting the correct number in place of the x. 
234 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 25, p. 32. 
235 See my discussion of Husserl’s logicist leanings in 1.2.b, as well as the beginning of 1.2.c. 
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For, if there are truths that we have not expressed, then they comprise a group of 
propositions that are independent of actualization in our thought; and there are then also 
ideas that have not occurred to us, some that are the nominalizations of true propositions 
that we do not know,236 and most likely others too among the concepts that comprise 
those true propositions that we have not articulated.237  Moreover, it is not lost on Husserl 
that these consequences regarding signification follow from his Bolzanian view of truth.  
On the contrary, his defense of conceptual and propositional independence builds on a 
more basic case that truth is independent of our thought.  What, then, is the case for such 
truths? 
As Bolzano makes it, that case consists of three components.  First, Bolzano 
offers what he calls a “proof that there is at least one truth in itself”.238  He purports to 
establish that there is some truth, by reducing the contradictory supposition (viz., “the 
proposition that no proposition has truth”) to absurdity.239  The core of the proof deserves 
to be quoted at length:   
“That no proposition has truth disproves itself because it is itself a proposition and 
we should have to call it false in order to call it true.  For, if all propositions were 
false, then this proposition itself, namely that all propositions are false, would be 
                                                 
236 For Bolzano as for Husserl, there are not only ideas expressed by nouns, such as “Napoleon” and 
“Moscow”; there are also ideas expressed by the nominalizations of statements, such as “Napoleon’s 1812 
invasion of Moscow” (where the pre-nominalized, full statement would have been, “Napoleon invaded 
Moscow in 1812”).  Bolzano admits this broader class of ideas in § 49.3 of his Theory of Science (p. 64). 
237 Put differently: if there are true propositions that we have not articulated, then it is likely that some of 
them involve conceptual parts for which we have no words or notions.  Before discovering the truth of the 
proposition that America does not belong to the Asian continent, e.g., European minds did not have the 
concept of America. 
238 Bolzano, Theory of Science, §§ 30-31, p. 39. 
239 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 30, p. 39. 
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false.  Thus, not all propositions are false, but there are also true propositions.  
There are truths, at least one.”240 
This little argument, which has recurred throughout the history of philosophy,241 appears 
to be sound.  No one can justly deny its starting point: if all propositions are false, then 
each is false, including the proposition that all are false.  The most that someone might 
object to is the inference that carries us from that starting point to the argument’s 
conclusion.  For, like every reductio ad absurdum, the proof presupposes that the 
contradiction of a false (or self-defeating) statement must be true.  By virtue of its 
structure, then, the proof seemingly contains, as a hidden premise, the principle of 
excluded middle; it appears to presuppose, in other words, that each proposition must be 
either true or false.  And contemporary readers might reject this presupposition, citing the 
possibility of multivalent logics that are ready to dispense with the principle of excluded 
middle by allowing for more than two truth values.242  However, to deny a principle as 
basic as the law of excluded middle, along with a strategy of argument as indispensable 
as the reductio, is a heavy price to pay, especially when all that is purchased is a reason 
for rejecting an otherwise inevitable and initially plausible conclusion.  Acknowledging 
the possibility of sane critics, then, rather than following Bolzano’s brash contention that 
                                                 
240 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 31, p. 39. 
241 As Bolzano notes, his own formulation closely imitates one that Aristotle articulated millennia before.  
Bolzano borrows heavily from Metaphysics IV.6.7-8, especially the argument that total skepticism 
“destroy[s]” itself, at 1012b5-23.     
242 Bolzano anticipates this objection to the logical principles operatively assumed by the process of the 
proof: “in order to be persuaded by the proof”, he recognizes, “the doubter must presuppose as true the 
principle of inference that is used in it” (Theory of Science, § 33, p. 41).  Moreover, the same skeptic who 
doubts whether there are any truths is likely also to doubt whether even broadly legitimated principles of 
inference are actually valid. 
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only “imbeciles and mentally disturbed persons could doubt [his proof’s] validity”, it is 
nonetheless difficult to assess the argument as being less than very strong.243   
 Still, even if we provisionally accept the argument as sound, the scope of its 
implications is limited.  For, whatever its force, the argument does not aim to establish 
that some truths are independent of our realization.  If it succeeds, according to its own 
criteria of success, what the proof entails is only that there is at least one truth; it leaves 
the task of showing that there are truths unknown by us to further arguments.  Granted, 
the proof may imply, effectively but accidentally, that truth is logically necessary.  And 
perhaps the proof thus allows us to extrapolate that truth does not depend on human 
existence, thought, and knowledge.  In particular, perhaps it allows us to reason as 
follows: 
• While the claim that human beings do not exist is counterfactual, this claim is not 
incoherent.  Our existence appears to be contingent, our non-existence “logically 
possible.”  
• The claim that there are no truths is self-defeating, and thus incoherent, rather 
than merely counterfactual.  To affirm that there is at least one truth is to commit 
oneself to a proposition that could not possibly be false. 
• What is logically necessary cannot depend on what is contingent.  What must be 
true cannot depend on what might not have been the case. 
• Therefore, the truth of the proposition that there is at least one truth cannot 
depend on human existence.  In simpler terms, then, truth does not depend on 
human existence.244  
                                                 
243 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 33, p. 41. 
244 Cf. the fourth argument against “specific relativism” in § 36 of Husserl’s Prolegomena (p. 80). 
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In this way, one might draw inferences from suggestions that are arguably latent in 
Bolzano’s proof to conclusions that it does not contain.  Yet, taking the proof at face 
value, in terms of what it purports to show, we only arrive at the conclusion that there are 
some truths, and not at any further claims regarding the status truths have with respect to 
human cognition. 
 Thus, Bolzano’s broad case that truths are independent of our experience only 
begins in earnest at its second stage.  In the first, preliminary stage, as we have just seen, 
Bolzano merely establishes to his satisfaction that there is at least one truth.  He only then 
offers reason for the further conclusion that some truths are unknown to us. 
 The second stage of Bolzano’s broad case for truths in themselves, and the first in 
which he plainly contends that there are some truths that we do not know, consists of an 
appeal to examples.  It consists of references to particular propositions like those I have 
cited above, concerning numbers of blossoms and berries, and is effectively a challenge 
to Bolzano’s readers: How, it asks, could we deny that there are such propositions, or 
regard those propositions as anything but truths that we do not know?  Take, for example, 
the proposition that states as it is the number of flowers that blossomed at a certain time 
on a certain tree.  Clearly, this proposition satisfies Bolzano’s definition of truth.  Further, 
even if we have not expressed it, it seems we cannot deny that there is such a proposition, 
which could be expressed.  For even if we are now incapable in practice of finding how 
many blossoms grew on a certain tree last spring, there is a number that someone might 
have discerned and stated.  Moreover, it is clear that we have not, in fact, discovered all 
of these propositions, which might be expressed, and which “state something as it is”.  
Consider all of the true propositions that someone might have expressed and confirmed 
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about the genetic structure of an extinct animal, or the precise path that a solitary insect 
followed in the course of a day, or the geological composition of a remote planet.  Each 
of these examples appears to demonstrate that there are some truths that we have not 
realized.  Indeed, the ease with which such examples come to mind appears to indicate 
that there are countless other truths, unknown to us, of which we have not even definitely 
realized our ignorance — of which we have not even thought. 
 But someone might object that this argument from examples begs the question.  
For if we need to be convinced that there are truths independent of our thought, we will 
not be satisfied by an argument that merely points to what appear to be truths in 
themselves from a Bolzanian standpoint.  After all, the legitimacy of that position is at 
issue.  Consider, for example, how Bolzano’s argument from examples could seem to 
assume too much to those who lean toward a reductive naturalism.  Critics of this type 
could respond to Bolzano’s challenge, and provide grounds for their refusal to affirm that 
there are truths in themselves, by reasoning as follows:  
• Truths that we do not know can only be postulated.  By definition, they are not 
objects of our experience.245 
• It is unnecessary to postulate such truths.  A more minimal ontology will suffice.  
There are mental processes that certain animals undergo, and there are non-mental 
realities that can be known; no more is necessary in order to account for the 
phenomena of truth and knowledge, in which a particular mental process, which 
we call a judgment or belief, corresponds to the reality that it represents. 
                                                 
245 On this basis alone, Hume would counsel us to “consign” Bolzano’s talk of truths in themselves “to the 
flames” (An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 12, part III). 
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• By Ockham’s razor, we should not admit unnecessary categories or entities into 
our ontology. 
• Therefore, we should not affirm that there are truths about a number of blossoms, 
or an extinct animal, or whatever, when we have no knowledge of that about 
which there are supposed to be truths. 
This reply shows how the examples from which Bolzano argues may not constitute 
satisfactory reasons for holding that there are truths in themselves.  It shows how 
Bolzano’s purported examples of truths in themselves can lose their force.  We need only 
define a truth as a statement that we know to be true, and say that all other uses of the 
term “truth” are unwarranted extensions, and we can cease to count many of Bolzano’s 
“truths in themselves” as truths at all.   
 In this way, the crux of the dialectic between Bolzano and his critics rests in the 
second premise of the counterargument formulated above: while Bolzano holds that it is 
theoretically necessary to postulate truths in themselves, his critics deny that there is any 
need or warrant for such a postulate.  And Bolzano must offer his critics something more 
than purported examples to demonstrate such a necessity.  If he is to convince his critics 
that they need his postulate of truths in themselves, Bolzano must take for his starting 
point some enterprise or belief to which he and his critics are commonly committed, and 
show how that shared practice or theory presupposes that there are truths that we do not 
know.  
While there is no such demonstration explicitly contained within Bolzano’s 
Theory of Science, the whole work, in its general thrust, strongly suggests such an 
argument.  For when we abstract from its intricacies and attend to its broader 
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brushstrokes, the Theory of Science is essentially, true to its title, an attempt to clarify the 
nature of science.246  It thus concerns, among other topics, the scientific pursuit of 
knowledge to which Bolzano and his critics are jointly committed.  And one of its central 
contentions is that we cannot explain that scientific enterprise without reference to truths 
in themselves.  By implication, then, Bolzano’s critics would be bound, insofar as they 
engage in scientific efforts, to presuppose that there are objective networks of truths to be 
discovered.  For they would thereby act as though many truths might remain hidden from 
us — as though there are truths that we would risk failing to uncover if we did not engage 
in inquiry. 
This contention concerning the structure of our scientific striving constitutes the 
third stage and final culmination of Bolzano’s case for truths in themselves.  Again, there 
is no fully realized argument, within the Theory of Science, toward the conclusion that 
intellectual inquiry necessarily presupposes truths independent of the inquiring intellect.  
Bolzano’s lengthy “exposition of logic” does not put that proof forward alongside the 
many others that it contains.247  Instead, the work offers only the partly developed seeds 
of an argument, by way of several suggestions that might be extracted and assembled into 
an attempt at persuasion.   
                                                 
246 I use “scientific” here in Bolzano’s sense, to designate one elevated type of the attempt to know.  
Bolzano does not follow the present-day practice of conflating science (or die Wissenschaft) in general with 
the natural sciences (or Naturwissenschaft) in particular.  He rather employs something like Robert 
Sokolowski’s specification of science and the scientific, according to which “The scientific consciousness 
is one that takes a professional interest in … the difference between what is and what is meant” (Husserlian 
Meditations, p. 279).  To speak of scientific efforts, in this sense, denotes merely the professionalized 
actualizations of our desire to know — a broad and diverse range of disciplines that are nonetheless only 
part of the broader, largely non-professional, human pursuit of knowledge. 
247 On Bolzano’s view, logic and the theory of science are the same (§ 6, p. 7).  One consequence of this 
view, which turns out to be pivotal for Husserl’s conception of logic, is that an adequate “definition of 
‘logic’ requires a prior definition of ‘science’”(§ 4, p. 4). 
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This latent argument, if realized, would start from the question of what science is.  
To begin, it would pose these questions: What are the essential constituents of the 
objective, intersubjectively available bodies of knowledge that we call sciences?  
Correlatively, what conditions are necessary for any scientific endeavor?  And it would 
reply, as Bolzano does near the outset of the Theory of Science, by defining science in 
terms of truth.  A science, Bolzano says, is “any aggregate of truths of a certain kind”.248  
Now, Bolzano’s critics would be hard-pressed to charitably contest that this definition is 
fine, as far as it goes.  For it is plausible, and even uncontroversial, to the same degree 
that it is merely a schematic working definition.  As such a preliminary definition, its 
primary function is simply to punt the controversial questions about what science is into 
an adjacent arena of controversies concerning truth.   
Bolzano’s argument would proceed within that arena.  It would raise the question 
of whether our existing sciences are comprehensive “aggregate[s]” of all the truths that 
there are about this and that kind of objects, or whether they instead circumscribe only 
part of broader, largely undiscovered fields of truths about those objects.  And it would 
reply, as Bolzano does at the very opening of his Theory of Science, by proclaiming that 
there are far more truths than our existing intellectual enterprises have taken in.  It would 
direct us to “suppose that all the truths that are now, or ever were, known to man, were 
somehow collected together”, in a “sum of all human knowledge”, and would declare that 
“this sum is very small” in comparison to “the immense domain of truths in 
themselves”.249  Now that claim is one that Bolzano’s critics could charitably contest;250 
                                                 
248 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 1, p. 1.  
249 Bolzano, Theory of Science, § 1, p. 1. 
250 In particular, Bolzano’s critics could object that the theory of truth adumbrated at the outset of the 
Theory of Science, which pervasively preoccupies its subsequent pages, is precisely what Bolzano’s needs 
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it is clearly controversial.  Yet, according to Bolzano, it is the only interpretation of the 
relationship between science and truth that is compatible with our scientific activity.  For 
the business of science does not consist solely in what Bolzano calls the “division” and 
“representation” of already known truths; given that we could not represent and divide 
truths unless we had first discovered them, our scientific work plainly also includes 
ineliminable components of research and “discovery”.251  Within the context of our 
scientific practice, then, truth cannot be treated solely as something that we possess.  
Instead, the practice of research, with its aim toward discovery, differs from the division 
and representation of truths by being oriented toward truths that we have not yet realized.  
Unlike the activities of division and representation, it at least appears to be a search for 
truths that do not, and that may never, belong to our existing knowledge.  Indeed, it 
would be difficult to plausibly characterize what research is, with respect to truth, in any 
contrary way.  Of course, we could engage in the work of inquiry while denying that 
there are such truths independent of our practice.  But it appears that we would then be 
                                                                                                                                                 
to demonstrate.  The most pivotal part of the argument that Bolzano suggests is therefore that which comes 
after, and in support of, this contentious point. 
251 Bolzano implies this line of reasoning by the way that he structures his Theory of Science.  That work’s 
official aim is merely to answer two practical questions: Bolzano initially identifies the theory of science 
with “the aggregate of all rules which we must follow when we divide the total domain of truths [known to 
us] into individual sciences, and represent them in their respective treatises”, and so his work must 
ultimately say how we ought to divide truths and how we can “represent” them in a “comprehensible” and 
“convincing” manner (Theory of Science, § 1.4, pp. 2-3).  But Bolzano only gets around to that final, 
practical task of his Theory of Science in the fifth of its five books.  He differentiates “the theory of science 
proper” from the theory of science more broadly conceived, taking the latter as the discipline that must say 
what science and truth are, and he devotes the first four books to that more expansive, less practically 
oriented question (§ 15, pp. 16-17).  Now, Bolzano’s primary reason for distinguishing “the theory of 
science proper” from the theory of science more broadly conceived is that “the theory of science proper 
should be preceded by a discussion of the rules to be followed in the discovery of truths: heuretic” (§ 15, 
pp. 16-17).  And the reason that heuretic should precede what Bolzano calls the theory of science proper is, 
presumably, that our presentation and division of truths presupposes our discovery of truths.  In much the 
same way, heuretic should in turn be preceded by a “discussion of the general conditions of human 
knowledge”, and notably by proofs that there are “ideas”, “propositions”, and “truths in themselves”, 
because our discoveries presuppose that there are such semantic objects independent of our inquiry (ibid.). 
The arrangement of projects and books within the Theory of Science thus expresses this argument that I am 
formulating on Bolzano’s behalf: our existing sciences presuppose discovery, and that in turn presupposes 
truths independent of our inquiry. 
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engaging in a performative contradiction: we would be rejecting the aim that constitutes 
our activity. 
Such is Bolzano’s case.  To summarize, its three stages unfold as follows.  First, 
Bolzano confronts the assertion that there are no truths, and dismisses it as a truth claim 
that destroys its own possibility of success.  Next, once he has concluded that there is at 
least one truth, Bolzano infers from a survey of purported truths that there are indefinitely 
many truths that we have not yet discovered.  Of course, many would regard the 
examples that Bolzano mentions differently, rather than taking them as truths in 
themselves.  But, according to the final stage of Bolzano’s case, the work of inquiry is 
predicated on the assumption that there are such truths.  Far from lacking any warrant, 
then, the postulate of truths that we do not know would be an inescapable presupposition 
of the scientific enterprise to which Bolzano and his critics are commonly committed. 
Husserl appropriates and builds on this case.  Through his own reasoning in 
support of the contention that there are truths independent of our inquiring intellects, 
Husserl indicates an affirmative assessment of Bolzano’s prior depiction of our scientific 
enterprise as a practice in which we search for, delimit, and finally convey, various 
clusters of truths that we might never have discovered.  What is more, Husserl’s 
reasoning also offers a response to those who would contend, contra Bolzano, that 
scientific work does not involve any process properly called the discovery of truths.  That 
is, Husserl presents reason to think that inquiry essentially aims at the realization of truths 
that are whether we realize them or not, rather than at the invention of truths that 
otherwise would not be.   
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Consider first how Husserl effectively reiterates Bolzano’s depiction of our 
scientific enterprise.  On one hand, Husserl is quick to admit that our scientific projects 
are not primarily concerned with their own meanings.  For every positive science, 
whether geology or history, is typically focused on certain objects and states of affairs 
rather than on the meanings of the expressions set down in its scientific publications and 
discourse: “if we perform the act [of meaning] and live in it, as it were, we naturally refer 
to its object and not to its meaning”.252  On the other hand, if we engage in the reflective 
theory of science that Bolzano passed on to Husserl, then the scientific achievements that 
we have made, as well as those that we strive to make, alike appear to belong to a field of 
truths: they appear to belong to a field of significations that disclose how things present 
themselves.  For these achievements are not inextricably tied to a passing eureka moment 
of initial discovery, or to the particular signifiers by which they are expressed in a first 
publication; they are rather trans-historically and trans-linguistically available.253  An 
“ideal fabric of meanings” thus appears to be the “one homogenous stuff” that makes up 
the “objective content” of “all theoretical science”.254  And the ongoing efforts of 
theoretical science, to the extent they aim at concepts and truths that have not yet been 
reached by such efforts, appear to aim at a field of significations that extends beyond the 
set of significations that we have thought or expressed.  If our scientific efforts do pursue 
such a semantic sphere — one that is still only partly reached, but also partly unreached, 
and perhaps unreachable, by our efforts — then, Husserl suggests, we could on that basis 
                                                 
252 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 34. 
253 In Husserl’s words, “there is no intrinsic connection between our signs and significations” (Logical 
Investigations, Inv. I, § 35, p. 233).  Translation is possible because we can employ different signs to call 
the same significations to mind.  
254 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 29. 
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speak of meaning that is independent of our thinking and expressing.255  The nature of 
our inquiries would thus indicate that there are meanings — concepts and true 
propositions — independent of those inquiries. 
But why think that inquiry is a process aimed at discovery rather than invention?  
Given that our existing sciences amass truths through research, why suppose that the 
truths thus aggregated were uncovered from an independent field of truths?  This is a 
question that Bolzano does not squarely face.  Why believe that our scientific efforts 
pursue and partly uncover a sphere of truths that we do not, and might never, know?  On 
this point, Husserl contributes an argument that substantiates the Bolzanian depiction of 
science by way of illustrating what it is that research seeks.  His argument may be 
recreated as follows:   
• “Everything that is … is a being definite in content”.256  This is merely to say that 
the principle of non-contradiction applies to that which is.  Taken in a certain 
respect and at a certain time, every city, tree and cell possesses certain features and 
lacks others.  
• “[W]hat is objectively quite definite, must permit objective determination”.257  
That which is definite presents itself in an objective way that would consistently 
fulfill certain attributions and frustrate contrary predications.  The structure of a 
certain tree, e.g., would render certain attributions about the number of its 
blossoms correct, and other attributions incorrect. 
                                                 
255 More exactly, Husserl claims on this basis that “there are … countless meanings which … are never 
expressed, and [which] … can, owing to the limits of man’s cognitive powers, never be expressed” 
(Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 35). 
256 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223. 
257 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223. 
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•  “[W]hat permits objective determination must, ideally speaking, permit 
expression through wholly determinate word-meanings”.258  Even if we are 
constitutionally incapable of adequately expressing an object’s structure, due to 
our own limitations, propositions that someone might express canvass each aspect 
of that object’s determinate character. 
• Any “objective unity of meaning” that is “adequate to the objectivity which is 
evidently ‘given’, … is whatever it is, whether anyone realizes [it] in thought or 
not”.259  The propositions that we might express divide into truths and falsehoods 
on the basis of their adequacy or inadequacy to their objects, rather than on the 
basis of our knowledge or ignorance of those objects.  A flawed and limited 
intellect is not the measure of truth, but rather falls short, and has its limits and 
errors exposed as such, against the criterion of true propositions that someone 
might express.  
• Given the four steps above, it follows that “everything that is … is a being … 
documented in such and such ‘truths in themselves’”.260  If “everything that is” is 
definite; and what is definite “permits objective determination”; and, for 
everything that permits determination, there is a meaning that someone might 
express, which adequately presents that thing; and, for every meaning that 
adequately presents something, that meaning is independent of its being realized 
by us; then, for “everything that is”, there is a meaning that adequately presents 
that thing, which we need not realize.  Whether or not we want to call them “truths 
in themselves”, then, there are propositions that we might express, which we do 
                                                 
258 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223. 
259 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 29, p. 226.  
260 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, §§ 28, 29, pp. 223 and 226. 
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not necessarily realize, which present the objects of possible study as those objects 
are.  
Now, critics could of course call this argument into question.  Here as in other arguments, 
the notion that expressible meanings do not require our realization is vulnerable to 
assault.  But Husserl does not labor under the illusion that every rational reader will grant 
him his premises, and so the argument’s purported value does not lie in its potential to 
persuade all possible critics.  On the contrary, what I have reconstructed as an argument 
is intended more exactly as a fairly detailed explication of what scientific research 
essentially presupposes.  It attempts to articulate several enacted commitments of inquiry 
that, together, entail the supposition that truth is independent of the inquiring intellect.  
And, when we follow Husserl’s illustration, it does appear that “the scientific 
investigator” must at least act as though truths have independence, i.e. as if truths are 
meanings that the investigator “discovers” rather than “make[s]”.261  In inquiry, we must 
act as though the object of our study possesses a determinate character; we must act as 
though there are propositions that someone might express which present that character as 
it is; we must act as though those propositions hold as valid whether we realize their 
validity or not; and so we must act as though those propositions are not mere functions of 
our thought, but instead are members of an independent field into which our studies may 
or may not advance.  Indeed, the inquirer cannot always proceed “as if he were concerned 
with contingencies of his own or of the general human mind”, because such a procedure 
would reduce every pursuit of intellectual goods to introspection or psychology.262  The 
                                                 
261 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 29, p. 226.  
262 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 29, p. 226. 
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practice of research thus presupposes the falsity of psychologism, which is to say that it 
presupposes the enacted affirmation of truth’s independence from our thought. 
This was enough to persuade Husserl.  His appropriation and extension of 
Bolzanian reasoning left him unable to evade an almost logicist view of meaning.  He 
saw that our research appears to be a pursuit of independent truths, and he surpassed 
Bolzano’s argumentation by pre-emptively answering those who claim that inquiry may 
be an invention rather than a discovery of truths.  He saw, moreover, that truths are 
propositions that state what is as it is, and that, as assertoric significations, they contain 
concepts (or non-assertoric significations) as constituents.  He could not, then, avoid the 
conclusion that there is a logically interconnected domain of objective meanings, which 
domain is independent of any realization in our thought and knowledge. 
 
4.3: Meaning as act: descriptions from Brentano’s psychology 
4.3.1: A descriptive psychological persuasion 
While Bolzano’s Theory of Science persuaded Husserl that objective meanings 
transcend our passing experiences, Brentano presented his student with a persuasive case 
in an apparently contrary direction.  Specifically, Brentano articulated grounds for 
understanding meaning primarily as a kind of mental “act” — and he thereby gave 
Husserl reason to regard reiterable logical objects not as fully “mind-independent” 
entities, but rather as dependent aspects of a certain concrete experience.  The aim of this 
section is to represent those reasons, which Husserl found in his teacher’s work, for 
adopting a psychological sort of semantics. 
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These reasons emerge from Brentano’s descriptive psychology.263  Accordingly, 
if we are to fairly assess Husserl’s reasons for embracing the more psychological side of 
his own theory of meaning, it is important that we briefly survey the method at work in 
Brentano’s descriptive psychology.  How does that method relate to psychology as it is 
practiced today?  How could description supplant or supplement experiment, explanation, 
and discursive demonstration as that which provides support for certain psychological 
conclusions?  Once we address these questions, we should then be in a position to 
appreciate the basis of Husserl’s more Brentanian perspective on meaning. 
 
4.3.2: In defense of description 
In the 1874 Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint and again in a series of 
lectures that Husserl attended during 1888 and 1889, Brentano defended what would now 
be a somewhat deviant concept of psychology.264  He did not conceive of the discipline in 
a regressive way; he did not reject experimental innovations.  But neither did he conceive 
of the discipline in a way that fully corresponds to the predominant contemporary 
                                                 
263 Husserl’s phenomenological project as a whole, including his theory of meaning, is rooted in Brentano’s 
descriptive (or “psychognostic” or “phenomenological”) style of psychology in the following important 
respects.  First, Husserlian phenomenology attempts to describe the same subject matter that Brentano 
made focal through his contrast between “mental” and “physical phenomena” (see section 4.3.3); it 
attempts to describe precisely those data that Brentano called “mental phenomena”.  Second, Husserl 
appropriates Brentano’s attempted exclusion of “metaphysical presuppositions”.  At the outset of his 
philosophical project, Husserl brackets the issue of whether given entities are mind-dependent or mind-
independent, much as Brentano in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint (a) eschews Cartesian 
divisions between mental and physical substances (in favor of the less contentious distinction between 
evidently different types of phenomena) and (b) delays the question of whether intentional experiences 
have a soul at their basis or are instead the theme of what is in fact a “psychology without a soul” 
(Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. Rancurello, Terrell, and McAllister (New York: 
Humanities Press, 1973 [1874]) pp. 11, 18).  Finally, Husserl appears to have derived his hope that we may 
successfully bracket metaphysical presuppositions, as did Brentano, from the view that second-order (or 
“inner”) perception is built into first order experiences of desiring, hearing, imagining, and the like (see 
section 4.3.2). 
264 The 1888-89 lectures were among those in Brentano’s series on the subject matter that he at different 
times called “descriptive psychology”, “descriptive phenomenology” and “psychognosy”.  See Brentano, 
Descriptive Psychology, trans. Benito Müller (New York: Routledge, 1995). 
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understanding of psychology as a primarily explanatory and experimental enterprise.  
Instead, Brentano believed that the study of the psyche should become “genetic” and 
experimental only at a secondary stage.  On this view, psychology should ultimately 
provide an explanation of conscious processes, and in some cases should do so by tracing 
the genesis of our mental events from neuro-physiological substrata.  Yet psychology 
should also include a pre-experimental component that (a) aims to describe rather than to 
explain, (b) proceeds by reflection rather than by (visual and auditory) observation, and 
(c) stands independent of all inquiries concerning the physiological conditions and 
efficient causes of mental events.  In other words, psychology should include a 
theoretically fundamental, reflective, and “descriptive” subdiscipline, as well as the 
experimental and explanatory practice that is more familiar today.265  For psychology 
should first describe the reflectively available phenomena that it is determined to 
explain.266  Psychologists are right, for example, to seek to understand the links between 
our readily apparent mental events and their less obvious physical conditions; but before 
we can pretend to explain our “mental phenomena”, whether in terms of “physical 
phenomena” or in any other terms, we must first perform at least the following 
descriptive tasks: we must identify and clarify “those characteristics that are common to 
all mental phenomena”;267 we must “classify mental phenomena” into importantly 
                                                 
265 Compare the following statements from Brentano’s 1888 “Descriptive Psychology” lectures: “Genetic 
psychology is … the second part of psychology”; “Descriptive psychology is the prior part.  The 
relationship between [descriptive psychology] and genetic psychology is similar to the one between 
anatomy and physiology”; thus, descriptive psychology “is the foundation of genetic psychology” 
(Descriptive Psychology, p. 137).  Moreover, as Victor Velarde-Mayol suggests, the 1874 Psychology from 
an Empirical Standpoint already draws this distinction between primary and secondary kinds of psychology 
that became more explicit in Brentano’s later work.   
266 Barry Smith (Austrian Philosophy: The Legacy of Franz Brentano (Open Court: Chicago, 1995), p. 27) 
and Victor Velarde-Mayol (On Brentano (Belmont, CA; Wadsworth, 2000), p. 10) similarly see Brentano 
as making it almost axiomatic that “description of phenomena is prior to their explanation”.  
267 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 44. 
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distinctive sets; and we must “determine satisfactorily the characteristics … of each 
class”.268  In short, we must accurately characterize the nature and types of the 
phenomena that we seek to explain. 
Now, these descriptive tasks can precede explanation, on Brentano’s view, 
because of the privileged epistemic access that we each have to our own experience.  
More precisely, Brentano holds that there are two epistemic capacities that together allow 
us to complete the tasks of a descriptive psychology.  First, Brentano asserts that there is 
an “inner perception” of our acts of consciousness built into those acts.  “Every mental 
act”, he writes, “includes within itself a consciousness of itself”.269  When I see sunlight 
on a tree, for example, I am at the same time conscious that I am seeing; my experience 
in this sense has as its “primary object” the sunlight on the tree, but also has itself as a 
“secondary object”.270  In this way, my experience makes me capable of affirming that 
sunlit branches have stood before me and that I have seen them.  Moreover, though this 
consciousness of my own experiencing is not focal like my observation of the tree is, it is 
nonetheless no more disputable than my perception of the primary objects of my 
experience.  Indeed, although I might often be mistaken about certain primary objects of 
my experience, such as “external” things and relations, I know and cannot be mistaken 
that I am having an experience which itself has a certain determinate content.271  First, 
                                                 
268 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 31. 
269 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, pp. 153-154; quoted by Velarde-Mayol, On 
Brentano, p. 72.   
270 As Rolf George and Glen Koehn note in their essay, “Brentano’s relation to Aristotle” (The Cambridge 
Companion to Brentano (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 20-44), Brentano here 
appropriates Aristotle’s claim that our mental acts always include a sense of themselves “on the side” — 
i.e., alongside their consistently primary orientation toward “something else”, other than themselves (ibid., 
pp. 28-29; cf. Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 12.9, 1074b35). 
271 Cf. the following claim from Brentano’s Psychology: “no one can really doubt that a mental state which 
he perceives in himself exists, and that it exists just as he perceives it” (p. 20; quoted by Velarde-Mayol, 
On Brentano, p. 18).  Along the same lines, Brentano even goes so far as to take “inner perception” to be 
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then, there is an eminently trustworthy reflexive capacity built into our living experience; 
and this capacity for “inner perception” makes possible a kind of psychology that, while 
not yet experimental, is nonetheless empirical.  Second, Brentano holds that we are 
capable of achieving intuitive insight concerning structures.272  Like his “master” 
Aristotle before him and his students Stumpf and Husserl after him, Brentano holds that 
we can intuitively grasp the characteristics that are essential to a certain type of 
phenomena.273  For our minds do not only deduce consequences from presupposed 
principles, or propose merely probable inductive conclusions made likely by our 
experience of so many individuals.  Rather, as members of the Brentano school like to 
point out, our minds can also discern that extension is necessary for the appearance of a 
color, that there can be no sound without a volume and a pitch, that no group of four can 
appear unless a group of three also appears, and so on.  We do not need to hazard 
uncertain generalizations, based on the experience of so many colors and tones and 
groups, in order to establish these conclusions.  Instead, it seems that an insightful 
encounter with no more than a single instance of the sort of phenomenon in question 
                                                                                                                                                 
the most evident and foundational mode of perception (see Sensory and Noetic Consciousness (New York: 
Routledge, 1981), pp. 4-5).  He claims that our “inner perception” of our own mental acts has “immediate, 
infallible self-evidence” (Psychology, p. 91).  Husserl can only follow his teacher along this line up to a 
point. He agrees with his teacher that “adequate perception can only be ‘inner’ perception” (Logical 
Investigations, Inv. V, § 5, p. 86), but he does not ascribe across-the-board veridicality to a faculty of 
“inner perception”.  He instead holds that “most perceptions of psychic states cannot be evident” (Logical 
Investigations, Inv. VI, Appendix 4, p. 341).  In what follows, we need only achieve Husserl’s level of 
confidence, and admit the possibility of perceiving certain mental events no less evidently than we perceive 
things such as basketballs and dulcimers. 
272 Velarde-Mayol has similarly noted that Brentano, following Aristotle, posits a capacity for “inductive 
intuition”.  Such intuition “consists of seeing the intelligible conditions of a particular instance” (On 
Brentano, p. 24). 
273 Brentano refers to Aristotle as his master in a brief autobiographical comment: “First of all I had to 
apprentice myself to a master.  But since I was born when philosophy had fallen into the most lamentable 
decay, I could find none better than old Aristotle” (Die Abkehr com Nichtrealen, p. 291; translated by Rolf 
George and Glen Koehn, in “Brentano’s relation to Aristotle”, The Cambridge Companion to Brentano, p. 
20).  For Aristotle’s affirmation of an intuitive faculty that is capable of grasping basic principles (and that 
thus can serve as the “originative source of scientific knowledge”), see Posterior Analytics 1.3-1.4, 
especially 72b18-24, and 2.19, especially 100b10-17.  For Stumpf and Husserl’s agreement that there is 
categorial intuition, see my section 3.2 above. 
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would suffice.274  Second, then, we have a capacity for discerning the characteristics that 
are essential to a type of phenomena, perhaps even from a single token; and we thus have 
a capacity for grouping and differentiating types of phenomena in terms of their essential 
characteristics.  Given this capacity for intuition of structures, together with the capacity 
for “inner perception”, we have what we need for a reflective, descriptive, and categorial 
discipline.  We have the conditions for the possibility of a descriptive psychology, 
wherein we are guided and constrained by the data of “inner perception”, and thereby 
discern what is essential to different classes of mental phenomena. 
Brentano exposes the experiential dimension of meaning by just this sort of 
reflective description.  He employs descriptive means to show that meaning is, in 
important part, a kind of experience; and his descriptions of living experience entail that 
all meanings are either concrete experiences or dependent aspects of experiences.  
Moreover, Brentano grounds his description in reflections that should be available to and 
repeatable by each of his readers.  We can accordingly begin to assess his account of 
meaning as act by checking to see whether the descriptions on which it is based hold up 
against reflections on our own experience. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
274 Velarde-Mayol has made the same point with reference to the geometrical conclusion that “all squares 
are rectangles” (On Brentano, p. 25).  In our experience of squares, he notes, we can grasp the relevant 
“necessary and universal laws at a single stroke, so to speak” (ibid., p. 24).  In such cases, he writes, “it is 
not necessary to see many cases, one could be enough” (ibid., p. 25).  But it is tempting (if not accurate) to 
interpret geometry as an axiomatic discipline, within which all conclusions follow deductively from 
presupposed definitions.  What the examples of colors and sounds show is that sure intuition is also 
possible with regard to classes of material (or empirical, not-purely-formal) phenomena. 
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4.3.3: Meanings and reference 
The relevant descriptions occur in Brentano’s definition and subsequent 
classification of mental phenomena.  That is, it is Brentano’s distinction of mental 
phenomena from all other phenomena, along with his distinction of the subtypes of 
mental phenomena, that together offer reason for regarding meaning as an act.  As an 
initial step, then, consider how Brentano defines mental phenomena.   
Brentano defines mental phenomena in terms of intentionality.  For Brentano, as 
for Husserl after him, the word “intentionality” roughly designates a sort of openness, or 
direction, or orientation. 275  To say that an entity or event is intentional, in the Brentanian 
tradition, is to say that it is of, or about, something other than itself.  Given that 
understanding of intentionality, we may express Brentano’s definition of mental 
phenomena by the following formulations:276 
• Mental phenomena are appearances “characterized” by the feature of 
intentionality.  No other phenomena display that feature.277 
• A presentation278 of x is a mental phenomenon if and only if x is intentional. 
                                                 
275 Compare my first discussion of intentionality as being of in section 2.2.3. 
276 I take slight interpretive liberties in equating these formulations.  For, whereas Brentano at some points 
identifies the phenomena with “that which is perceived by us” (Descriptive Psychology, p. 137), I follow 
Husserl’s practice and distinguish phenomena from that which appears via phenomena.  To thus speak of 
the “appearances of” mental and physical events, when interpreting Brentano’s text, in some cases 
constitutes a departure from what Brentano probably intended.  Yet it would make for only superficial 
clarity to pretend that acts of sorrow and sympathy and the like are themselves mental appearances rather 
than that which appears via mental phenomena; it would likewise avoid complications only at the expense 
of precision to pretend that bicycles and streams and other physical things are themselves physical 
phenomena rather than things that appear by way of physical phenomena. 
277 Brentano asserts the coincidence of the mental and intentional on pp. 88-89 of his Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint.  See p. 88 for his inclusion of all that is mental within the category of the intentional 
(“Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the 
intentional … inexistence of an object …”), and p. 89 for his inclusion of all that is intentional within the 
category of the mental (“This intentional inexistence is characteristic exclusively of mental phenomena”). 
278 Brentano and Husserl alike use the term “presentation” (Vorstellung) in a very broad sense.  Each could 
say: “In view of the generality with which we use this term it can be said that it is impossible for conscious 
activity to refer in any way to something which is not presented” (Psychology from an Empirical 
Standpoint, p. 198).  Each uses the correlated term “phenomena” (Phänomene) in an equally broad sense. 
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• If we call every x the presentations of which are mental phenomena an 
“experiential item” — whether such items are whole experiences or moments 
(i.e., non-independent parts) of some experience(s) — then all and only 
experiential items are intentional. 
Brentano arrives at this definition by differentiating two sets of phenomena. There are, he 
claims, two non-overlapping sets of appearances, which sets together exhaustively 
include “all the data of our consciousness”.279  On the one hand, there are what Brentano 
calls “physical phenomena”.  Here Brentano places the appearances that occur in the 
absence of any experience of others and in the absence of any reflection on living 
experience.  These are the data that are available to our sensory modalities, imagination 
and thought apart from any “inner perception” or empathy.  Examples of such data 
include the presentations of “a figure, a landscape which I see, a chord which I hear, 
warmth”, and the like.280  On the other hand, according to Brentano, there are phenomena 
that we encounter only via “inner perception” of our own living experience and by means 
of in-feeling (or empathetic) perception of others’ experience.  Brentano calls these 
appearances “mental [psychischen] phenomena”.  They include the appearances of 
“hearing”, “seeing”, “feeling” and other sensory and imaginary “act[s] of presentation”; 
they include the appearances of “judging”, “recollecting”, “expecting”, “inferring”, 
“opining” and “doubting”; and they include the appearances of acts of “joy, fear, hope, 
courage, despair, … love, hate, desire”, and so on.281  Because we are aware that we live 
                                                 
279 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 77.  We need not fully accept Brentano’s strict 
separation of mental and physical phenomena in order to adopt important elements of the description to 
which it leads.  As we will see, the tidy split of physical and mental phenomena plays a rhetorical rather 
than presuppositional role in establishing the Brentanian descriptions that were pivotal for Husserl’s theory 
of meaning.  
280 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 80.   
281 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 79. 
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through such acts and because we are cognizant of aspects of such acts, we can speak 
with reason of their appearance.  Because we know that each such act is distinct from 
“that which is presented” in it and because our awareness of such acts is essentially 
secondary, we have some basis for distinguishing the data that are available via this 
awareness from all that which presents itself through “physical phenomena”.282 
 Now, Brentano’s crucial descriptive claim is that each mental phenomenon 
resembles all others, and differs from all physical phenomena, in virtue of manifesting an 
intentional direction toward an object.  He finds this orientation toward objects in the way 
that mental acts appear: “In presentation something is presented, … in love loved, in hate 
hated, in desire desired and so on”.283  In this way, each appearance of that which is 
“mental” (or experiential), and no physical phenomenon, presents an act’s object as well 
as an act.  Or such is Brentano’s claim: “every mental phenomenon includes something 
as object within itself”, and only mental phenomena thus manifest a “reference to a 
content”;284 no mental phenomena lacks this feature of intentionality, and “no physical 
phenomenon exhibits anything like it”.285  If we prefer to speak in terms of experiences 
and their aspects, we may put the same claim thus: every experiential item is intentionally 
oriented toward a referent or field distinct from itself, and only experiential items are thus 
intentionally open to, or directed at, some other.  Do these equivalent assertions withstand 
reflection on our own experience? 
                                                 
282 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 79. 
283 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 88. 
284 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, pp. 88-89.  Though Husserl found himself 
“force[d] to abandon the terminology” of “mental phenomena” and the intentional “inclusion” of an object, 
he still “adhere[d] to Brentano’s essential characterization” of intentionality to such an extent that we may 
overlook those “departures” here (Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 11, p. 97).  
285 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 89. 
 126 
We might have some qualms regarding the conditional according to which x must 
be intentional if x presents itself via mental phenomena.  For it seems that there are 
saliently different sorts of experiential items — that there are non-intentional as well as 
intentional items that can only achieve focal status through reflection or empathy.  
Among the realities the appearances of which are mental rather than physical phenomena, 
it seems we should include not only whole, concrete experiences, which Brentano called 
“mental acts”, but also the component aspects of those acts.286  And it seems that certain 
act-components such as sensations, which show up within our reflection by way of 
mental phenomena, might not yet be intentional.  Husserl, at least, objected to the 
conditional in question on the grounds that sensations are not intentional items.  He 
claimed that sensations, which no doubt comprise a class of experiential items, instead 
only acquire a kind of intentional relation to an object when they are subjected to an act 
of apprehension — an “objectifying interpretation”.287  To follow the path to Husserl’s 
1900-01 view of meaning, then, we need not admit that every component of every 
experience is intentional.  We need not fully include the experiential within the 
intentional.  It is rather enough for the purposes of Husserl’s theory of meaning merely if, 
as Husserl says, “in perception something is perceived, in imagination, something 
imagined, in a statement something stated, in love something loved”, and so on.288  It is 
sufficient if such whole conscious experiences (or “mental acts”) are experiences of __.  
                                                 
286 Brentano crucially employs the language of “mental acts” when first presenting his concept of mental 
phenomena.  See Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, pp. 79-80. 
287 On the non-intentionality of sensations, see Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 10, p. 97.  (Husserl there 
writes: “That not all experiences are intentional is proved by sensations and sensational complexes”.)  On 
what Findlay calls the “objectifying interpretation” of sensations, see Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 2, p. 
83.  (Findlay could have chosen a better translation for Auffasung than “interpretation”, given the 
difference between the sensations to which our acts of sense-perception apply, on the one hand, and the 
texts to which our acts of interpretation apply, on the other hand.) 
288 Logical Investigations, Inv. V, § 10, p. 95. 
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Thus we need not — and indeed Husserl thinks we should not — strictly adhere to 
Brentano’s claim that, if x is an experiential item, then x is intentional. 
What matters much more for our purposes is whether the converse conditional 
holds true.  What matters, in other words, is whether the only phenomena that manifest 
intentionality are mental phenomena.  And it does in fact seem to hold that, if x is 
intentional, then x is an experiential item.  For it is solely in reflection on one’s own 
living experience and in attention to another’s experience that we fix our focus on what is 
intentionally directed at an object or intentionally open to a field.  In contrast, those 
things that are only objects of experience, rather than acts or act-aspects, plainly do not 
possess intentionality.  Hills are not given a sensory or imaginary world; clouds have no 
access to a domain of ideas.  Entities that do not belong to the set of experiential items 
simply are not oriented or open or directed in the respect that consciousness essentially 
is.   
Granted, there are liminal cases.  Some entities that can be objects of our focus 
apart from any attention to mental acts do possess a kind of orientation.  And their 
orientation to something other than themselves might tempt us to regard these entities as 
intentional.  Yet these entities possess their particular kind of direction solely in virtue of 
experience; their referential function can only be clarified in terms of experience.  For 
example, computers that run thought-like programs, representational works of art and 
simple signs are all, in some sense, about something other than themselves.  Whether by 
physical pointing or pictorial resemblance or complex processes of computation, these 
things refer us to something distinct from their own component materials.  However, 
these entities do not by themselves intend that to which they point; they rather become 
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involved in an intentional kind of orientation solely by functioning as media for 
conscious experience.  Signs, for example, derive their referential character from the 
signifying intentions of conscious beings.  They bear the traces of intentionality, but they 
cease to make reference and lose their character as signs to the extent that we take them 
by themselves, in abstraction from conscious experience.  Paintings, likewise, lose any 
representational character that they possess, and even amount to nothing more than paint 
scattered across a surface, insofar as we consider them in abstraction from all creators 
and viewers.  Computers are similarly reduced to nothing more than mechanical 
converters, exchanging input for output, insofar as we regard them in abstraction from the 
conscious beings for whom things may be presented and for whom the terminus of 
calculations can be significant.  Whatever orientation such things would possess apart 
from experience no more constitutes an intentional mode of reference than a bowl’s 
openness to liquid constitutes an intentional openness to a field of manifestation.  Instead, 
the referential character that we recognize in signs, paintings and computers derives from, 
and hinges on, referential experience.  So these liminal cases require only a nuanced 
specification, rather than any ad hoc revision, of the general thesis at issue.  We can still 
say that what is intentional must be either a whole experience or a dependent aspect of a 
concrete experience; we need only amend to this thesis a consequence that it already 
suggests, namely that whatever bears the trace of intentionality can do so solely insofar as 
it is dependent on experience.  
It thus follows from reflective description that every mental act is intentional 
(even though quite possibly not every aspect of such acts is intentional), and conversely 
that whatever is intentional is either a mental act or an aspect of such an act.  
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Intentionality and experience may not be equivalent notions, in that certain non-
intentional aspects of mental acts may give the experiential a broader extension than the 
intentional.  Yet all whole experiences are intentional and all that is intentional is also 
experiential.  To that extent, Brentano’s definition of mental phenomena withstands 
critical scrutiny.  The definition expresses a typically overlooked but essential character 
or our mental acts, and effectively demarcates the sphere of intentionality within that of 
living experience.  What is more, this definition historically provided a founding insight 
for Husserl’s phenomenology of logic.  In order to see how the more psychological side 
of Husserl’s semantics follows from that definition, however, we should first consider 
also how Brentano divides up the mental acts that appear via mental phenomena.  For that 
classification provided another founding insight, as well as the point of departure, on the 
basis of which Husserl constructed his more psychological account of meaning.  
Brentano’s classification of mental acts is the broadest division within his 
psychology.  It falls just one tier beneath the distinction that delimits the field of 
psychology from that of physical science; and it subsumes in turn all of Brentano’s more 
specific subdivisions of mental phenomena.  What Brentano proposes, in his basic 
division of mental phenomena, is that there are exactly three genera of mental acts.  
There is a class of “mere presentations”, in which “something appears to us” without yet 
being affirmed or denied, loved or hated; there is a class of judgments, which involve not 
only the presentation of a content but also its “acceptance (as true) or rejection (as 
false)”; and there are acts of “love and hate”, which go beyond presentation by involving 
also “emotions”, “interest”, “wish[es]”, or the like.289  Brentano understands this last 
class of mental phenomena as the field of ethics; he regards the class of judgments as the 
                                                 
289 Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, pp. 198-99. 
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field of logic; and he identifies the capacity for presentation as the foundation for the 
other mental facilities.  Does this classification withstand reflection on our experience? 
We might quibble with the points at which Brentano draws his divisions.  We 
might object that he splits the field of mental acts at the wrong joints.  We might ask if 
there are not more or fewer than three basic categories of mental phenomena.  But what 
we cannot very well contest is that Brentano’s three categories comprise modes of 
intentional orientation.  For we do indeed find ourselves oriented to the world, directed to 
a variety of objects in a plethora of ways, and what Brentano calls “judgment”, 
“presentation” and “love and hate” are clearly among the ways (if not exhaustive of the 
ways) in which we may be so oriented.  If I stare blankly and idly at a painting, for 
example, my orientation toward it is at minimum one of presentation.  If I then take an 
interest in the painting, I enact a different, aesthetically appreciative mode of orientation 
to the same object.  If I judge, in a disinterested way, that the painting adheres to a certain 
artist or school’s principles of composition, I enact another distinctive orientation toward 
the painting.  In each case, it is hardly disputable that I am engaged in a type of intention.  
Brentano’s contention that presentation, judgment and the like are kinds of experience is 
therefore well founded.  
Further, that descriptively founded contention held no small significance for 
Husserl’s theory of meaning.  For whether or not all presentations and acts of love and 
hate are meanings, judgments, at least, plainly are.  Indeed, logicians no less than 
psychologists readily regard judgments as a model class of meanings.290  Given 
Brentano’s demonstration that at least certain judgments are experiences, then, it should 
                                                 
290 While Bolzano notably contended that judgments and presentations (Vorstellungen) alike are meanings, 
logic perhaps deals primarily in judgments.  Sentential logic, at least, takes as its primary subject matter 
judgments that may hold true and that stand in relationships of deductive consequence to one another. 
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follow for all parties that an exemplary subgroup of meanings are experiences.  
Brentano’s descriptive classification of mental phenomena thus provides an evidential 
basis for the more psychological sort of semantics at work in the later Logical 
Investigations, and might even seem to suggest that meanings in general are mental acts.        
However, Brentano’s classification of mental phenomena certainly does not 
establish on its own that meaning is entirely experiential.  Much less does it entail that all 
meanings are concrete experiences.  The description at work in Brentano’s classification 
shows that some judgments are experiences and that judgment is a kind of experience; yet 
judgment may thus function as a sort of experience without that function exhausting its 
nature.  We may deduce from Brentano’s classification that many meanings are 
experiences; but it does not follow that meanings are exclusively either experiences or 
aspects of experience.  On the contrary, thoroughgoing advocates of a supposedly mind-
independent sphere of “meanings in themselves” may consistently affirm the same 
semantic thesis for which Brentano’s descriptive classification provides a secure basis.  
Bolzano, for example, may readily grant, without falling into incoherence, that certain 
meanings are mental acts.291  To be consistent, Bolzano merely needs to call these 
meaning-acts “subjective”, and to contrast them with an “objective” class of presentations 
and judgments that he claims are independent of all mental acts.  Even given that there is 
a large, “subjective” class of meanings that are experiences, then, why suppose that the 
ideas and propositions that Bolzano called “objective” meanings are also experiential 
items?  Why think that both classes of meanings — logic’s “objective” class as well as 
psychology’s “subjective” class — are either experiences or dependent on experience? 
                                                 
291 Indeed, as we have seen, the fact that some meanings are experiences does not only function as a point 
of departure for Husserl’s Brentanian account of meaning; it also functions as a starting point for Husserl’s 
Bolzanian account of meaning’s independence from our experience. 
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Husserl found an answer to this question in Brentano’s definition of mental 
phenomena.  He found it, more precisely, in the compelling description that partly 
constitutes that definition.  Recall Brentano’s descriptive claim that whatever is 
intentional is experiential.  In some cases, as we saw, that description clearly holds: 
entities that are only objects of experience, such as walls, tables and chairs, plainly do not 
possess intentionality, whereas our whole experiences (say, of seeing walls, tables and 
chairs) do have an intentional orientation.  There were also liminal cases to which a 
dualistic description did not as easily apply.  But while plaques and portraits and other 
such cases perhaps undermined Brentano’s tidy separation of mental and physical 
phenomena, they, too, conformed to the essence of Brentano’s description.  For these 
things that function as media of reference and thereby bear the stamp of intentional acts 
are divested of their referential role and thus stripped of their intentional residue, as we 
saw, insofar as they are severed from the experiences in which they exercise their 
referential function.  Borderline cases thus confirmed Brentano’s descriptive claim that x 
is experiential if x is intentional; they showed that x can bear the referential mark of 
intentionality only insofar as x is an experience or depends on experience.   
Now, in light of that description, consider the status that objective meanings have 
with respect to experience.  Brentano’s description shows how the sphere of experience 
circumscribes that of reference: items can only have a referential character to the extent 
that they are, or depend on, experience(s).  Given that circumscription, then, it follows 
that an objective signification that is essentially referential cannot be apart from some 
experience(s).  Moreover, objective meanings in general are referential by their nature.  
So much is evident from the two following reflections.  First, objective significations, 
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like signs and pictures, direct us to a referent.  Whether we focus on the reiterable 
significations of noun-phrases, such as “bright afternoon” and “mountain lake”, or those 
of assertoric sentences, such as “the moose is running”, it is plain that the meanings to 
which we refer primarily function as media of reference.  Second, objective meanings, 
unlike paintings and signs, are fully constituted by that referential function.  Of course, 
inkblots and sound complexes and other things that function as signs are referential, 
insofar as they are signs; but all such things that function as signs may be distinguished 
from their signifying function.  In contrast, there are no things that function as objective 
significations, no underlying materials to divorce from that referential function.  Thus, 
objective meanings are constitutively and ineradicably referential.  To be sure, there may 
be no existing referent for a given reiterable concept, and no state of affairs to fulfill a 
given proposition.  But there can be no concepts or propositions without some act(s) of 
reference, no objective meaning apart from some act(s) of meaning.  In that sense, 
objective significations are fully dependent on the living experience of meaning.292  
Such was the almost psychologistic conclusion at which Husserl arrived by means 
of his teacher’s psychological descriptions.  In Brentano’s classification of mental 
phenomena, Husserl found grounds for the fairly obvious but nonetheless hugely 
important understanding that certain (“subjective”) meanings are intentional experiences.  
In Brentano’s definition of mental phenomena, Husserl found a descriptive demonstration 
that any remaining (“objective”) group of meanings must also be experiential.  Together 
these descriptions gave Husserl reason to regard every meaning as either an experience or 
                                                 
292 Despite Brentano’s much-discussed aversion to most things Kantian, Brentano and Husserl are in 
agreement with the early Kant on this point.  For Kant too had suggested that, while there may be no 
existing referent for a given concept, objective significations in general depend on some existing act(s) of 
reference (Cf. Kant’s 1763 Only Possible Proof-Ground, 2:78-79).  Moreover, this point on which they 
agreed spurred Kant and Husserl alike toward transcendental methodological developments. 
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a dependent aspect of some experience(s).  They showed that acts of meaning constitute 
the concrete basis without reference to which all of our talk about objective meanings is 
inevitably abstract.  They established that there could be no objective meaning apart from 
some experience(s) of meaning.  And they thereby provided insights at variance with 
those that Husserl had inherited from Bolzano, setting Husserl’s view of meaning at odds 
with itself.   
 
4.4: Meaning as paradox: conflicts between logical and psychological insights 
 Had Husserl entirely accepted both Brentano and Bolzano’s theories of meaning, 
he would have been forced into contradictions.  For those two theories, when taken in 
full, do not only represent the sort of tensed viewpoints that may turn out to be 
complementary.  Instead, the two thinkers who were the primary influences on Husserl’s 
theory of meaning also made bluntly incompatible claims about its subject matter.  On 
the one hand, Bolzano contended that there are logical entities “in themselves”.  He did 
not only defend Husserl’s view that there are objective concepts, judgments and truths; he 
also denied that the sphere of logical objects depends on any experience.  On the other 
hand, Brentano claimed that there are no objective significations.  He did not merely 
hold, with Husserl, that reiterable concepts and judgments are entirely dependent on some 
intentional experience(s); he rather denied that we should speak of significations at all 
unless we are referring to acts of signification.293  Clearly, then, we cannot coherently 
conjoin every claim from Brentano and Bolzano’s theories of meaning.294   
                                                 
293 This stronger stance is evident in Brentano’s assertion that “logic … has psychology as its source” 
(Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 21).  It is evident when he includes the “characteristics and 
laws of judgments” within the “essential fields of psychology” (Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 
foreword to the 1874 edition, p. xv.).  And it is evident again in Brentano’s claim that “judgment belongs to 
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 Fortunately, the synthetic reach of Husserl’s composite semantics extends only to 
the genuine insights that his primary influences achieved from their disparate vantage 
points.  Husserl did not maintain, and did not seek to reconcile, every thesis that his 
mentors expressed.  On the contrary, the same well-founded claims concerning meaning 
that Husserl appropriated from his mentors gave him reason to reject some of their less 
defensible views.  In particular, Bolzano’s cogent case that objective significations 
transcend our passing experiences prevented Husserl from adopting Brentano’s decision 
to regard meaning solely as an act; and, conversely, Husserl’s descriptive psychological 
insight that objective meanings depend on living experience kept him from affirming 
Bolzano’s speculation that such meanings are independent of all experience. 
 Still, even by accepting only those Bolzanian and Brentanian insights that I have 
detailed in sections 4.2 and 4.3, Husserl was left with a significant dissonance.  Bolzano’s 
cogent arguments had sounded an almost logicist note, showing that objective meaning is 
independent of our thought.  Brentano’s descriptions had sounded an almost 
psychologistic note by effectively demonstrating that all meaning is or depends on some 
                                                                                                                                                 
the field of psychology … and is directly accessible to scientific inquiry only in this domain” (Psychology 
from an Empirical Standpoint, p. 307; from a 1911 appendix to The Classification of Mental Phenomena).  
On these points Husserl’s Bolzanian “development [had] led to [his] drawing apart” from Brentano; it had 
led Husserl to see there are at least some judgments (or propositions) that we have neither verified nor 
articulated, which thus are inaccessible to our psychological reflection (Husserl, Logical Investigations, 
foreword to the first edition).  Granted, Husserl and Brentano alike consistently opposed the psychologistic 
“theory according to which beings other than men could have insights which are precisely the opposite of 
our own”; they both rejected the psychologistic view that “confuse[s] logical validity with the genetic 
necessity of a thought, whether for the individual or the human species”; and they both granted “that 
psychology has anything at all to contribute to epistemology and logic” (Brentano, Psychology from an 
Empirical Standpoint, p. 307; from a 1911 appendix to The Classification of Mental Phenomena).  But, as 
Robin Rollinger puts it, “… Brentano remained unconvinced that it was necessary to posit propositions and 
other Bolzanian “thought-things” in order to rescue logic from relativism” (“Brentano and Husserl”, The 
Cambridge Companion to Brentano, pp. 267).  Thus, as Rollinger notes, Brentano completed the whole of 
his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint “… without the slightest mention of propositions”, and 
instead depicted judgment solely as “an act of consciousness” (“Brentano and Husserl”, p. 260).   
294 Can a reductive psychological account of logical objects cohere with the insistence that logical objects 
are absolutely independent from experience?  It seems not, even when we consider Brentano’s unusually 
broad notion of psychology and correspondingly unusual type of psychological reductionism.  
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act(s) of reference.  By acknowledging both of these discordant semantic insights, 
Husserl forced himself to walk a thin line.   
It is almost as though Husserl had tried to affirm Protagoras’ well-known claim, 
according to which “man is the measure of all things”, and had also caustically asked, 
with Socrates, if it would be any less absurd to regard “a pig” as “the measure of all 
things”.295  Husserl knew why Socrates scoffed.  He had learned from Bolzano that the 
sphere of true propositions does not depend on our epistemically limited cognitive 
capacity — that human beings, like pigs, are not “the measure of things that are, that they 
are”, nor “of the things that are not, that they are not”.296  Yet Husserl also knew that 
Protagoras’ famous claim is “not mere babbling”.297  He had learned from Brentano that 
there is some reason to suspect that human beings are the measure of truth, and that there 
is indeed better reason to suspect humans than “pigs” and other “things that have 
sensation” of being this criterion.298  For Husserl had realized, thanks to Brentano’s 
descriptions, that there could be no objective meanings (including truths) without 
intentional experience, and more specifically that there could be no objective meanings 
without a categorial kind of intentional experience.299   
 Husserl was thus forced by genuine insights into a philosophical problem that 
jeopardized his nascent phenomenological project.  The study of meaning that had 
                                                 
295 According to Plato’s Theaetetus (151e, 160c-d and 161c), Protagoras made his famous claim “at the 
beginning of his book Truth”, a book which we no longer possess. The question that I quote Socrates 
effectively poses at 161c of Plato’s Theaetetus, by offering the following retort to Protagoras’ famous 
doctrine: “I don’t see why he does not say … that a pig or a dog-faced baboon or some still-stranger 
creature of those that have sensations is the measure of all things” (trans. Harold Fowler). 
296 Theaetetus, 151e. 
297 As Socrates says with reference to Protagoras’ claim that “man is the measure”, “it is likely … that a 
wise man is not merely babbling” (Theaetetus, 152b).  Socrates’ apparently caustic question indirectly 
reveals the truth underlying Protagoras’ (less than entirely valid) claim.  
298 Theaetetus, 161c. 
299 Brentano seems to have echoed Protagoras intentionally on this point, stating that “the man who judges 
with evidence is the measure of all things” (quoted by Velarde-Mayol, op. cit., p. 56).   
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culminated in his Logical Investigations left him with apparently conflicting realizations.  
Where Bolzano had offered proofs showing the independence of objective meanings 
from our passing experiences of meaning, Brentano had offered descriptions that exposed 
meaning as an experience on which objective meanings depend.  And these arguments 
and descriptions drove Husserl to accept apparently competing theories.  But while 
Husserl was thus pushed to publish two discrepant views of meaning as his own, he did 
not yet, in his Investigations, resolve the discord that his dyadic semantics posed.  Indeed, 
Husserl in his 1900-01 publication did not even explicitly recognize the discord between 
the two sides of his theory of meaning as such.  In that “breakthrough” work, he instead 
left the problem that threatened his philosophical project with incoherence both inexplicit 
and unresolved.     
 
5: From a two-faced semantics through a two-step reduction to a “two-sided” logic 
5.1: A methodological development 
 Though Husserl did not openly address the discord between his Brentanian and 
Bolzanian semantic insights within his “breakthrough” work, the same discord became 
central to the phenomenological program.  For the discrepancy within Husserl’s dyadic 
semantics shaped his phenomenological method; and that method then served, in turn, to 
partly confirm the theory of meaning from which it arose, and to resolve that theory’s 
internal dissonance.  This circular development may be parsed by reference to three of 
Husserl’s major publications, in roughly the following way.  First, in the Investigations of 
1900-01, Husserl faced the problem of how to come to terms with the dyadic 
phenomenon of meaning.  Next, that problem then precipitated a two-step method, which 
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Husserl perhaps most famously presented in the first volume of his Ideas Concerning 
Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, of 1913.300  Finally, when 
Husserl then applied that two-step method to the field of logic, as he did throughout the 
1929 work titled Formal and Transcendental Logic, he found that his procedure not only 
reinforced his earlier understanding of signification as fundamentally “two-sided”, but 
also explained why meaning displays those two sides.301 
In this chapter, I trace in greater detail the circular relation between Husserl’s 
method and theory of meaning.  In section 5.2, I examine how the semantic studies that 
Husserl published in 1900-01 determined the contours of the method that he articulated in 
1913.  In 5.3, I examine how Husserl’s method, when employed for the 1929 publication 
that Husserl devoted exclusively to logical issues, substantiated the basic tenets that he 
had endorsed with respect to signification when he published his first book of logical 
studies.  In 5.4, I examine how Husserl’s method led to his resolution of the dissonance 
between his Brentanian and Bolzanian semantic insights.  Then, finally, given that 
circular reasoning is suspect, I use section 5.5 to pose the critical question that the 
reciprocity between Husserl’s method and conclusions must prompt.  I there consider if it 
was not viciously circular for Husserl to derive conclusions about meaning by means of 
his method — given that Husserl’s method was, in important respects, a product of his 
theory of meaning. 
 
                                                 
300 Husserl. Ideas Concerning Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, volume I: General 
Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Trans. W. R. Boyce Gibson. London: Collier, 1969 [1913]. 
301 Husserl. Formal and Transcendental Logic. Trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969 
[1929]. The language of “two-sidedness” emerges in the 1929 Formal and Transcendental Logic (see, e.g., 
§§ 8-9), but that language expresses the same understanding that Husserl had already begun to achieve in 
1901.   
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5.2: Origins of the eidetic and transcendental reductions 
 We are told that the Logical Investigations were the “breakthrough” to Husserl’s 
phenomenological program.  But while we would thus expect the phenomenological 
method to be an accomplishment of the Investigations, there is no thorough or explicit 
account of that method in Husserl’s 1900-01 text.302  Instead, Husserl was able to achieve 
a full statement of his method only after the Investigations were complete.303  After also 
sketching a budding concept of phenomenology in lectures that he gave during the first 
decade of the twentieth century, Husserl first articulated his methodology for the reading 
public in the well-known 1913 Ideas publication subtitled General Introduction to Pure 
Phenomenology (hereafter: Ideas I).304  In what way, then, were the 1900-01 
Investigations the breakthrough to the method articulated in 1913?  
                                                 
302 As Jocelyn Benoist notes in his “Phénoménologie et ontologie dans les Recherches logiques” (La 
représentation vide suivi de Les Recherches logiques, une œuvre de percée., ed. J. Benoist and J.-F. 
Courtine (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2003), p. 112), a reading of (the 1901 edition of) the 
Investigations evidences an “under-determination of the idea of phenomenology.  Its first use lacks lucidity.  
Nowhere in the work does one find a definition in good and due form.  On the contrary, in reading the 
Logical Investigations, it is difficult to know what is phenomenological.  One can reconstruct what is 
phenomenological only by an examination of what Husserl does.”  As Husserl notes in his foreword to the 
second edition of the Investigations, the few sections on the idea of phenomenology contained in the 
introduction to Investigation I (as in Findlay’s English translation) are the result of the thorough “revision” 
done in 1913.  Whereas very little is said in the Investigations about a phenomenological method, however, 
explicit theses regarding meaning abound.  The views of meaning thus precede (and, I will argue, gave rise 
to) a clarified phenomenological method. 
303 Of course, even this statement of Husserl’s method was only as “full” or complete as a provisional 
exposition can be; it would be regularly modified through the course of Husserl’s later work.  Still, Ideas I 
appears to be the first publication in which Husserl provides a conception of his program and method that 
would remain roughly intact, despite all of his modifications.  It represents a pivotal development in 
Husserl’s methodology, wherein Husserl first clarifies that phenomenology is an eidetic and transcendental 
discipline.  
304 Although the first volume of Ideas is the best-known early exposition of the phenomenological method, 
an early concept of that method is already depicted in the 1907 course of lectures titled The Idea of 
Phenomenology and the 1906-07 lecture-course, Introduction to Logic and Theory of Knowledge, and is 
already present in Husserl’s private writings as early as 1905 (cf. Husserl’s history in The Crisis of the 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (trans. David Carr, Evanston: Northwestern 
University Press, 1970), especially at p. 243, regarding his first “explicit self-consciousness” of his 
method); see also Dermot Moran and Joseph Cohen, Husserl Dictionary (New York: Continuum, 2012), p. 
273). 
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 As we have seen, the Investigations, taken cumulatively, produce a discord in 
their presentation of meaning that they then leave provocatively unresolved.  This discord 
incited a reception that was hostile on two fronts: some dismissive critics complained of 
an “unfruitful and sterile [logical] formalism” at the same time that others charged 
Husserl with “a relapse into psychology” (and, more precisely, into psychologism).305  
Moreover, even for those who would seek to understand Husserl’s intent before 
disparaging his work, the discord within Husserl’s account of meaning elicits a question 
about that account’s coherence.  Even charitable readers are forced to ask: how could 
Husserl posit, and claim to study, an intentional basis of objective meaning, without 
thereby embracing the psychologistic claim that meaning and truth depend on our passing 
experience?306 
 In Ideas I, we see the response: phenomenology, Husserl claims, has reflective 
access to a theoretical field of intentionality that is not identical to the psychologist’s field 
of real, factual experiences.307  By reason of this access, phenomenology would be 
capable of giving non-psychologistic accounts of an intentional ground of objectivity.  
But what is this not-exactly-psychological field of intentionality?  And how could 
phenomenology achieve access to it?   
                                                 
305 The first attack came from Melchior Palágyi, a critic whom I have already mentioned, who, according to 
Husserl, entirely failed to notice the later Investigations’ attempted “elucidation of the origin of the logical 
concepts” (cited by Husserl in his “A Reply to a Critic”).  The wording of the second attack is Heidegger’s 
(History of the Concept of Time, trans. Ted Kisiel (Indiana University Press, 2009 [1925]), p. 24), but 
Heidegger uses these words to represent a judgment of Paul Natorp’s.  As noted before, Husserl refers to 
this second critique too, though without mentioning Natorp, as “the often heard, but to [his] mind grotesque 
reproach, that [he] may have rejected psychologism sharply in the first volume of [his] work, but that [he] 
fell back into psychologism in the second” (Logical Investigations, foreword to the second edition of the 
sixth Investigation, p. 178). 
306 Logical Investigations, foreword to the second edition of the sixth Investigation. 
307 Compare Husserl’s claim, in the Introduction to Ideas I, that the phenomenological method “make[s] the 
[“general structures” of the] transcendentally purified consciousness with its essential correlates perceptible 
and accessible” (p. 41).  
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If we are to do phenomenology and gain access to its distinctive domain, 
according to Husserl’s 1913 work, we must engage in an unusual course of thought that 
essentially involves two steps.  One of these steps Husserl calls “transcendental”.  The 
other he calls “eidetic”.  Together they comprise the “phenomenological reduction”.308  
That is, the two steps together comprise the specifically phenomenological method, by 
means of which a reflection on our living experience can purportedly access a domain of 
research that differs from the real, factual experiences at issue in psychology.  
The procedure for the “transcendental” component of Husserl’s method is as 
follows.   To begin, employ existential “doubt” as a “device of method”; set well-justified 
attributions of existence “out of action”.309  Most importantly, hold back from (a) our 
natural tendency to ascribe existence to the appearing world and (b) our habit of 
regarding ourselves as existing members of an existing world.  Without any intention to 
deny these existential theses, “bracket” them: put them out of play.310  Next, while thus 
suspending the operation of our belief in the existence of much of what appears, consider 
the nature of appearance itself.  That is, while standing back from what Husserl calls “the 
                                                 
308 While Husserl formulates the phenomenological reduction(s) somewhat differently in different texts, he 
introduces it as a two-part procedure, which involves transcendental and eidetic components, both in the 
1913 introduction to Ideas I (pp. 39-41) and in the 1931 preface to the English edition of Ideas I (pp. 5-8).  
For all of the divergent shapes that the phenomenological method undertook in Husserl’s thought after 
1913, he still conceived of phenomenology in 1931 as “a science of the eidetic essence of a transcendental 
subject”, which is to say that he still saw his as a discipline of thought requiring both “the reduction to the 
transcendental and, with it, [the] further reduction to the Eidos” (Ideas I, Preface to the 1931 English 
Edition, p. 7).   
309 Ideas I, § 31, pp. 97-98.   
310 Ideas I, §§ 31, 32. To be clear, Husserl does not believe that these existential theses are false.  He “does 
not deny the positive existence of the real [realen] world and of nature”; on the contrary, he says that the 
world’s existence “is quite indubitable”, and acknowledges that “everyone accepts [the world], and with 
undeniable right, as actually existing” (Ideas I, Author’s Preface to the 1931 English Edition, p. 14).  But 
Husserl can very well ask how we achieve our sense that the world exists — how that sense of existence is 
constituted, and how our thought can have objects that transcend it — without skeptically doubting the 
world’s factual existence.  For, while our belief that the world exists is extraordinarily well founded, it is 
not on that account incapable of reflective examination.  Instead, Husserl’s surely understandable query of 
how the world can appear to us essentially includes as a sub-query the issue of how the world can appear to 
us as existing (rather than as, say, illusory, or merely supposed).   
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standpoint of everyday life”, wherein we take “the world as it confronts us” for granted, 
and wherein we understand our mental activity as an existent part of the world, “lay bare 
the presuppositions essential to this viewpoint”.311  Rather than presuming that there is an 
existing world and that there are beings within the world for which the world appears, as 
we move on to pose questions about the world and the beings within it, broach instead the 
more fundamental question of how it is possible that the world appears at all.312  
This psychology does not do.  For, as Ideas I puts it, “psychology is a science of 
realities [Realitäten]”; it concerns itself with mental events that “take their place with the 
real subjects to which they belong in the one spatio-temporal world”, and just “in so far 
as [these mental events] have real existence [Dasein]”.313  That is, psychology sets itself 
the task of investigating mental events to the extent that they are parts of the natural 
world; it asks, for example, how our mental events are causally related to various stimuli 
and behaviors and neural occurrences.  In attending to conscious processes, then, the 
psychologist typically assumes a perspective that sees only real parts of the world sitting 
external to other real parts of the world,314 and bypasses the question of how the 
transcendent field of experience, with all of its parts, is available to consciousness.  In 
order to do phenomenology, in contrast, the psychologist would have to ask reflectively 
(or, in the language of Ideas I, “transcendentally”) how any transcendent objects, and 
                                                 
311 Ideas I, Introduction, p. 40. 
312 Cf. Ideas I, § 53. 
313 Ideas I, Introduction, pp. 39-40.  
314 Following Husserl, Merleau-Ponty described the psychological perspective in these terms.  He noted 
that the psychologist meets so many beings and pieces that stand (“partes extra partes”) in “only external 
and mechanical relations” to one another, related if at all as “function to variable”, and often by the 
efficient causality of “motion received and transmitted” (Phenomenology of Perception, p. 84).  Merleau-
Ponty also noted, following Husserl, that this “objective” approach, by taking consciousness too as “no 
more than a sector of being”, cannot consider how that consciousness might have “an inner communication 
with the world” (ibid., pp. 68, 111). It cannot, then, adequately consider “the problem of the constitution of 
the world”, which, as Husserl clarifies in Ideas I, it is phenomenology’s task to consider (ibid., p. 69). 
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indeed a whole publicly observable “objective field”, are available for investigation to his 
or her own consciousness.315   
The phenomenological method is thus essentially “reflective”, in a way that 
psychology is not.316  Whereas psychology avoids self-critical questions and so counts 
among the disciplines that Husserl classes (“in a good sense” and “without … any 
depreciation”) as “dogmatic”, phenomenology poses what Husserl calls questions of an 
“epistemological” or “specifically philosophical” type.317  Psychology self-confidently 
seeks results, wasting little or no time with “skeptical problems relating to the possibility 
of knowledge”; phenomenology temporarily suspends psychology’s confidence and 
places psychological results into brackets, taking the skeptical challenge seriously.  Or, to 
be more precise, phenomenology takes the skeptical challenge constructively: without 
adopting the skeptic’s negative view of established scientific claims, it heeds the 
skeptic’s demand to put aside existing bodies of knowledge, so that it may thereby ask 
how knowledge is possible.  In what I have presented as the first step of Husserl’s 1913 
method, then, which Husserl at that time and afterward called the “transcendental 
reduction”, phenomenology delays the study of any particular region of objects, and 
instead considers “the transcendence that the objects of knowledge claim to possess in 
relation to knowledge itself”.318   
Once this “reflective” and “epistemological” change of orientation is made, 
subjectivity then comes into focus as that which Husserl calls “transcendental 
                                                 
315 Ideas I, § 86.  On “specifically philosophical” questions see Robert Sokolowski, “Husserl on First 
Philosophy”, § 3, “Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse”, and “The Method of Philosophy: 
Making Distinctions”. 
316 According to § 77 of Ideas I, “phenomenological method proceeds entirely through acts of reflection” 
(p. 197). 
317 Ideas I, § 26, pp. 86-88.   
318 Ideas I, § 26, p. 87.   
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subjectivity”.319  In other words, subjectivity then presents itself as that for which, a step 
over (transcendere) from which, there is an appearing field.320  Correlatively, while our 
presumption that the world exists is placed into brackets, we are left nonetheless with the 
world’s appearance.  That is, though we have adopted a position from which we do not 
presume the existence of that which appears to exist, we still have the phenomena: we 
still have presentations of sensuous individuals and backgrounds, of imaginary and 
hallucinatory objects, of states of affairs, of objective significations, of essences, and so 
on, as data that are variously given within an experiential field.  We are thus left, in 
Husserl’s language, with “unities of sense”.321  Some of these unities present themselves 
as “valid”; others are merely supposed.  But they all count as what Husserl calls 
“noemata”: they are all correlates of what we might call mental events or living 
experiences and what Husserl calls “noeses” (as short for stages of nous).  By means of 
the phenomenological method’s transcendental step, then, we have a thoroughly 
intentional frame of reference.  In place of the picture of an all-encompassing thing-based 
world, which psychology operatively assumes, we have a dyadic and fundamentally 
subjective framework, and a new field of research.  On one side (the “noematic” side), we 
have the objects of every other epistemic enterprise, as so many transcendent unities of 
sense; and, on the other side (the “noetic” side), we have a domain of subjectivity 
                                                 
319 Ideas I, § 26, p. 87.  For Husserl’s depiction of the reduction as an “epistemological” procedure, see also 
his claim that “the phenomenological reduction … is the ultimate source for the only conceivable solution 
of the deepest problems of knowledge” (Ideas I, § 97, p. 263). 
320 Compare Husserl’s characterization of “what can remain over when the whole world is bracketed”: 
“Consciousness in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute uniqueness of nature remains 
unaffected by the phenomenological disconnection.  It therefore remains over … as a region of being which 
… can become in fact the field of a new science — the science of phenomenology” (Ideas I, § 33, pp. 101-
102).   
321 For example, Husserl claims that the terms “reality and world” come to offer themselves, within the 
reflecitve orientation achieved by the transcendental reduction, simply as “the titles for certain valid unities 
of sense” (Ideas I, § 55, p. 153).  
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importantly different from that which psychology studies: we have subjectivity 
considered as that for which unities of sense are constituted.  But does the step into this 
frame of reference, by itself, differentiate Husserl’s phenomenology from psychologism?  
Does this step by itself show us how Husserl could, without any “relapse” into 
psychologism, claim that objective meaning depends on meaning qua act? 
 On the contrary, the transcendental reduction on its own does not necessarily 
exclude psychologism.  Granted, the reflective move within Husserl’s method prevents 
its practitioners from interpreting, say, neuroscientific objects as the ground of 
propositions and truths.  For if we place our belief in the existence of the human nervous 
system into brackets, we would then be obliged to explain, without presupposing any 
conclusions derived from neuroscientific inquiry, how a neuroscientist can experience the 
objects comprising his or her field of study.  Our attempts to explain experience and 
judgment in terms of the human brain would then be preempted by a demand to do just 
the opposite — and so we would be blocked from claiming that logical objects are only 
functions of human brain processes.  But the transcendental reduction does not preclude 
all forms of psychologism.  Consider, for example, a transcendental orientation of the sort 
that Hume deploys.  Hume’s genetic epistemology is a transcendental project: Hume 
poses constitutional questions, asking how the objects of our perception and thought 
(“impressions” and “ideas”) come to be; and, although this is not only a “device of 
method” for Hume as it is for Husserl, Hume temporarily suspends the belief that there is 
a world of substances standing in causal relations with one another.  Yet, by adopting this 
transcendental orientation, Hume is certainly not prevented from reductively denying that 
there are general meanings of the sort that Bolzano and Husserl affirm.  Instead, Hume 
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programmatically seeks to reduce such media of thought to so many fleeting 
psychological entities.  He depicts all ideas as nothing but faded impressions (albeit 
impressions often combined into various “concatenations” and occasionally grouped 
under names into various associative configurations).  He enacts what Husserl calls a 
“systematically applied psychologism”.322  Clearly, then, a transcendental line of thought 
does not rule out all claims of a psychologistic sort.   
 Moreover, there is even a structural affinity between transcendental and 
psychologistic orientations.  Consider characteristic psychologistic assertions.  Suppose 
we say that logical laws are only descriptions of our patterns of thought and intellectual 
aversions; or suppose we say that numbers are only our “mental constructs”, and derive 
their being from our acts of counting.323  Such claims effectively offer replies to 
constitutional questions.  For, when we reductively regard the objects of our thought 
(such as numbers and logical laws) as dependent on our passing thoughts, we have 
already shifted our attention away from a straightforward focus on objects and 
reflectively considered how those objects come to be given in our experience.  Thus it is 
not only the case that rare kinds of psychologism are compatible with a transcendental 
orientation; it is also the case that psychological reductionism very often involves the 
constitutional kind of questioning that is essential to the transcendental reduction.324 
                                                 
322 Logical Investigations, Inv. II, appendix to chapter 5, p. 302. 
323 Husserl disparages this view of numbers in Ideas I, § 22 (p. 81).  We need not presuppose the world’s 
existence in order to make psychologistic claims such as these.  
324 Of course, Husserl intends his “reduction(s)” to be a restorative return to a certain domain of the things 
themselves, rather than an elimination of what is given in some disparaged modes of insight.  (For a clear 
treatment of Husserl’s “reduction” as a “restoration” and a “return”, see Bob Sandmeyer, Husserl’s 
Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problem and Purpose (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 74 ff.)  Still, as 
we can see, there are certain parallels between the restorative transcendental reduction and purposefully 
eliminative psychological reductionism. 
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 So the transcendental reduction is not enough.  We might follow Husserl through 
the transcendental aspect of his procedure and still psychologistically hold that objective 
meaning depends on our own factual experiences.  In order to gain access to 
phenomenology’s not-exactly-psychological field, then, we must also take another step.  
We must undertake what Husserl called the “eidetic reduction”. 
 The eidetic step within Husserl’s phenomenological reduction serves to deflect 
attention from the contingent matters of fact to which transcendental reflection might 
otherwise lead us.  It serves as a change of regard — even though it does not reverse the 
transcendental reduction’s reflective direction.  For whereas the transcendental 
orientation that phenomenology demands directs us reflectively back toward our own 
experiences, phenomenology through its eidetic step then comes to regard those factual 
experiences merely as examples.  Specifically, the eidetic reduction requires us to take 
our factual experiences as examples by which we can discern the essence (or eidos) of 
experience as such.  Thus, in the eidetic reduction, I do not concern myself with the 
“individual element” of my experience.325  The person engaged in the eidetic reduction 
does not pay heed to the time or location of his or her experience, or to his or her 
distinctive personality.326  Within the eidetic reduction, instead, we employ our individual 
experiences in a “merely exemplary capacity”, using them much as we might use the 
pieces of an “abacus” in order “to grasp … in their pure generality the series 2, 3, 4, … as 
                                                 
325 According to Ideas I, “phenomenology ignores” the factual character of the experience on which each of 
us can reflect (§ 75, p. 192).  Husserl does not rule out a “factual study” study of the individuals who can 
perform the transcendental reduction, but that “metaphysics” is not the task of Husserl’s phenomenology of 
logic (Ideas I, Introduction, pp. 40-41). 
326 We can imaginatively vary when, where, and for whom a given experience occurred, while keeping 
what is essentially the same experience in mind.  According to Husserl, it is generally true that an 
individual, or “tode ti” (this here), presents a factual, “hic et nunc” (here and now) aspect, which can be 
varied while the individual’s essential character remains the same (cf. Ideas I, §§ 2, 75).  A singular eidos 
indeed must not vary, any more than does the answer to the question, “what is this individual?”. 
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such, pure numbers as such”.327  Starting, via the transcendental reduction, from the 
factual consciousness to which we have reflective access, we then in the eidetic reduction 
place our focus on “the essential nature of the consciousness of something” and on 
“conscious living experience in general”.328  Having made a transcendental turn toward 
subjectivity, and reflectively disclosed our own consciousness as the kind of being for 
which there is appearance, we then attend to the structure and possibilities of 
transcendental subjectivity in general. 
 In this way, the eidetic reduction completes Husserl’s path toward a domain of 
inquiry that is distinct from, and that does not problematically overlap with, that of 
psychology.  Already in the transcendental reduction Husserl achieves a distinction 
between psychological and phenomenological domains.  Already with that reduction 
Husserl marks how his reflective research program turns from experience understood as 
one natural reality among others and toward experience understood as that for which 
there is appearance.  That distinction between domains, however, does not erase their 
important overlap, insofar as both transcendental and psychological study direct an 
individual’s reflective inquiry toward his or her own individual experiences.  It is only by 
the eidetic reduction that phenomenology then takes a different angle of approach to this 
shared field of individual experiences, directing our gaze away from the factual 
dimensions of those experiences, and toward the essential issue: what is experience?329  
                                                 
327 Ideas I, Husserl’s preface to the English edition, p. 5.   
328 Ideas I, § 34, pp. 103-104. 
329 Of course, the general essential question, “what is experience?” includes narrower essential questions 
regarding types of experience, such as “what is the experience of signs?” and “what is the experience of 
images?”.  Further, according to Husserl, who contends that each singular experience has an “ideally 
selfsame essence, which like every essence could particularize itself not only hic et nunc but in numberless 
instances”, our essential questioning also includes the question, “what is this experience” (Ideas I, § 75, p. 
192). 
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 Together with a transcendental turn, then, the eidetic turn culminates in a 
direction of reflective inquiry that veers away not only from the natural realities typically 
at issue in psychology, but also from the facts with which psychology is characteristically 
concerned.330  When we, having already bracketed the existence of the natural world, find 
ourselves nonetheless reflecting on factual experiences that undoubtedly lie within 
psychology’s field, the eidetic reduction issues the following prompt: neglect inductive 
concern regarding what happens to hold for so many observable factual experiences, and 
consider instead what must hold for each conceivable experience.331  Thus, once we 
undertake both the eidetic and transcendental components of Husserl’s method, we point 
ourselves toward a thoroughly distinctive domain of study.  We turn toward a domain of 
study within which (a) psychology’s transcendent realities are bracketed and (b) the 
factual variables of individual experiences are disregarded.  We orient ourselves toward 
“experiences as such, considered from the standpoint of their own essence as liberated 
from all natural apperception”.332   
 Now, this orientation represents a significant philosophical accomplishment, 
because it opens up the possibility of a transcendental discipline not beset by 
psychologistic problems.  It allows us to say, without expressing any type of 
psychologism, that objective meaning has an intentional basis.  For Husserl’s 1913 
method puts us in position to say, in a strictly general way, that there could be no 
signification if there were no experience.  It puts us in position to affirm the general 
                                                 
330 Cf. Husserl’s distinctions of the “real” from the “irreal”, on the one hand, and of “fact” and “essence”, 
on the other hand, in the introduction to Ideas I (pp. 39-41). 
331 If the transcendental turn may be pictured as a horizontal one, which sets the natural world to the side as 
it moves toward the distinct but overlapping field of transcendental subjectivity, then the eidetic turn is a 
vertical one, which neglects the superficial, factual aspect of those experiences making up the field that 
phenomenology and psychology hold in common, and looks toward what any possible experience (or any 
possible experience of a certain type or content) must be. 
332 Ideas I, § 79, p. 205.     
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dependence of objective meanings on acts of meaning.  Yet it at the same time prevents 
us from judging that logical objects depend on a particular piece of the world or that 
invariant meanings require my own (recently begun) stream of experience.  The 
transcendental reduction blocks us from interpreting any transcendent entity as the 
ground of logic’s objective significations, and the eidetic reduction guards against our 
regarding the particular factual experience upon which we can reflect as that ground.333  
Together, then, these two reductions allow us to non-psychologistically posit an 
intentional basis of ideal unities of meaning. 
 In Husserl’s case, moreover, the two-pronged phenomenological reduction also 
represents a crucial methodological achievement.  For, by clarifying the boundaries of 
Husserl’s distinctive field of research, the reduction provides a needed defense against 
those who confuse phenomenology with psychologism.  Take those readers who 
dismissively charged Husserl with letting psychologism creep back into his thought in the 
later Logical Investigations.  Consider what those readers would find if they then 
proceeded through both steps of the method that Husserl articulated in 1913.  By thus 
complying with the phenomenological procedure, Husserl’s readers would indeed find 
themselves regarding all unities of sense, including logical objects, as generally 
dependent on intentionality.  No less follows from the transcendental reduction.  By 
taking up this view of intentionality and objective signification in general, however, 
Husserl’s readers would not further commit themselves to any of the familiar 
                                                 
333 As we have seen, the transcendental reduction does not suffice for Husserl’s attempt to decisively 
differentiate phenomenology from all psychologism.  The eidetic reduction is also a necessary aspect in 
“the phenomenological outlook”, according to Husserl, as a means to overcome “the extraordinarily 
widespread disposition of our time to interpret the eidetic psychologistically”; it is needed in order to 
overcome, i.e., the tendency to “confuse the consciousness of [objective] essences … with these essences 
themselves” (Ideas I, § 61, p. 163). 
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psychologistic claims, according to which they as existing individuals, or the existent 
species to which they belong, are the ground of meaning.  On the contrary, the 
transcendental and eidetic reductions rule out precisely those claims.  In this way, then, 
the procedure that Husserl made explicit in 1913 guides his readers to a position from 
which they can make general claims regarding the origin of objective meaning without 
yet delving into any metaphysics of individuals.  The phenomenological method exposes 
the possibility of such a position, and with it exposes the gap between psychologism, on 
the one hand, and Husserl’s study of an intentional basis of logical objects, on the other 
hand.  Contra the charges leveled by dismissive critics of the Investigations, then, 
Husserl’s 1900-01 theory of meaning is not incoherent — and the 1913 procedure 
demonstrates precisely how Husserl could coherently affirm both sides of his semantics.   
 We can thus see how the Investigations constituted the “breakthrough” to the 
partly eidetic, partly transcendental two-step that is the phenomenological method.  We 
can see how that two-step method is a response to strains inherent in the two-faced 
semantics that Husserl defended in 1900-01.  The transition occurred as follows: 
Husserl’s dyadic semantics elicited charges of incoherence and of a “relapse” into 
psychologism; these charges then created a demand for Husserl to clearly distinguish his 
own mode of inquiry from that which psychologists practice; and Husserl then presented 
his readers with a method which demonstrated the psychology-phenomenology 
distinction and which showed how Husserl could reconcile his Bolzanian and Brentanian 
semantic claims.  Again, the question of whether those claims could cohere at all had put 
at risk the philosophical project inaugurated in the Investigations.  How could Husserl 
claim that objective significations are both independent of our passing experiences of 
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meaning and nonetheless dependent on the experience of meaning?  As we can see in 
light of his 1913 work, Husserl could have made both of those claims coherently in 1900-
01 if he had been speaking about transcendental acts of meaning and transcendent (or 
objective) meaning in general.  And the phenomenological method provides a way of 
speaking about precisely that general subject matter.  Thus, the phenomenological 
method is an artifact of Husserl’s struggle to demonstrate the difference between 
phenomenology and psychology.  The two-step method articulated in 1913 is an attempt 
to reconcile the two facets of his dyadic semantics; it is a response to the charges of 
incoherence that his 1900-01 account of meaning had provoked and left unresolved.   
 Now, to be sure, Husserl does not apply his method only to the logical realm.  
Husserlian phenomenology is not concerned exclusively with categorial experience and 
objects.  Husserl also employs his method in the study of “pre-predicative” experience; 
he also utilizes the transcendental and eidetic reductions in order to consider, for 
example, the kind of bodily presence that is available in tactile experience.  He provides 
methodologically distinctive studies of various sensory and imaginary acts.  Therefore it 
is not as though the phenomenological field consists solely in the categorial level of 
experience, nor as though Husserl’s reflective description is concerned only with 
syntactical acts of judging, questioning, commanding, and the like.  Yet while Husserl’s 
application of his method rather extends so that all sensing and sense become an object of 
phenomenological study, his method nonetheless arose out of issues in the theory of 
meaning.  The method stems from specifically semantic problems, even though the 
method’s functionality is not confined to the logical realm.  
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 I should also make one further, and final, qualification, in order to more 
adequately indicate how Husserl’s two-step method was determined by his two-faced 
semantics.  This qualification concerns the order of the transcendental and eidetic “steps” 
within the phenomenological procedure.  In my analysis of that procedure up to this 
point, I have for purposes of clarity consistently presented the transcendental reduction as 
a first step, to be followed by what has perhaps seemed like an essentially secondary 
eidetic reduction.  In Husserl’s practice, however, this order is often reversed.334  In 
practice, Husserl often begins with an anti-psychologistic defense of the eidetic, and only 
afterward broaches a distinctively phenomenological topic, by raising the transcendental 
question of how the eidetic is constituted.  He structures his later major logical 
publication, for example, so that it comprises a first half (or so), in which he investigates 
the transcendent and invariant nature of objective significations, along with a second half 
(or so), in which he traces objective signification’s intentional and transcendental origin.  
So, too, when Husserl first introduces a reading public to his “method of 
“phenomenological reductions””, the eidetic reduction is given as a first step, and 
followed by the transcendental.335   
 Still, however its parts are arranged, Husserl’s 1913 method is a response to his 
1900-01 semantics.  For, whatever their order, each of the two steps within Husserl’s 
                                                 
334 Moreover, though we need not investigate this possibility here, the eidetic and transcendental steps that I 
have divided in my analysis may be inseparably tied to one another.  Husserl often divides the two steps in 
his own analyses of his method, yet he does not hesitate to depict the reductions somewhat fluidly.  The 
reductions often appear less like discrete methodological pieces in fixed relations and more like mutually 
dependent, and so only abstractly isolable, aspects of a method that they jointly comprise (cf. Ideas I, 
Introduction, p. 40, and § 88, p. 239). 
335 Ideas I, Introduction, p. 40.  When the eidetic reduction thus occupies the first place within Husserl’s 
two-step, it functions as an initial and incomplete procedure, which is comparable in its results to an 
objectively oriented philosophy of logic — much as an isolated transcendental reduction might achieve 
only a kind of psychological conclusions.  So, when Husserl undertakes the eidetic step first, it is then only 
in the transcendental reduction that he achieves access to the distinctively phenomenological field of study. 
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procedure is tied to one of the two sides comprising his dyadic theory of meaning.  More 
precisely, the eidetic and transcendental reductions both respond to a demand that is 
raised by a side of Husserl’s partly Bolzanian, partly Brentanian view of signification.  
Notice how the eidetic reduction answers to the requirements imposed by Husserl’s 
Bolzanian insights.  Through engaging in this reduction, a person effectively refuses to 
reject objective concepts and propositions, and is prevented from regarding invariant 
meanings as dependent on our passing experiences of meaning.  Notice further how the 
transcendental reduction answers to an imperative inherent in Husserl’s Brentanian 
insights.  By engaging in the transcendental reduction, a person is turned toward the 
concrete, living experience of meaning; he or she is prompted to inquire reflectively 
about the intentional origin of meaning; and he or she is prevented from fixating on 
causally interacting particles in a way that occludes intentionality.   
 In these ways, the transcendental reduction follows from the Brentanian view of 
meaning, and the eidetic reduction from the Bolzanian view.  Each half of 
phenomenology’s two-step moves the person who engages in it away from a view of 
meaning that contradicts one half of Husserl’s dyadic semantics.  And the full two-step 
thus places its practitioner in a position to see the field of study to which Husserl had 
broken through via his 1900-01 semantics.  The full two-step thereby attempts to show 
how that dyadic view of meaning could be consistent; and so the method is an attempt to 
answer the charges of incoherence that Husserl’s semantics had incited.  In its parts and 
as a whole, then, the procedure that Husserl recommended to his readers is essentially a 
response to exigencies created by his investigation of meaning.   
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 Thus Husserl’s concept of phenomenology, in its pivotal 1913 expression, stems 
from his 1900-01 theory of meaning.  The two-step method is motivated by the two-faced 
semantics.  However, as we have already begun to see, this means that the influence 
between Husserl’s semantics and method did not flow only in one direction.  After he 
articulated a method in response to problems within his theory of meaning, Husserl was 
not then content to leave those problems without any resolution.  Instead, Husserl then 
deployed his method in an attempt to resolve the questions that his semantics had raised.  
He used his partly transcendental, partly eidetic procedure to ratify, to integrate, and to 
revise his partly Brentanian, partly Bolzanian view of meaning.  So, in the remaining 
sections of this chapter, I turn to that ratification (in 5.3), integration (in 5.4), and revision 
(in 5.5).  I examine and assess the reciprocal determination that Husserl’s method exerted 
upon his semantics.  
 
5.3: The legitimating result of the phenomenological reduction 
5.3.1: The reduction’s operation in Husserl’s later theory of meaning 
 We might suspect that Husserl’s methodologically pivotal work, during the years 
leading up to 1913, caused a reversal in his theory of meaning.  We might suspect that the 
transcendental turn amounted to a total about-face.  In fact, however, there is a basic 
continuity between Husserl’s earlier and later accounts of meaning.  Husserl’s method, 
once explicit, did not cause him to reject either fundamental piece of his dyadic 
semantics.  Instead, once Husserl achieved his enduring conception of phenomenology as 
an essentially eidetic and transcendental discipline, his subsequent logical studies 
purported to confirm the primary insights of his earlier semantics. 
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 To find decisive evidence that Husserl’s method, once accepted, would serve to 
legitimate his earlier, two-faced view of meaning, we need look no further than Formal 
and Transcendental Logic.  That 1929 work is plainly the best source for Husserl’s 
mature and methodologically informed account of meaning.336  What we must notice is 
only (a) how that 1929 text’s procedure complies with the concept of phenomenology 
that Husserl clarified in 1913 and (b) how Husserl argues in that 1929 work in support of 
Brentanian and Bolzanian claims that he had first defended decades before.   
 In what sense, then, does Formal and Transcendental Logic comply with the 
pivotal concept of phenomenology articulated in Ideas I?  We must grant, of course, that 
Husserl’s methodological development was not complete in 1913.  His understanding of 
the phenomenological discipline rather continued evolving throughout his 
phenomenological practice.  Still, the persistent notion that phenomenology involves a 
partly eidetic, partly transcendental two-step is clearly operative in his 1929 publication.  
We can discern as much simply from the work’s title and general structure.  Even the 
adjectives that Husserl includes in the full title of his Logic already give reason to expect 
a partly eidetic, partly transcendental approach to logical issues.337  And a closer look at 
the Logic confirms this expectation.  In the five chapters comprising the book’s first, 
“formal” part, Husserl straightforwardly describes “the structures and the sphere of 
                                                 
336 Outside of the Investigations, Formal and Transcendental Logic is the only major work that Husserl 
published during his lifetime the scope of which is confined exclusively to the logical realm of categorial 
acts and objects.  It is the only one of Husserl’s publications that focuses entirely on logical issues that also 
originated after Husserl first publicly formulated the reduction(s) in his 1907 lectures on the Idea of 
Phenomenology.  There are other works that have been published since Husserl’s death, in which Husserl 
focuses importantly on the semantic dimensions of experience.  They include his 1908 lectures on “the 
theory of meaning”, his lectures on “transcendental logic” from the early 1920s (now organized and 
translated in Analyses Concerning Passive and Active Synthesis), and the materials that Ludwig Landgrebe 
edited and published under the title Experience and Judgment.  But none of these works offers an account 
of meaning as unitary and comprehensive as that which Husserl chose to publish in 1929. 
337 If Husserl had named his work “Eidetic and Transcendental Logic”, the title would have been less 
specific but no less correct.  Given Husserl’s terminology, all that is formal is also eidetic — although not 
all that is eidetic is formal (on “material and formal generalities”, see Experience and Judgment, § 86). 
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objective formal logic”.338  In compliance with the spirit of the eidetic reduction, he 
recognizes (and then goes on to survey) the eidetic field of self-identical concepts and 
judgments and arguments that today’s logic textbooks formally analyze.  Then, in the 
seven chapters that comprise the “transcendental” part of his Logic, Husserl reflects on 
the subjective conditions of this eidetic field.  In concert with other “critiques of 
knowledge” or “transcendental philosophies” that we see in “the modern age”, he “turns 
back” from a straightforward focus on an objective field to consider how that 
transcendent field can be an object for our thought.339  Thus, although the language of 
“reductions” appears somewhat less ubiquitously in 1929 than it did in 1913, Husserl’s 
“two-sided” Logic is nonetheless structured according to the pair of reductions 
popularized through Ideas I.340 
How, then, does Husserl, in his Logic, uphold the primary contentions of his 
earlier theory of meaning?  Above all, he does so by depicting logic as an essentially two-
sided science.  He initially depicts logic in this way by roughly historical means, and then 
fills in the details of his historical sketch through extensive formal and transcendental 
analyses.  So, in what follows, I first reconstruct Husserl’s historically based outline of 
logic’s purportedly two-sided essence, and then distill the most salient aspects of his 
fuller picture of the same, in order to show how this depiction of logic’s two sides 
reinforces the two-faced account of meaning offered by the Investigations. 
 
 
                                                 
338 Formal and Transcendental Logic, p. 42 (“The structures and the sphere of objective formal logic” is 
the title of Part I). 
339 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 10, p. 34. 
340 For Husserl’s claim that logic is essentially “two-sided”, see §§ 8 and 56 of Formal and Transcendental 
Logic. 
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5.3.2: Semantic theses reinforced 
Crucially, Husserl’s 1929 history of logic does not merely rehearse the familiar 
account.  It does not identify logic primarily with our existing, evolving discipline of the 
same name, and it does not measure logical accomplishments solely against the criterion 
of recent advances.  Instead, Husserl’s history defines logic by reference to the historical 
intention from which he believes the discipline arose.  Moreover, Husserl does not 
attribute logic’s initial rise primarily to Aristotle.  That is, Husserl does not picture 
Aristotle as the first Western figure to engage in what can correctly be called logic.  In 
agreement with the predominant contemporary history of logic, Husserl readily 
acknowledges the materials assembled in the Organon as “historically the first part of a 
systematically executed logic”.341  But, distinguishing logic’s systematic execution from 
its founding intention, Husserl’s history gives primary pride of place to Aristotle’s 
teacher.   
According to what is perhaps the central contention within Husserl’s history of 
logic, the form of inquiry and body of knowledge in question arose in the first instance 
“in the struggles of Plato’s dialectic”.342  More specifically, Husserl’s view is that today’s 
logic stems historically from Plato’s struggles with a “universal denial of science”.343  
Against this “sophistic skepticism”, “Plato had to weigh, and establish by criticism, 
precisely the essential possibility of such a thing as science”.344  He had to clarify that 
which distinguishes episteme from what only purports to be so; he had to identify “the 
essential requirements of ‘genuine’ knowledge and ‘genuine’ science”; he had to locate 
                                                 
341 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 12, p. 42, my italics. 
342 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 1.   
343 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 1. 
344 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, pp. 1-2. 
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“norms … in conformity with which … a science consciously justifying its method and 
theory … might be built”.345  Moreover, Plato could not achieve these goals merely by 
pointing to examples of already firmly established and universally respected enterprises.  
In the absence of any body of knowledge that skepticism would recognize as such, Plato 
was forced to identify what is essentially required of any science without lapsing from his 
normative project into one that was merely descriptive of purported sciences: “If all 
science was called in question, then naturally no factual science could be 
presupposed”.346  Thus, what Plato needed was a theory of science that was not a mere 
theory of existing sciences: he needed a theory of the norms the aspiration toward which 
defines science, and a theory of the general criteria that an organized body of knowledge 
would have to meet in order to be certified as genuinely scientific.  So it came to pass that 
Plato, according to Husserl’s history, became the first to seek a thorough “self-
understanding and self-justification” on behalf of the sciences.347  So Plato initiated the 
“theory of the pure principles of possible cognition and science” — the “theory of 
science” that Husserl calls “logic”.348 
While Husserl thus regards Plato as something like a first logician, he does not 
diminish Aristotle’s role in the history of logic.  Instead, Husserl pictures Aristotle as 
                                                 
345 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 1.  Husserl does not think that any science 
“consciously justifying its method and theory” had yet been built in Plato’s time.  He regards the geometry, 
astronomy, natural philosophy, and other “cultural formations” of that age as “naively straightforwardly 
effected work[s] of theoretical reason”, which, because they were lacking a critical theory of science that 
Plato provided, could not become “what we today call science, in our pregnant sense of the word” (ibid.).  
Science in the “pregnant sense” becomes possible, according to Husserl, when science subjects itself to 
scrutiny in terms of principles prior to itself.  In Suzanne Bachelard’s words, science in Husserl’s “pregnant 
sense” becomes possible just as “the teleological idea that governs all scientific activity gradually comes to 
light: the scientist not only makes judgments but also grounds them” (Husserl’s Logic, p. xli). 
346 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 2.  This is the case, as Husserl notes, whether there 
are existing sciences or not: “The possibility of science cannot be shown by the fact of sciences, since the 
fact itself is shown only by <their> subsumption under that possibility as an idea” (Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, § 101, p. 236). 
347 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 12. 
348 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 2. 
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jointly responsible, with Plato, for the rise of logic.  More exactly, Husserl credits 
“Aristotle’s analytics” with the first “systematic” realization of the meta-scientific 
intention that remained relatively nebulous in “Plato’s dialectic”.349   
Husserl’s history is hardly unusual in crediting Aristotle with “a first 
commencement of a logic of theoretical formations”.350  For Aristotle’s formal logic 
indisputably engages in a formal analysis of judgments such as those we find in any 
theoretical enterprise.  It clearly conducts a “survey of the (always materially 
determinate) judgments of life and science”, in which “the most universal groupings of 
judgments according to types, the perfect likenesses of form among judgments pertaining 
even to heterogenous provinces, immediately come to the fore”.351  Whereas others had 
already formally analyzed real continua, real sets, and other objects, “Aristotle was the 
first … to execute in the apophantic sphere — the sphere of assertive statements … — 
that formalization” that had already taken place in mathematics.352  He was “the first”, in 
short, “to bring out the idea of form which was to determine the fundamental sense of a 
formal logic”.353  Thus, today’s formal logic builds on Aristotle’s beginnings.  Husserl’s 
assertions to this effect only repeat the standard account of logic’s historical origins; he 
cannot but concur with the standard history on this point. 
Husserl’s history is more novel in its suggestion that Aristotle’s pioneering formal 
logic is basically an expression of Plato’s intentions.  According to this suggestion, 
Aristotle engages in his formal analysis of the apophantic sphere in order to achieve 
                                                 
349 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 7.  Husserl uses the term “Aristotle’s analytics” to 
name the philosopher’s mode of thought rather than to refer exclusively to the Prior and Posterior 
Analytics.  Within Husserl’s lexicon, analytics is to Aristotle what dialectic is to Plato. 
350 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 12, p. 42. 
351 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 12, p. 42. 
352 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 12, p. 42.   
353 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 12, p. 42. 
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precisely the same goal that Husserl detects in “Plato’s dialectic”.  That is, Aristotle 
performs a formal analysis of the judgments of purported sciences so as to attain “a 
theory relating to the essential conditions for any possible science”.354  When he directs 
his attention to judgments, when he abstracts their forms (replacing determinate 
categorical terms with formal place-holders capable of signifying any content), and when 
he shows how these judgment-forms stand in lawful relations to one another, his goal is 
to reveal the formal laws that constrain every system of judgments deserving to be called 
a science.  Thus Aristotle’s whole project of formal apophantic analysis, on Husserl’s 
reading, is motivated by Plato’s aim of identifying the preconditions for science.  
Aristotle’s own categorical logic, and consequently each subsequent expansion of formal 
logic, is an expression of the “universal theory of science” that Plato had intended.355     
We need not decide here whether Husserl is correct that logic has been driven, 
however unwittingly, by a Platonic intention.  What matters for our purposes is what this 
history implies, within Husserl’s framework, with respect to meaning.  We need only 
note how Husserl’s 1929 history, in its implications, aligns with his 1900-01 view of 
logic and meaning. 
Given the premise that logic, in virtue of the historical intention from which it 
arose, is the theory of science, it follows, within Husserl’s conceptual scheme, that logic 
is an essentially two-sided discipline.  For the theory of science, according to Husserl’s 
conception, has two sides.  On one side, the theory of science is a study of the reiterable, 
intersubjectively available domain of propositions.  It concerns the range of objective 
judgments that hold true — existing sciences and possible sciences as objectively 
                                                 
354 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 4. 
355 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, p. 7. 
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understood — and the rest of the apophantic sphere that Aristotle formally analyzed.  On 
the other side, the theory of science is a study of judicative mental acts.  It concerns the 
experience of knowing that Plato had to define and defend against skeptics who denied 
that knowledge is possible.  Husserl’s history of logic leads him to this account of logic’s 
two sides. 
In this way, moreover, Husserl’s 1929 account of logic’s historical origins also 
leads him to reaffirm his 1900-01 theory of meaning.  For his history of logic, in its two-
sided depiction of the theory of science, invokes his two-faced conception of meaning.  
When Husserl pictures the theory of science as a study of the domain of propositions, he 
draws on his Bolzanian view of meaning.  When he pictures the theory of science as a 
study of mental acts, he draws on his Brentanian view of meaning.  Already in its 
historical sketch of logic as a two-sided discipline, then, Husserl’s 1929 publication 
echoes the basic contentions of his 1900-01 theory of meaning. 
These echoes recur throughout Husserl’s Logic, beyond its introductory history of 
logic’s beginnings and across its “formal” and “transcendental” analyses.  Indeed, 
Husserl’s Logic as a whole not only echoes, but also methodically reinforces, the 
Investigations’ dyadic semantics.  Its first five chapters, in their eidetic characterization 
of logic’s typical subject matter, repeatedly reach Bolzanian semantic conclusions;356 and 
its final seven chapters, which pose transcendental questions concerning logic, include a 
defense of the Investigations’ Brentanian insights regarding meaning.   
                                                 
356 Husserl’s mature conception of logic deviates from Bolzano’s in certain important respects.  Husserl 
explicitly differentiates his understanding of the relation between logic and mathematics from Bolzano’s 
(see Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 26d, p. 74); Husserl readily acknowledges the value of 
contributions that had been made to logic since Bolzano’s time (see, for example, Husserl’s comments 
about George Boole’s work, in ibid., §§ 23a and 25); and Husserl argues that logic is inseparable from 
transcendental questions that Bolzano was not as ready to ask.  But these deviations do not diminish the 
depth of Husserl’s Bolzanian inheritance. 
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Take the “formal” chapters of Husserl’s Logic.  In those chapters, with their 
eidetic approach to the “sphere of objective formal logic”, Husserl arrives at several of 
Bolzano’s positions.  As he had in his Bolzanian work of 1900, Husserl again claims that 
logic’s “sphere” consists of transcendent “apophantic meanings” —357 “thoroughly firm 
and steadfast objects”358 that “reach beyond the subjectivity now actually cognizing and 
its acts”.359  He again claims that the judgments comprising logic’s “province” are each 
“identical” throughout varying acts of judgment.360  He again claims that the judgments at 
issue in logic are “ideal” in a way that “psychologism”, with its “old inherited fears of 
Platonism”, fails to recognize.361  And he again claims that logic’s invariant judgments, if 
true, are available “to everyone”, “at any time”, “even before their discovery”.362  Husserl 
thus finds, from his eidetic outlook, that logic is a Bolzanian theory of science — a 
formal analytics of an ideal realm of transcendent significations.  He leverages an eidetic 
procedure to reinforce Bolzano’s theory of meaning.   
Next, take the “transcendental” chapters of Husserl’s Logic.  Husserl there argues 
that logic ought to “overstep” its typical, relatively “straightforward” concern with 
                                                 
357 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 54b, p. 131.   
358 Objective meanings are “thoroughly firm and steadfast objects”, according to Husserl, in that they are 
“seizable objectivities, steadfast under observation, always re-identifiable, and accessible to repeated 
observation, analysis and description” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 11, p. 36). 
359 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 8, p. 30. 
360 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 17, pp. 55-56. 
361 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 26b, pp. 71-72. 
362 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 44bγ, pp. 111-112.  Importantly, Husserl retains this view 
throughout his transcendental analyses.  See especially § 80.  Husserl there mentions a few “truisms”: he 
notes the belief that “there are indeed truths in themselves, that one can seek, and also find, by avenues 
already predelineated in themselves”; he notes that “one never asks whether there is a truth, but only how it 
can be reached or, at worst, whether it is not utterly unattainable by our factually limited powers of 
cognition …”; and he echoes the Bolzanian reasoning of his Prolegomena, by recognizing again that “the 
possibility of sciences depends entirely on [the] certainty that their provinces exist in truth, and that, 
concerning their provinces, theoretical truths-in-themselves exist”.  Husserl then goes on to question these 
beliefs.  Crucially, however, Husserl through his transcendental questioning does “not intend to give up any 
of these truisms”; he instead continues to acknowledge that these truisms “surely rank as evidences” (idid., 
p. 176).  
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objective conditions of knowledge, such as objective significations and logical laws, in 
order to also identify the subjective conditions for the possibility of knowledge.363  He 
argues that logic indeed must make this reflective turn, if it is to be, true to its founding 
intention, a theory of science.  (He argues, in other words, that logic must include a 
transcendental component so that it can provide a critical theory of knowledge that 
achieves a “radical self-understanding and fundamental self-justification” on behalf of the 
existing sciences.364)  Through Husserl’s own transcendental turn toward the subjective 
conditions of knowledge, moreover, he arrives again at what I have called the Brentanian 
semantic claims of the Logical Investigations.  That is, Husserl’s transcendental analyses 
of logic lead him to conclude that there could be no objective significations or truths if 
there were no act(s) of meaning.  He contends that all objective judgments are 
“productions”, with a “genesis” in some “formative doing”;365 and he likewise indicates 
that there could be no objective truths without the experience of truth (Evidenz).366  The 
“reductive deliberations” of Husserl’s transcendental logic thus lead him back to the 
Brentanian view that meaning and truth are fundamentally intentional.   
                                                 
363 Compare Formal and Transcendental Logic, §§ 9-10 and 69.   
364 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 56, p. 137.  If logic does not identify science’s operative 
presupposition of meanings and truths in themselves, or if logic uncritically holds our evidence of such 
meanings as being “absolute evidences”, according to Husserl, it abandons too early the critical impulse 
that defines it as theory of science (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 92b, p. 200).  Logic would thus 
fail to be an adequate theory of science insofar as logicians, in “self-forgetfulness”, fixate only on objective 
significations and neglect the “subjective-logical”, never taking their own “productive [and, more 
specifically, categorial] living as a theme within [their] field[s] of vision”  (Formal and Transcendental 
Logic, Introduction, pp. 11, 14).   
365 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 63, pp. 149-150.  
366 On this point, see especially chapters 5 and 6 of Formal and Transcendental Logic part II.  Husserl there 
offers a “criticism of the naïve concepts of evidence and truth … that govern the whole logical tradition” (§ 
92a, p. 198).  He argues that, while there is indeed evidence for Bolzano’s postulates of meanings and 
truths in themselves, this and every evidence only occurs within an intentional horizon.  “If what is 
experienced has the sense of transcendent being”, he writes, “then it is the experiencing that constitutes this 
sense” (§ 94, p. 206).  So, while we are conscious of truth’s transcendence in our “concourse with others”, 
in our experiences of “illusion”, and in our other realizations that what is given exceeds what our own 
minds grasp, this sense of transcendence is “included intentionally in the consiousness itself” (§ 94, pp. 
206-207).  Thus we can always ask, and logic as transcendental ought to ask, how the truths of objective 
formal logic “can take on and confirm this sense of transcendence that we have” (§ 93c, p. 204). 
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Through its two main parts, then, as in its introductory account of logic’s 
historical origins, Husserl’s Logic reinforces both of the views of meaning that he had 
defended in his Investigations.  His eidetic analyses of the “structures and spheres of 
objective formal logic” reiterate many of the Prolegomena’s anti-psychologistic 
contentions regarding meaning; and his transcendental investigation of logic, with its 
almost-psychologistic character, recites the later Investigations’ conclusion that objective 
meanings presuppose experience.  Husserl thus seeks to overcome the “one-sidedness 
that determines the specific sense of traditional logic as essentially an ‘objective’ logic”, 
via his transcendental turn, without thereby falling into the differently one-sided approach 
of “psychologizing logicians and epistemologists”.367  Much as he had sought a middle 
way in his Investigations, so Husserl seeks again to recognize the evidences on both sides 
of the psychologism debate.  But is such a two-sided account of meaning tenable? 
Whereas Husserl had left the conflict between his two views of meaning inexplicit 
in 1900-01, he readily acknowledges this conflict in 1929.  This acknowledgement is 
evident in the way that Husserl attempts to pre-emptively deflect the charges of 
incoherence that had been raised against the similarly two-faced semantics of his 
Investigations.  Husserl explicitly anticipates, and rejects, the charge of a “relapse into 
psychologism”.368  He denies that his more Brentanian account of meaning is equivalent 
to “the psychologizing of … irreal significational formations”.369  He denies that his 
transcendental questioning has left him “blind to the peculiar objectivity of all ideal 
formations”, or “blind” in particular, to the “judgments, … truths, … arguments, proofs, 
                                                 
367 Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction, pp. 9, 13. 
368 Formal and Transcendental Logic, §56, p. 136. 
369 Formal and Transcendental Logic, §56, p. 136. 
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and theories” that “make up the objective province of logic”.370  And he denies that his 
more psychological view of meaning mistakes “syllogisms” for “psychic processes of 
judging and inferring”.371  Yet how could the anti-psychologistic conclusions that Husserl 
reaches through his eidetic approach to logic not stand at odds with the almost 
psychologistic conclusions that he reaches through his transcendental approach?  Do not 
basic “equivocations” become inevitable with Husserl’s turn to a transcendental concept 
of logic?372  Or how could Husserl give a transcendental account of logical objects if not 
by “equating” those ideal “formations” with certain “real occurrences belonging to the 
sphere of psychology”?373  By reaffirming his earlier Bolzanian and Brentanian views of 
meaning, Husserl in his 1929 text raises again these questions of coherence that his 1900-
01 breakthrough had left unresolved. 
 
5.4: The most controversial consequence of the reduction(s) 
 Husserl’s Logic supplies his answer to the above questions regarding the 
coherence of his semantics.  That answer, in two words, is “transcendental subjectivity”.  
With this term, Husserl signifies his rejoinder to the “mutual bugbears” of “a wrong 
skeptical relativism and a no less wrong logical absolutism”;374 he names the field of 
study by reference to which he could purportedly recognize the sane motives behind both 
psychologistic and logicist theories of meaning without falling prey to the errors of either 
theory; and he designates the result of his attempt to circumspectly understand meaning 
via a partly transcendental and partly eidetic approach.  These, at least, are my 
                                                 
370 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 56, p. 135. 
371 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 56, p. 135. 
372 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 70, p. 158. 
373 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 57a, pp. 137-138. 
374 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 105, p. 246. 
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interpretive claims.  In this section, I aim to establish that transcendental subjectivity did 
in fact serve as Husserl’s answer to the charges of incoherence that had been raised 
against his theory of meaning.  I attempt to show how Husserl in fact utilized his two-step 
method not only to reinforce his psychological and logical semantics, but also to resolve 
the strain between these views of meaning.   
 Already in section 5.2, I indicated that I think Husserl invokes transcendental 
subjectivity in order to account for his pair of seemingly opposed insights regarding 
meaning.  On my view, again, the transcendental reduction responds to Husserl’s 
Brentanian insight by affirming that objective meanings have an intentional origin; the 
eidetic reduction answers to Husserl’s Bolzanian insight by denying that any of the 
contingent beings who happen to engage in the phenomenological procedure are 
themselves that origin; and the transcendental subjectivity to which the eidetic and 
transcendental reductions jointly lead thus ought to accommodate both Brentano and 
Bolzano’s semantic insights.  On my view, then, “transcendental subjectivity” does not 
(or does not only) designate a grandiose speculative construction, but rather expresses 
(albeit among other things) a restrained reply to a legitimate question regarding objective 
meanings.  Husserl’s invocation of transcendental subjectivity would allow him to answer 
the question “whence meanings?” without saying anything more psychologistic or 
speculative than that intentional experience in general is a condition for the possibility of 
objective signification.  
 In Husserl’s Logic we can see the evidence that supports this reading.  
Throughout that text as a whole, Husserl is engaged in what he calls “the radical 
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overcoming of the problem of transcendental psychologism”.375  This means, in part, that 
Husserl is continuing the approach to meaning that he had pioneered in 1900-01.  As he 
had been in his Investigations, so he is again engaged in a “war against logical 
psychologism” in all of its varieties.376  And he again is not content to merely expose the 
faults in the project of psychological reductionism.  In order to overcome that project in a 
sufficiently “radical” way, Husserl is again attempting to defeat it at its roots — to 
recognize the sensible reasons for mistakenly supposing that logic ought to be fully 
included in psychology.  In both respects, Husserl in his Logic is following the course of 
his Investigations.  He is showing how psychologistic conclusions are faulty, as he had in 
his “Prolegomena to Pure Logic”, while also acknowledging the insights behind 
psychologism, as he had in the later Investigations’ case that meanings are inseparable 
from experience.  But how, then, does the Logic represent an important advance, in 
Husserl’s view, beyond the Investigations?  And why does Husserl refer specifically to a 
problem of transcendental psychologism?377  
According to Husserl’s 1929 analysis, the problem of transcendental 
psychologism ultimately consists in “an obscurity” that has impacted “the whole of 
transcendental philosophy”.378  Superficially, no doubt, the problem at issue is simply 
that certain transcendental accounts of meaning, such as Hume’s, have subscribed to 
psychological reductionism.  At bottom, however, the problem is that the origin of 
objective meaning has historically remained obscure — and obscure in such a way that 
                                                 
375 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 56, p. 136. 
376 See Formal and Transcendental Logic, §§ 56 and 57a, for Husserl’s continued opposition to the “anti-
Platonism” of “English empiricism”, and §§ 65 and 67 for his opposition to other representationalist 
failures to recognize the objectivity of the ideal.  
377 These questions are the same, because it is precisely the 1929 analysis of transcendental psychologism 
that Husserl, in his Logic, casts as a necessary addition to his 1900-01 attempt to uproot psychologism. 
378 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 56, p. 136. 
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any theory proposing to seek this origin via “a concrete consideration of cognitive 
subjectivity” has inevitably been regarded as psychologistic.379  The problem, in other 
words, is that the subject of transcendental logic has not been sufficiently differentiated 
from that of logical psychologism.   
Hume did play an important role in the history of this obscurity.  For Hume, who 
embraced psychologistic answers to each of the transcendental questions that he posed, 
was perhaps the first to “raise the transcendental problem of the constitution of the 
world”.380  It was Hume who set the precedent for subsequent transcendental philosophy, 
and that precedent is one in which the transcendental and the psychologistic are 
coextensive.  This coextension obtains, as Husserl notes, in Hume’s transcendental 
account of logical objectivity.  Hume stops short of a thorough psychologistic account of 
logical objectivity, but just insofar as he stops short of any transcendental account of his 
“relations of ideas”; and, when Hume does pose transcendental questions regarding logic, 
by asking about the origin of abstract ideas, he does not hesitate to depict those objective 
ideas psychologistically.381  After Hume, Kant went some way toward disassociating 
psychologism and transcendental philosophy, when he introduced a transcendental 
program in “reaction against” Hume’s.382   Yet Kant did not go far enough, by Husserl’s 
lights, but remained too much in “dependence on” that against which he reacted, because 
he retained Hume’s hesitation to ask about a transcendental origin of logical 
                                                 
379 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 67, p. 155.  
380 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 229. Although Husserl traces transcendental philosophy to 
Cartesian beginnings, he regards Hume as “the first to see the necessity of investigating the objective itself  
as a product of its genesis from subjectivity” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 100, p. 226).  
Accordingly, while Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology has a Cartesian character, it is importantly co-
determined by the style of Hume’s investigations.  Husserl, of course, nonetheless regards his project as 
superior to those of his predecessors. 
381 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 229.   
382 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 100, p. 230. 
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objectivity.383  For Kant not only refused, against Hume, to subject logic to any 
“psychologistic reinterpretation of its ideality”; he also, in keeping with Hume’s position 
concerning relations of ideas, “ascribed to [logic] an extraordinary apriority, which raised 
it above” all “transcendental questions”.384  So it could still seem to be the case, after 
Kant, that any account of logical objectivity that is transcendental is ipso facto 
psychologistic. 
Given this history, we can readily understand how the hostile reception of 
Husserl’s Investigations was inevitable.  For Husserl in that text “had the courage to 
venture” a proto-transcendental analysis of logical objectivity: he (a) accepted “the 
ideality of the formations with which logic is concerned as the characteristic of a 
separate, self-contained “world” of ideal objects”, and he (b) asked “how subjectivity can 
in itself bring forth, purely from sources appertaining to its own spontaneity, formations 
that can be rightly accounted as ideal objects”.385  But he did not yet show how these two 
                                                 
383 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 100, p. 230. 
384 Formal and Transcendental Logic, §§ 99, 100, pp. 228, 230.  When Husserl speaks of the “half-way 
character of [Kant’s] advancement of a systematic transcendental philosophy”, he means that Kant, thanks 
to Hume, “never thought of asking transcendental questions about the sphere of formal logic, taken as a 
sphere in and for itself” (ibid.).   Granting that “Kant’s logic is presented as a science directed to the 
subjective”, Husserl claims that this logic “actually … concerns the ideal formations produced by thinking 
and, concerning them, … fails to ask properly transcedental questions” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, 
§ 100, p. 230).  Kant falls back on formal logic when he offers a transcendental account of the natural 
sciences, but he offers no similar account of logic: “Formal logic is, for him, something absolute and 
ultimate, on which philosophy can be built without more ado” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 100, p. 
234).  Granted, in the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant distinguishes “transcendental logic” from that 
“general logic”, more familiar today, which “abstracts from any relation of [cognition] to the object, and 
considers only logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another” (A55/B79, trans. Guyer and 
Wood).  (Such a general logic provides criteria for truth, according to Kant, that are “to [an] extent entirely 
correct but not sufficient” (A59/B84).  In order to account better for the truth of synthetic a priori 
judgments, a science would thus be necessary that “determine[s] the origin, the domain, and the objective 
validity of such cognitions” (A57/B81).  Kant calls this science, which “expounds the principle without 
which no object can be thought at all”, “transcendental logic” (A62/B87).)  On Husserl’s history, however, 
Kant was led to pose transcendental questions about synthetic a priori judgments by Hume’s transcendental 
criticism of our knowledge concerning “matters of fact”; and Kant “did not make his analytic Apriori a 
problem”, much as Hume had similarly stopped short of any transcendental inquiry regarding his “relations 
of ideas” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 100, p. 230).  
385 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 100, p. 230. 
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projects could cohere; he did not yet explicitly invoke “transcendental subjectivity” in his 
descriptions of the origin of meaning; he did not yet make an explicitly transcendental 
turn.  The Investigations instead left obscure how a description of objective meaning’s 
intentional origin could be anything but psychologistic.  They thereby left the obscurity 
that has shrouded transcendental philosophy intact, and failed to fully overcome the 
“problem of transcendental psychologism”. 
To be sure, as Husserl readily concedes in 1929, his 1901 work already “paved 
the way to a transcendental phenomenology” and to a transcendental account of 
meaning.386  “It may even be said”, Husserl’s Logic grants, that the Investigations already 
employed “the same method of intentional ‘analysis’ that is used in transcendental 
phenomenology”.387  For the Investigations provide an “eidetic” description of 
“intentional mental processes”.388  They offer a description, moreover, that anticipates 
Husserl’s transcendental reduction by disregarding that the mental processes described 
are those of a specific sort of thinking being.  Their description, in other words, does not 
permit “the relation” between (a) the intentional processes reflectively described and (b) 
“the organism” to which those processes factually belong to “enter expressly into [this 
description’s] conceptual content”.389  And so the subjectivity that the Investigations 
present as the basis of logical objectivity is not specifically human; they rather attempt to 
describe what subjectivity is, more generally, as the basis of objective meanings.  Despite 
all this, the Investigations remained too psychological, from Husserl’s 1929 perspective, 
to be fully compliant with the transcendental reduction.  For in Husserl’s 1900-01 work, 
                                                 
386 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 56, p. 136. 
387 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 225. 
388 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 225. 
389 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 225. 
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“a psychological apperception is performed”, by which apperception the relation between 
our living experiences and a mundane organism becomes “co-posited” along with the 
experiences under description.390  And it is not enough, according to Husserl’s 1929 
work, to effectively exclude all references to this relation from one’s phenomenological 
description.  Instead, it is also necessary that the relation between the content of one’s 
reflective description and a particular organism be explicitly or “consciously 
parenthesized”.391  Only thus can “that content” of our reflective descriptions “acquire 
[the] transcendental significance” that allows for “the radically ultimate clarification of 
the problem of transcendental psychologism and, at the same time, its solution”.392  
On these textual grounds we can safely draw the following interpretive 
conclusions.  First, Husserl believed, in 1929, that psychologism could be adequately 
overcome only by reference to transcendental subjectivity.  Husserl in 1900-01 had 
already refused the false dichotomy of logicism and psychologism.  He had already 
presented the intentional basis of meanings and truths without succumbing to 
psychological reductionism.  Yet his campaign against that reductionist paradigm was 
still inadequate, we are told, precisely because it did not denote as “transcendental 
subjectivity” the intentional experience that it described.  Second, then, Husserl held that 
                                                 
390 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 225. 
391 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 225.  Husserl makes this distinction between a conscious 
parenthesis and an inexplicit exclusion the basis for a concomitant distinction between, respectively, the 
“transcendental phenomenology” of his Logic and the “psychological phenomenology” of his 
Investigations (ibid.).  He could grant that he already saw, in 1901, that “logic must overcome its 
phenomenological naivete” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 100, p. 233.).  That is, he had already 
seen that logic, “even after having learned to recognize that which is ideal, … must be more than a merely 
positive science of logico-mathematical idealities”; and he had already intimated that logic, “with a 
continuously two-sided research … must go back systematically from the ideal formations to the 
consciousness that constitutes them phenomenologically” (ibid.).  But he had not yet identified the 
consciousness that constitutes ideal formations as “the concrete … nexus of transcendental subjectivity”; 
and, in not doing so, he had also failed to argue that “the ideal objectivity of the formations with which 
logic is concerned” may be in “no way altered” by his claim that these formations are “essentially products 
of the correlative structures of productive cognitive life” (ibid.). 
392 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 225. 
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he was able to “radically overcome transcendental psychologism” in 1929 thanks to the 
methodological achievements that he had announced in 1913.  It was Husserl’s two-step 
method, specifically in its transcendental aspect, that resulted in the reference to 
transcendental subjectivity, by which reference alone Husserl believed that psychologism 
could be adequately defeated.  Third (and equivalently), Husserl believed that this same 
reference enabled him to clarify and solve the problem that he had confronted in his 
1900-01 semantics.  For Husserl’s 1929 deployment of his method issued in his detailed 
account of, and proposed resolution to, the apparent incompatibility of his Bolzanian and 
Brentanian semantic insights.  Again, Husserl’s 1900-01 semantics had provoked 
accusations of incoherence because they presented meanings first as independent of 
human experiences and then as dependent on experience.  And Husserl answered these 
accusations in 1929 by identifying the acts of meaning on which objective meanings 
depend as those of a “transcendental subjectivity” — those of a constitutive intentionality 
accessed by reflection but importantly distinct from the human psyche. 
Transcendental subjectivity thus functioned, within Husserl’s thought, as the 
answer to the riddle that his dyadic semantics had posed.  Before he invoked 
transcendental subjectivity, when Husserl first argued that a third way between 
psychologism and logicism was necessary, he had not yet demonstrated that such a route 
was even possible.  So, when Husserl then developed and followed the full two-step 
course that led to transcendental subjectivity, he did so in order to show, against 
suspicions from either side, that his middle way was viable.  He did so in order to 
demonstrate that it is possible to describe that for which there is appearance solely in 
terms of its essential features, and that it is thereby possible to recognize, without falling 
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into psychologism, that meanings require intentionality.  Husserl invoked transcendental 
subjectivity, then, in order to show that Brentanian and Bolzanian insights not only 
should be, but also can be, coherently incorporated into a unitary theory of meaning. 
In this respect, Husserl’s invocation of transcendental subjectivity could express a 
conciliatory and restrained thesis, designed to accommodate disparate insights without 
passing beyond what those insights demand into unwarranted speculation.  Yet the term 
“transcendental subjectivity”, and the synthetic account of meaning for which it stands, 
has been little (if any) less controversial than the “relativist” and “absolutist” antitheses 
that it was designed to overcome.  Husserl’s 1929 response to accusations of incoherence 
raises as many objections as it answers.  Moreover, while some of these protests stem 
from misunderstanding, there are also well-informed dissents from Husserl’s 
transcendental account of meaning that emerge from within the phenomenological 
program.   
 I turn now to these internal critiques.  First, in section 5.5, I critically consider the 
process by which Husserl sought to substantiate his dyadic semantics.  Then, in chapter 6, 
I assess the resulting notion of transcendental subjectivity, which Husserl proposed as his 
resolution to the strain between his dissonant accounts of meaning.  
 
5.5: A methodological criticism 
 We have now seen (in section 5.2) how the Investigations’ problematic theory of 
meaning shaped the phenomenological method and (in sections 5.3 and 5.4) how Husserl 
then deployed that method in order to exonerate his maligned semantics.  This 
methodological development prompts a critical question.  It prompts us to ask: Is there 
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not some vicious circularity here?  Does not the reasoning that Husserl offered after 
1901, in order to defend and extend his contested theory of meaning, illicitly presuppose 
that which it was supposed to establish?   
 This formulation attaches some methodological content to one of Heidegger’s 
popular complaints about his teacher’s thinking.  That complaint, roughly, is that Husserl 
uncritically inherited his theory of meaning.  In Heidegger’s own, more acerbic words, 
the charge is that Husserl’s account of meaning is one in which “a rigorous investigation 
of the matter is disregarded and a completely banal Platonism is resorted to”.393  More 
specifically, the allegation is that Husserl fell into his two-sided semantics not because of 
critical, inquisitive work, but rather because he was naively participating in the “Platonic” 
practice of “opposing a valid sense to a real, temporal sense”.394  And the trouble, as we 
can now see, is not simply that Husserl was heavily dependent on certain influences, such 
as Bolzano, when he first articulated his view that signification has both “ideal” and 
“real” sides; the issue is also that the phenomenological method, by means of which 
Husserl later purported to offer a “rigorous investigation” that supported and extended his 
earlier semantics, was itself dependent on that questionable dyadic view of meaning.  
Given Husserl’s methodological development, then, Heidegger’s reproach implies that 
his teacher’s semantics was credulous straight through, from its 1900-01 indications that 
meaning is essentially ambiguous to its 1929 attempt to explain that ambiguity with 
reference to transcendental subjectivity.   
                                                 
393 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, trans. Daniel Dahlstrom (Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 2005 [1923-24]), p. 68. 
394 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, p. 70. 
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 There are, however, at least two problems with this line of criticism.  One is the 
probing character of Husserl’s initial, positive appropriation.  Another is the fact that 
Husserl eventually negated or revised many of the views that he initially appropriated.   
The first problem stems from the body of evidence that we have in the 
Investigations, documenting the manner in which Husserl initially appropriated aspects of 
his predecessors’ theories of meaning.  This evidence of course confirms Heidegger’s 
view that Husserl inherited semantic theses from various historical figures (including 
those that I surveyed in chapter 3).  Most important in the present context, the 
Investigations cite Hume’s distinction of “relations of ideas” and “matters of fact”, along 
with Leibniz’s parallel distinction of “vérités de raison” and “vérités de fait”, as 
antecedents for Husserl’s own distinction between real, passing acts of meaning and 
ideal, invariant meanings — what Husserl calls “the most fundamental of epistemological 
distinctions”.395  Yet this mere fact of intellectual inheritance hardly entails that one or 
another previous theory was “simply taken over”.396  On the contrary, as we have seen (in 
chapter 4), Husserl reached his 1900-01 semantic conclusions through his own extensive 
investigations concerning experiences of meaning and knowing, and concerning the 
presuppositions of objective logic.  He did not take over any predecessor’s theory of 
meaning in full; rather, when he did turn from his study of his primary subject matter to 
secondary discussions of relevant literature, he considered a broad range of the theories 
on offer, and did so with a careful (if occasionally tendentious) scrutiny.  In this respect, 
it appears less that “a rigorous investigation of the matter is disregarded” in Husserl’s 
1900-01 discussions of meaning than that such an investigation is just beginning.  For the 
                                                 
395 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 51, pp. 119-120.  
396 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, p. 69. 
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manner in which the Investigations take up the theses that they inherit evidences a first-
hand examination of the matters at issue.  Of course, if “Platonism” is a heresy, then 
Husserl’s semantics is anathema.  If, however, we put off the polemic practice wherein 
“Platonism” is a pejorative, in order to ask if there is actually a basis for the distinction 
between real and ideal meanings, then we may begin to see the many ways in which 
Husserl interrogated this same distinction.  
This leads us to the second problem with the criticism according to which Husserl 
uncritically adopted and retained his two-sided depiction of meaning.  This second 
problem is that Husserl revised his theory of meaning,397 and that his practice of criticism 
extended to precisely the real-ideal distinction that he is alleged to have “simply taken 
over without the slightest alteration”.398  No doubt the phenomenological method, in its 
application to questions of meaning, may seem to simply beg the question: Husserl’s 
partly eidetic, partly transcendental procedure was shaped by the Bolzanian and 
Brentanian theories of meaning that it purports to legitimate and reconcile.  In fact, 
however, Husserl’s method led him to persistently re-examine his views concerning 
meaning, and ultimately to substantially alter many of those views.  In the remainder of 
this section, I itemize a few of those re-examinations and revisions most closely related to 
the “Platonic” differentiation of ideal from real meanings, in order to demonstrate that 
Husserl was critical of the appropriated claims that he made central to his semantics.   
                                                 
397 The revisions in Husserl’s later theory of meaning are plentiful enough to be regarded by some in 
Husserl studies as excessive.  Dallas Willard, for example, writes that the “theory of propositions” in Ideas 
I and Formal and Transcendental Logic  is “immensely — and, I think, unfortunately — more complex” 
than that in the Investigations (“The Paradox of Logical Psychologism: Husserl’s Way Out”, p. 54). 
398 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, p. 69.  
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 Important revisions were already underway at the time when the Investigations 
were brought to press.  Husserl had been working interminably on modifications.399  And, 
most important for our purposes, Husserl was already critical, and already expressed 
reservations in the text that went to the publisher’s, of the view that he had inherited from 
Lotze, according to which objective meanings are species to which individual acts of 
meaning belong.  Moreover, Husserl’s reservations about this Lotzean view led him to 
also question the same “Platonic” distinction to which Heidegger objects.   
Consider first, then, how Husserl’s 1900-01 text, through its attention to the 
phenomenon of meaning, finds both support for, and resistance to, Lotze’s species view.  
Husserl initially accepts Lotze’s view, in the Investigations, in order to account for the 
relationship between the psychological and logical sides of meaning.  He had realized 
that an identical signification can be realized in a variable “multiplicity of individual 
experiences”.400  And so he had been pushed to ask: If significations so transcend the 
“vanishing noise” of words “uttered here and now”, and the quickly elapsing life of our 
significative acts more generally, how then do these acts reach beyond themselves to 
significations?401  How are logical objects that, according to the Prolegomena, are 
“untouched by the contingency, temporality, and transience of our mental acts”, realized 
in those acts?402  It is in response to this question that Husserl, at first, affirms that the 
                                                 
399 Malvine, Edmund’s wife, reportedly had to steal the manuscript from his desk to take it to the publisher. 
400 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 30, p. 229.  Husserl had observed, for example, that whereas “my act of 
judging that the three perpendiculars of a triangle intersect in a point” is “a transient experience” that 
“arises and passes away”, its signification is given as a “geometrical truth” that “neither arises nor passes 
away”; he had noted that “What this assertion asserts”, namely the proposition, “is the same, whoever may 
assert it and on whatever occasion or in whatever circumstances he may assert it” (Logical Investigations, 
Inv. I, § 11, p. 195) 
401 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 11, p. 195, p. 110. 
402 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 46.  In the words of the (revised) Prolegomena, the question is 
more exactly “how this ideal stands to the real, how it can be immanent in it and so come to knowledge” (§ 
51, p. 120). 
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ideal content of our thought is related to our passing experiences of thinking in precisely 
the way that the species is related to the individual.  He claims, for example, that it is “as 
a species, and only as a species”, that an identical signification “can embrace in unity … 
the dispersed multiplicity of individual singulars”.403  He argues that we are able to have 
the same meaning “in mind” in various acts of speaking and silently thinking, despite 
how these acts differ, because this sameness is that of a species that can, in principle, be 
realized or instanced in different acts.  He embraces a model on which “meaning is 
related to varied acts of meaning … just as Redness in specie is to the slips of paper 
which lie here, and which all ‘have’ the same redness”.404  Now, the reasoning behind 
this view proceeds by analogy: much as we can discern the same word when we hear 
various sensuously differing expressions (e.g., differing pronunciations of the same 
word), or as we can discern the same red when we see various colored objects (“the same 
red in these different strips”), so, the reasoning goes, we can reflectively discern the same 
signification when we reflect on various significative acts.  If we abstract from 
differences among experiences, we find that “there is something in the correlated acts 
which really corresponds to such selfsameness of meaning” — much as there is 
something in various shades of red in virtue of which they belong to the same species, 
“redness”.405  For these reasons, Husserl concludes in 1901 that different acts of meaning 
can share the same signification because significations are species of which various 
(actual and possible) acts of meaning are members. 
 Having arrived at this conclusion, however, Husserl already in 1901 foresees 
“serious problems” in so describing the phenomena of “occasional”, or indexical, 
                                                 
403 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 32, p. 230. 
404 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 32, p. 230. 
405 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 30, p. 229. 
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meanings.406  He discerns that a vast plurality of expressions have meanings that are 
indexed to “the occasion, the speaker, and the situation” of that expression.407  He 
perceives, further, that the class of such expressions is not limited to statements in which 
the explicit subject term could, depending on contextual determinations, have different 
referents (as in, for example, “the terrier is faster”, “Thomas wants to leave”, or “the 
peaches are ripe”).  He observes that sentences expressing judgments “about … inner 
experiences” — among which sentences Husserl includes all “interrogative, optative, and 
imperative sentences” — are also indexed to an individual setting, insofar as each such 
sentence refers to an unspecified “I”.408  And he sees that all other expressions that 
include a personal pronoun, a demonstrative, or “the [other] subject-bound 
determinations ‘here’, ‘there’, ‘above’, ‘below’, ‘now’, etc.”, are likewise bound to 
particular settings.409  (Husserl does not yet explicitly note in 1901, as he would in 1913, 
that “every empirical predication” too appears to implicitly include, as part of its 
meaning, the “here” and “now” that “designates the speaker’s vaguely bound … 
environment”.410  But he does already realize, in 1901, that this “occasional” character 
holds of an abundance of ordinary expressions.) And this plethora of expressions whose 
meaning, in important part, “varies from case to case”, such that they may only be 
understood in full by reference to “the occasion, the speaker, and the situation”, already 
                                                 
406 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 24, p. 216. 
407 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 26, p. 218. 
408 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 25, p. 216.  If the command, “Run!”, for example, is short for, “I order 
you to run”, then the command’s meaning is indexed to the sentence’s speaker (as well as to the person to 
whom the command is directed).  
409 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 26, p. 220.  As “the word ‘I’ names a different person from case to case, 
and does so by way of an ever altering meaning” (Inv. I, § 26, p. 218), demonstratives such as “this” 
similarly vary in their reference. 
410 Logical Investigations, foreword to the second edition, p. 7, and Inv. I, § 26, p. 220.  Insofar as the 
meanings of all empirical predications presuppose an unspecified body’s spatial orientation (or sens) and 
temporal location, it would follow that they too belong to the class of occasional meanings. 
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prompts Husserl to ask: “Can we there still stick to self-identical meaning-unities, 
elsewhere made clear in their opposition to varying persons and their experiences, when 
here our meanings must vary with such persons and their experiences?”411  
Responsiveness to these phenomena, then, pushes Husserl to criticize not merely the 
Prolegomena’s Lotzean thesis regarding the relation between ideal and real meanings, but 
also the still more basic Bolzanian (or “Platonic”) division of invariant meanings from 
passing experiences of meaning.  Husserl does not merely ask, in other words, whether 
the “important facts of fluctuation of meaning” debunk his species-model of the relation 
between real and ideal meanings; he also asks, more fundamentally, whether the 
subjectively, contextually indexed character of so many expressions shows that there are 
no ideal meanings.  He asks whether the phenomenon of occasional meaning is “enough 
to shake our conception of meanings as ideal (i.e., rigorous) unities, or [at least] to restrict 
its generality significantly”.412 
 To this latter question, Husserl answers negatively.  He claims that each 
occasional expression too has an ideal meaning: “The content meant by the subjective 
expression, with sense oriented to the occasion, is an ideal unit in precisely the same 
sense as the content of a fixed expression”.413  Husserl grants, again, that the meaning of 
occasional expressions is contextually determined.  Each time someone utters, “it is 
raining”, for example, the meaning of that utterance clearly hinges on the (inexact) place 
and time to which the speaker is referring, at which place and time it is supposed to be 
                                                 
411 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 26, pp. 217-218. 
412 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223.   
413 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223.  My discussion here benefits from Kurt Weigelt’s The 
Signified World: the Problem of Occasionality in Husserl’s Phenomenology of Meaning (Stockholm: 
Stockholm University Press, 2008). 
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raining.414  And so the expression, “it is raining”, without determination by any particular 
context, lacks the single meaning that, say, “2 + 3 = 5” has.  Though occasional 
expressions thus do not have “fixed” or fully determinate significations once divorced 
from their context, however, this does not entail that concrete, contextually embedded 
occasional expressions also lack determinate, fixed significations.415  On the contrary, 
Husserl argues, “each subjective expression is replaceable by an objective expression 
which will preserve the identity of each momentary meaning-intention”.416  “It is 
raining”, for example, is short for “it is raining in this (vaguely bound) time and place”.  
And all that is intended but implicit in my contextually indexed expression can be 
explicated: “what is objectively quite definite”, if inexact, such as where and when I 
mean that it is raining, “must permit objective determination, and what permits objective 
determination must, ideally speaking, permit expression through wholly definite word-
meanings”.417  The variability in the meaning of occasional expressions, then, is not a 
matter of invariant meanings changing, but rather of a change in the contexts and 
intentions of speakers who use those expressions: “change in meanings is really change 
in the act of meaning”.418  By this line of reasoning, Husserl weighs Bolzano’s invariant 
significations and finds them compatible with the phenomenon of occasional meanings.  
 If the “speaker and situation” of every occasional expression is ideally 
determinable, however, this does not close the question about the species view.  It does 
not settle whether Husserl’s view of ideal significations as species can account for the 
                                                 
414 Husserl mentions this example in Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 27, p. 221.   
415 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, §§ 25, 28.    
416 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223.  
417 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p. 223.   
418 Logical Investigations, Inv. I, § 28, p 224.  Husserl grants that “we are infinitely removed from this 
ideal” of explicating all that is implicit in our speech, and that we in most cases lack reason and resources 
to approach it in our speaking and thinking (Inv. I, § 28, p 224).  But the important point is simply that our 
meaning-intentions are susceptible to expression in utterances with fixed meanings.   
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individually indexed character of many acts of meaning.  On the contrary, that occasional 
character poses the following questions: Can we legitimately call each ideal meaning a 
species, and thereby claim that it is capable of being instanced in various acts of meaning, 
if this ideal signification is itself indexed to a singular act of meaning?  Does every ideal 
signification admit of being realized in various significative acts, and in the same way 
that the essence of red abstracted from this red strip always admits of being realized in 
other red individuals?  Or, instead, does not the reference to a here and now contained in 
the meanings of occasional expressions jeopardize the attempt to view those meanings as 
species?  Would not multiple acts that realize the same occasional meaning only be alike, 
and thus qualify to count as members of the same species, in being about the same logical 
object, which is itself indexed to a singular act?  And does not that logical object, as an 
occasional meaning, appear to be the essence of precisely one individual act, in a way 
that the meaning of “red” is not the essence of one individual?  Husserl did not yet 
answer these questions in 1901, but he was already studying the phenomenon of meaning 
in a way that posed what he recognized as a challenge to Lotze’s species view.  Thus the 
picture that emerges from Husserl’s 1901 treatment of occasional expressions and of the 
real-ideal relation, as from much of Husserl’s work, is less of a doctrinaire philosopher 
uncritically inheriting “banal” distinctions than of a principled thinker repeatedly testing 
out evidences obtained in one horizon within new horizons of research. 
 As a next piece of evidence indicating the critical way in which Husserl inherited 
his semantic views, I submit the fact that Husserl eventually came to regard “the position 
of the Prolegomena”, according to which objective meaning are species, as importantly 
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“incorrect”.419  Throughout the shifts in his later semantics, Husserl did retain the old 
distinction between contingent experiences that have a “binding temporal position”, on 
the one hand, and the invariant significations that can be realized in these passing acts, on 
the other hand.420  But he altered his answer to the question of how ideal significations 
are related to real acts.   
 This revision is evident in Ideas I.  Husserl there proposes that the essence of each 
real act of meaning is only parallel, and not identical, to an ideal, transcendent meaning.  
On this proposal, my act of judging that it is raining is distinct from what it is to judge 
that it is raining; and that essence, or species, of certain acts of judging, is distinct from 
the proposition that it is raining; and that proposition, in turn, is distinct from the state of 
affairs that it is raining.  What we must notice here is simply how Husserl introduces a 
framework that is more elaborate than the one that he had previously employed.  
According to Husserl’s earlier view, again, the essence of the act of judging that it is 
raining, in virtue of which all acts of so judging are specifically alike, is identical to the 
ideal judgment (or proposition) that it is raining.  By 1913, in contrast, Husserl rejects 
this identification.  He claims that he had previously confounded the specific types of acts 
of meaning, which types our particular acts of meaning instantiate, with the ideal 
significations that we express in our acts of meaning.421  For Husserl by 1913 had 
                                                 
419 Husserl acknowledges this perhaps most plainly in his “letter to Ingarden of 5 April 1918”: “A long time 
ago I recognized that the position of the Prolegomena is incorrect, or correct only with regard to truths of 
essence … The independence of the sense of the proposition in relation to the contingent judgment and the 
judging person does not imply that the ideal identity is the identity of a species’” (translated by Weigelt, 
The Signified World, p. 182). 
420 Experience and Judgment, § 64c, p. 257. 
421 In Ideas I, § 61, e.g., Husserl claims that there was “oscillation” in his simpler, earlier view; he claims 
that he had previously identified “the concept of the logical proposition” with both “the logico-categorical 
objectivity” and “the corresponding essence immanent in the judging thought” (pp. 164-165).  On the 
division between “the judgment as experienced” and “the judgment simpliciter as noema”, see also Ideas I, 
§ 94. 
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adopted a new account of the way(s) in which ideal meanings transcend our acts of 
meaning.  He had come to posit a “distinction and parallelism between the ‘noetic’ and 
‘noematic’”, and thus between the essence of real acts of meaning, on one side, and 
transcendent, ideal meanings, on the other side.422  From Husserl’s later perspective, then, 
the Investigations had only begun to come to terms with the complicated business that 
they called “the essential ambiguity of meaning as an idea”.423  They did not yet 
recognize that the species of acts of meaning, on the one hand, and the ideal meanings 
expressed by those acts of meaning, on the other hand, are two distinctive sides of 
signification.  
 A further revision in Husserl’s view of meaning occurs in his concept of 
psychologism.  I have already begun to indicate (in section 5.4) how Husserl’s opposition 
to psychologism, while sustained, nonetheless developed over time.  As I noted, Husserl 
by 1929 regarded his 1900-01 attempts to overcome psychologism as insufficient.  For 
while Husserl was fairly consistent in his understanding of and opposition to empiricist 
psychologism,424 he claimed to gain increasing clarity on the other variety of logical 
psychologism that he first labeled “aprioristic” and that he later preferred to call 
“transcendental”.425  In the Investigations, Husserl criticizes an “apriorist” psychologism 
that would “deduce” ideal laws from the sometimes-real, sometimes-ideal subjectivity of 
                                                 
422 Logical Investigations, 1913 foreword to the second edition, p. 7. 
423 Logical Investigations, 1913 foreword to the second edition, p. 7. 
424 Husserl’s consistent opposition to empiricist psychologism may be tracked across his primary logical 
works.  Following the second Investigation’s extended critique of Locke and Hume’s theories of 
abstraction, the second chapter of Ideas I is devoted to a “contest with empiricism” in which Husserl seeks 
to show, on phenomenological grounds and against “naturalistic misconstructions”, that “the ideal in all its 
diversity is an object”, i.e., is something of which we can make true predicative statements (§§ 18, 22).  
Formal and Transcedental Logic likewise includes a critique of the “anti-Platonism” that tries to find “an 
origin of all concepts” in psychological processes while neglecting, at the same time, that the laws of 
thinking (or “relations of ideas”) are objects of which we can have an experience — or for which a 
transcendental philosophy would have to seek an origin (§ 100).   
425 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, § 38, p. 83. 
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a “transcendental psychology”.426  “It is the curse of [such] theories”, according to the 
1900 work, “to at one time give … a real, at another time an ideal sense” to the terms 
“consciousness” and “reason”.427  We may be inclined to see a resemblance between this 
sometimes-real, sometimes-ideal subjectivity described in 1900 and the purported basis 
of objective meaning to which Husserl in Formal and Transcendental Logic claims to 
have reflective access.  But Husserl in 1929 claimed, to the contrary, that the 
Investigations did not yet recognize the “transcendental significance” of the subjectivity 
that they analyzed because they did not yet “parenthesize” their “psychological 
apperception” of this content.428  The fifth and sixth investigations study a subjective 
origin of objective meaning, without yet identifying that subjectivity as transcendental; 
and they thus come too close, from Husserl’s later perspective, to accidentally implying 
that real subjectivity is the origin of ideal objects.  According to Husserl’s later 
assessment, then, it was the Investigations that, with their provocative return to 
descriptive psychology, too closely resemble transcendental psychologism.  Again, 
though, Husserl’s later and sometimes more speculatively ambitious tendency toward 
deciding on the origin of logical objectivities can appear, when approached from the 
viewpoint of the “breakthrough” work, as at least resembling the “apriorist” 
psychologism that was rejected in the Prolegomena.  Husserl’s concept of psychologism 
thus developed in a way that gave rise to the question of how best to avoid transcendental 
psychologism.  That question of whether Husserl was right to posit transcendental 
subjectivity — and of whether his compulsion to do so was demanded by the phenomena 
                                                 
426 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, § 38, p. 83. 
427 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena to Pure Logic, § 38, p. 83. 
428 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 225. 
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of meaning — is therefore another testament to the fact that the later Husserl revised his 
earlier semantics. 
 Another shift that Husserl’s phenomenological work prompted him to make 
occurred in the language that he used to describe the temporal status of ideal meanings 
and of other ideal objects.  In Ideas I as in the Investigations, Husserl designates the valid 
signification that “can at any time be perceived as valid” and that is, in that sense, prior to 
“all theories concerning it”, as “non-temporal”.429  By the time of writing Experience and 
Judgment, however, Husserl was compelled by phenomenological consideration of how 
“objectivities of the understanding … have their givenness-time” (i.e., their temporal 
character in lived experience) to claim that “the timelessness of objectivities of the 
understanding, their being ‘everywhere and nowhere,’ proves … to be a privileged form 
of temporality”.430  Husserl still discerned a “supertemporality” in the capacity of such 
objectivities to “appear simultaneously in many spatiotemporal positions and yet be 
numerically identical as the same”.431  But he no longer took this supertemporality to 
necessarily imply atemporality.  For all objectivities that are “once … actualized or 
‘realized’” in our understanding, according to the later Husserl’s view, “are [thus] 
localized spatiotemporally” (albeit in such a way that they are reiterable).432  In some 
cases, then, “supertemporality” would imply not non-temporality but “omnitemporality” 
— a sort of invariant and reiterable character that, “nevertheless, is a mode of 
                                                 
429 Ideas I, § 22, p. 82. 
430 Experience and Judgment, § 64c, p. 261. 
431 Experience and Judgment, § 64c, p. 260. 
432 Experience and Judgment, § 64c, p. 260.  Husserl continues to allow the possibility, following Bolzano, 
of “a horizon of objects capable of being further discovered, although still unknown”, which, “as long as 
they are not discovered (by anyone), … are not actually in spatiotemporality” (ibid.).  Cf., along with the 
ensuing discussion of “free” and “bound” idealities in § 64d, the parallel discussion in § 100 of Formal and 
Transcendental Logic. 
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temporality”.433  In this allowance that supertemporality is, in some cases, a mode of 
temporality, we have another instance of the later Husserl adapting his account of 
meaning in light of that which he describes. 
 Husserl’s initial views of issues so crucial for his account of meaning as the 
temporal status of ideal objects, and how significations transcend significative acts, and 
what exactly “transcendental psychologism” designates, were therefore not so uncritically 
inherited that they were protected from revisions based on phenomenological 
questioning.  Neither was Bolzano’s postulate of “truths in themselves” — the key to 
Husserl’s “Platonism” — immune from this questioning.  On the contrary, the second 
part of Formal and Transcendental Logic involves a criticism of the same Bolzanian 
evidences by which Husserl had initially secured his old distinction between real acts and 
ideal meanings.   
 As I have noted (in section 5.3.2), Husserl’s Logic questions several of Bolzano’s 
“idealizing presuppositions”.434  It questions the thesis that there are truths that the 
logician can “reactivate”, “identify”, and “build upon”; and the thesis that there are truths 
that we might never discover to be true; and the thesis that these truths “themselves” are 
“actualizable by following explorable … ways of cognition”.435  Husserl in 1929 still 
recognized that these presuppositions “surely rank as evidences”.436  Yet he also 
                                                 
433 Experience and Judgment, § 64c, p. 261. 
434 Formal and Transcendental Logic, §§ 73-81. 
435 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 73, p. 164, § 80, p. 176.  
436 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 80, p. 176.  Husserl continued to embrace Bolzano’s claim “that 
there are indeed truths in themselves, which one can seek, and also find, by avenues predlineated in 
themselves” (§ 80, p. 176).  He continued to embrace the Bolzanian claim that science is predicated on this 
presupposition: “One never asks whether there is a truth, but only how it can be reached or, at worst, 
whether it is not utterly unattainable by our factually limited powers of cognition …”; and “The possibility 
of sciences depends entirely on this certainty …” (§ 80, p. 176).  Husserl accordingly couched his decision 
to affirm the independence of truths in terms of the following dichotomy: “Either logic operates with a 
universal fiction, and is therefore anything but normative; or logic is indeed normative, and this ideal is 
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emphasized how “astonishing” and “remarkable” it is to suppose that “we know a priori” 
that there are truths that we do not know, or “that courses of thinking with certain final 
results ‘exist in themselves’”.437  And Husserl’s astonishment incited his reexamination 
of these presuppositions.  It prompted him to ask how logical objectivity and truth can 
“take on and confirm this sense of transcendence we have”; it prompted him to ask “how 
we can know” that there are truths that we do not know; it prompted him to ask how, and 
in what sense, we can validly suppose that there are independent truths.438  Having begun, 
then, in 1900-01, by critically affirming Bolzano’s thesis that there are independent 
truths, Husserl by 1929 was also asking, transcendentally, how this excess of what is true 
over what we grasp as true can possibly be evident. 
 It is accordingly clear that Husserl extensively reexamined and revised the views 
of meaning that he inherited from various predecessors.  Without any more exhaustive 
summary of this reexamination and revision, it is plain already that Husserl’s actual 
attempts to account for meaning are not neatly captured by the caricature that Heidegger 
sometimes presented of his teacher.439  Given the critical character of Husserl’s initial 
appropriation of various semantic claims, together with his repeated re-examination of 
those claims, it hardly seems fair to say that Husserl “disregarded” any “rigorous 
investigation” of the “Platonic” distinction between ideality and reality.440  It is true that 
Husserl discerned an inner kinship between his full phenomenology of logic, on the one 
                                                                                                                                                 
indeed an actual fundamental norm pertaining inseparably to the possibility of genuine science” (§ 73, p. 
166). 
437 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 79, p. 175. 
438 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 79, p. 175, § 93c, p. 204. 
439 It should be noted, in Heidegger’s defense, that he is not often, even in his lecture courses, quite as 
agonistic and acrimonious in his comments regarding Husserl as he is in those presently at issue.   
440 Martin Heidegger, Introduction to Phenomenological Research, trans. Daniel Dahlstrom, pp. 68-69. 
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hand, and the motives of Plato’s works, on the other.441  It is true also that Husserl in the 
Investigations accepted Bolzano’s old distinction between ideal unities of meaning and 
real acts of meaning as variously “self-evident”.  But the partly Bolzanian, partly 
Brentanian theory of meaning that Husserl inherited was one that he took up critically, 
through his own first-hand reasoning (depicted in chapter 4); and it was one that Husserl 
began questioning again, and revising, as soon as he had made it his own.  Far from “a 
rigorous investigation” being “disregarded”, then, it rather appears that Husserl remained 
unsettled, though principled, to the end.  He did not hastily abandon his earlier insights, 
but he did return, in accordance with what he called the “zigzag” of “genuine” 
understanding, to examine his earlier account of meaning again against the appearance of 
meaning itself.    
 We may still be inclined to ask whether there was not something viciously 
circular about the process wherein Husserl’s theory of meaning first shaped, and then was 
reinforced by, his phenomenological method.  Yet our suspicion that Husserl’s two-step 
method is incapable of offering critical resistance to the two-sided theory of meaning 
from which it arose has turned out to be unjustified.  We have seen that the 
phenomenological method, with its roots in Husserl’s view of meaning, in fact resulted in 
several revisions.  These revisions, moreover, should come as no surprise.  For Husserl’s 
attempt to account for meaning indeed had a “zigzag” character, rather than the character 
                                                 
441 As I discussed in section 5.3.2, Husserl regarded Plato as the founder of logic because Plato, when faced 
with the “universal denial of science by sophistic skepticism”, sought to identify the subjective and 
objective conditions for the possibility of science (Formal and Transcendental Logic, Introduction).  We 
may not agree with this view of logic’s historical origins.  Yet Husserl’s view of Plato’s influence is at least 
less “banal” than the condescending mode of speech wherein “Platonism” is a poorly defined term of 
abuse.  “Platonism” can signify either (a) the simple recognition of the eidetic or (b) the ultra-realism 
regarding universals — the confusion between the eidetic and the thing-like — of which Plato himself 
articulated the still-decisive criticisms in the Parmenides.  Ascriptions of “Platonism” (to Husserl, among 
others) too often condemn (a) as though it were necessarily (b). 
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of vicious circularity, in the sense that it was a consistently self-critical process.442  An 
encounter with the data in question would issue in a provisional theory; Husserl would 
then measure that provisional theory through another return to the things themselves; this 
measurement would then issue in the next provisional theory; and so on.443  Now, if 
Husserl’s 1900-01 view of meaning were not based on any encounter with the things 
themselves, then we would not expect a method determined by that view to result in 
revisions.  If Husserl’s semantics had consisted of “the most banal Platonism” because he 
had eschewed any investigation, then it would indeed be surprising to find him engaged 
in an ongoing process of reexamination thorough enough to reach even the core of his 
initial theory of meaning.  If, however, Husserl’s original reasoning on behalf of his 
Brentanian and Bolzanian views of meaning was largely cogent, then it is no surprise that 
a method shaped by those views led to further original investigations and to revisions.  It 
is then only natural that Husserl returned to the phenomenon of meaning from a 
perspective, and with a method, shaped by his initial views, and only natural that those 
views were, in some respects, revised. 
 Husserl’s semantics is thus cleared of a popular methodological charge against it.  
We have seen manifold evidence that Husserl undertook both a first-hand study of 
meaning and a consistent reexamination of his own views.  This evidence belies the claim 
that Husserl was guilty, in his semantics, of gullible appropriation and vicious circularity.   
                                                 
442 Compare Husserl’s claim that all self-critical human inquiry involves a “zigzag” where the inquirer is 
“first making straight for the givenness of something itself, but then [is] going back critically to the 
provisional results already obtained” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 44b). 
443 So, for example, when Husserl through his investigations encountered evidence that there are ideal 
meanings, that Bolzanian insight came as a shock to the Brentanian paradigm that he had unequivocally 
embraced at the time when he was writing Philosophy of Arithmetic; when he saw the apparent incoherence 
of a partly Bolzanian, partly Brentanian view, he felt compelled to propose a resolution by which those 
views might be reconciled; when he applied his method he determined that his 1900-01 inquiry had not 
been psychological after all; and so on.  
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 While Husserl’s process of accounting for meaning is thus importantly vindicated, 
however, the most contentious conclusion of that process is not.  We may readily 
acknowledge Husserl’s disposition toward rigorous inquiry and still object to his 
resolution of the riddle that is his dyadic semantics.  Indeed, many thinkers within the 
phenomenological tradition — who to some extent appreciate Husserl’s 1900-01 pair of 
semantic insights, and who thus can recognize the motive force behind the eidetic and 
transcendental reductions — object to that resolution.  They object to the proposal that 
we ought to reconcile Bolzanian and Brentanian insights by reference to transcendental 
subjectivity.   
 Accordingly, I turn now from a methodological focus to a question about 
conclusions.  The question is: how should Husserl have explained the division that he 
detected within the phenomenon of meaning?  Phenomenological critiques of the later 
Husserl’s attempt to explain meaning’s dyadic character fall into two families.  One holds 
that Husserl’s depiction of a transcendental subjective origin of objective meaning is too 
speculatively ambitious; the other holds that Husserl’s discussion of objective meaning’s 
transcendental basis is not metaphysical enough.  So, in the following chapter, I examine 
in turn the case for each of these contentions.  
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6: Assessing Husserl’s resolution  
6.1: Speculative excess? 
 Within the program of inquiry that Husserl initiated, there are some who dissent 
from the later Husserl’s semantic conclusions and instead prefer the “metaphysical 
neutrality” of the Logical Investigations.444  These dissenters lament that Husserl’s theory 
of meaning did not steadfastly retain the Investigations’ stated policy of bracketing 
metaphysical claims.445  Without being hostile to metaphysics per se,446 they are 
suspicious of the admittedly metaphysical direction that Husserl’s later semantics 
takes.447  They favor the unresolved dissonance of the 1900-01 theory of meaning over 
the later Husserl’s proposed resolution.  For, according to this first group of dissenters, 
Husserl’s description of a transcendental basis of meanings, while purportedly guided by 
                                                 
444 On this “neutrality” see Zahavi, “Metaphysical Neutrality in Logical Investigations” (One Hundred 
Years of Phenomenology, ed. Dan Zahavi and Frederik Stjernfelt (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 2002), pp. 93-108), 
and Benoist, “Phénoménologie et ontologie dans les Recherches logiques”.  Among contemporary 
philosophers, Benoist is perhaps the principal advocate for the metaphysically “minimalist” character of the 
Investigations, wanting to maintain the “tensions” in Husserl’s 1900-01 semantics against Zahavi and 
others who side with the later Husserl.  See “Phénoménologie”, pp. 121-124, and “Husserl’s Theory of 
Meaning in the First Logical Investigation”. 
445 For Husserl’s discussion of the policy that puts metaphysical presuppositions out of play, see, e.g., 
Logical Investigations, Introduction to volume II, part I of the German edition, § 7.  Husserl there, as 
elsewhere in the Investigations, presents phenomenology as a “theory of knowledge” that is prior to “all 
metaphysics” (p. 178).  Above all — though, as Benoist notes, only in the original, 1901 edition — Husserl 
in this section explicitly excludes the “metaphysical question” concerning the “existence and nature of the 
“external world””.  In this way, as Benoist concludes, “the phenomenology deployed in the Logical 
Investigations” is “characterized” by a “radical lack of ontological engagement”— a “metaphysical 
abstinence” that puts the Investigations in a “neutral position in relationship to empirical psychology on the 
one side and logic on the other” (“Phénoménologie”, pp. 113-114). 
446 It is possible, of course, to prefer the relatively a-metaphysical stance of the Investigations to the 
particular metaphysical direction of the Logic while embracing some metaphysical position.  It is even 
possible to hold this preference while suspecting that Husserl was led toward a particular, flawed 
metaphysics precisely by his attempt to put the theory of knowledge prior to metaphysics.  Roman 
Ingarden’s opposition to Husserl’s later semantics is an actual instance of this possibility.   
447 For Husserl’s characterization of himself and those who accept his view of logic as “metaphysicians”, 
see Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 102, pp. 238-239.  Husserl is careful to add that he wants to do 
metaphysics only in what he calls “the right way”; he does not want “to ‘speculate’” (ibid., § 102, pp. 238-
239).  Cf. also Husserl’s suggestion that phenomenology excludes every “realism” that takes “the ego as a 
… bit of the world”, as well as many “idealisms” (ibid., § 93a, p. 202). 
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insight, was too often conjectural.  It too often involved a speculation unrestrained by the 
data at issue. 
 As a characteristic example of this type of dissent, we may take the objections of 
Roman Ingarden.  Ingarden belonged to what is often called the “Göttingen circle”, a 
group of thinkers who studied under Husserl at some point between 1901 and 1915 and 
who are perhaps the most important proponents of Husserl’s early phenomenology.  
Besides Ingarden, the group notably included also several philosopher-psychologists 
from Munich, who had traded that cultural and intellectual center for comparatively drab 
Göttingen in order to study with the man behind the Logical Investigations;448 it included 
(among these Munich philosophers), Adolf Reinach, who was poised to become 
Husserl’s successor at the head of the phenomenological movement, before he was killed 
in World War I;449 and it included, during the later years, Edith Stein, whose works 
remain among the most valuable contributions to phenomenological research, despite the 
staggering injustices that she suffered.450  Now, Ingarden’s evaluation of Husserl’s later 
thought should hardly be taken to exactly represent the full Göttingen circle’s judgment, 
given that the circle was a collection of original thinkers.  Yet Ingarden does roughly 
represent the group as a whole in the following relevant respects: 
                                                 
448 This subset of the Göttingen circle had studied under Theodore Lipps, one of the philosopher-
psychologists whom Husserl’s Investigations had charged with psychologism.  Along with several of 
Lipps’ other students who remained in Munich, and Max Scheler, and others, this part of the Göttingen 
circle comprised the Munich circle of phenomenologists.  On the Munich circle see Herbert Spiegelberg, 
The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960), pp. 168-270. 
449 See Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, “Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual Autobiography” (Speech Act 
and Sachverhalt, ed. Kevin Mulligan, Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1987) especially pp. 16-32. 
450 On Stein’s contributions to phenomenology, both “signed” and “anonymous”, see Marianne Sawicki, 
Body, Text, and Science: The Literacy of Investigative Practices and the Phenomenology of Edith Stein 
(Boston: Kluwer, 1997) pp. 151-171.   As Sawicki documents, the studies published in Stein’s own name 
far from exhaust her output: Stein also made significant but “anonymous” contributions to many works for 
which others took the credit, including at least two that have become foundational for phenomenology, 
namely the earliest set of Husserl’s manuscripts on time consciousness (i.e., the set drafted between 1904 
and 1911, published in the Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung in 1928, for 
which Heidegger was named as editor) and Ideas II. 
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• With the other members of the Göttingen circle, Ingarden engaged in 
phenomenological inquiry, and accepted at least the skeleton of Husserl’s two-
step method.451  He accepted that, in order to access the important domain of 
research to which “the master” had broken through, it is necessary (a) to 
temporarily “neutralize” our position “about the real existence” of that which we 
are studying, and (b) to attend to “the essential and [in many cases] general 
moments” of that which we are studying.452  
• Ingarden shared his colleagues’ attraction to Husserl’s early critique of 
psychologism, their antipathy toward neo-Kantianism, and their related 
reservations regarding Husserl’s turn to a transcendental idealism.  With the other 
early phenomenologists, he understood the phenomenological slogan, “to the 
things themselves”, as a reaction to much of the work that was done under the 
                                                 
451 When Ingarden objects to Husserl’s transcendental turn, he couches that turn as a misapplication, rather 
than as an essential part, of the phenomenological method.  He has no objection to “the investigation of the 
whole process of cognition”, with its “eidetic analysis” and its “appeal to conscious acts”; what he objects 
to, instead, is Husserl’s “practical performance of this task”, wherein Husserl “emphasizes too strongly the 
subjectively directed aspect of his inquiries”; what Ingarden objects to is that Husserl, “not wanting to 
perpetrate any dogmatic assertion about the objects of cognition, suddenly adopts the directly opposite 
point of view, treating the sense of the object constituted in the cognitive process exclusively as the 
creation of the acts coming into consideration” (On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental 
Idealism (trans. Arnor Hannibalsson (The Hague: Nijhoff), 1975), p. 37).  In this sense, Ingarden accepted 
a skeletal phenomenological method without accepting the way that Husserl fleshed the method out.   
452 Roman Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, p. 36.  The first, 
bracketing component of this procedure clearly at least resembles Husserl’s transcendental reduction.  The 
second Ingarden explicitly refers to as an “’eidetic’ attitude” (ibid., p. 36).  This two-step procedure can be 
applied whether we are attempting to clarify, say, what various types of art objects are, with Ingarden, or 
what the state is, with Stein, or what speech acts are, with Reinach, or what perception and judgment are, as 
in Husserl’s subjectively directed, purportedly pre-ontological type of phenomenology.  While this 
procedure, in virtue of its eidetic character, often considers what is general, it can also, as Ingarden notes, 
consider singular essences: “Phenomenologists do not take into account accidental qualities or attributes.  
There can be cases of a phenomenologist’s interest in the essence of certain exactly individual objects, for 
example of a certain determined person, but that is outside the framework of the matters which could lead 
him to be suspected of intruding into the field of physical research” (ibid., p. 36). 
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motto, “back to Kant”.  He took it to express the belief that we have epistemic 
access to things that are independent of our epistemic faculties.453 
Because Ingarden is representative of the Göttingen circle on these points, we would have 
some reason to take as likewise roughly representative of the circle’s position any 
evaluation he offers of the transcendental turn within Husserl’s later semantics.  Because 
Ingarden wrote extensively about Husserl’s intellectual development, moreover, he in 
fact was able to leave us critical comments concerning Husserl’s later theory of meaning.   
 These comments occur partly in Ingarden’s The Literary Work of Art.  The 
Literary Work of Art is primarily an attempt to clarify what aesthetic literary products 
essentially are.  Given this focus, Ingarden’s study is basically about something other 
than Husserl’s philosophy.454  But the 1931 publication also contains a preface in which 
Ingarden directly addresses the position of Husserl’s 1929 Logic.  Ingarden there briefly 
indicates what he cannot affirm in his teacher’s later position regarding the origin of 
objective meanings. 
 The chief point of contention is transcendental subjectivity, as Husserl describes 
it.  The question is whether the subjectivity that Husserl describes is a suitable candidate 
                                                 
453 The Göttingen circle affirmed both a metaphysical realism and our epistemic access to the things 
themselves.  “All the young phenomenologists”, according to Stein, “were confirmed realists” (quoted by 
Alasdair MacIntyre, Edith Stein: A Philosophical Prologue 1913-1922 (Lanham, MA: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 2007), p. 66).  Reinach indicated the sort of Neo-Kantianism to which the early 
phenomenologists were opposed in a letter to his friend Theodor Conrad (of the Munich circle), through 
this snarky recitation of a lecture by a neo-Kantian professor: “This thesis [that “a true idea must agree with 
its object”] cannot be true, because we know nothing at all about how things really are — Kant, too, 
pointed this out — and the whole world is only in our consciousness, — and outside of consciousness there 
is nothing” (translated in Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith, “Adolf Reinach: An Intellectual 
Autobiography”, p. 8). 
454 To be sure, Ingarden’s whole study of aesthetic literary products functions, indirectly, as a part within 
his decades-long rebuttal to Husserl’s transcendental idealism. (Compare Ingarden’s 1961 statement that 
his opposition to various forms of idealism, including that which Husserl came to embrace, “has been in 
fact occupying my entire scholarly life” (quoted in Jeff Mitscherling, Roman Ingarden’s Ontology and 
Aesthetics (Ottowa: University of Ottowa Press, 1997), p. 50).)  Nonetheless, the study’s direct theme is the 
structure and type of being of literary works of art. 
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for the role that his semantics would have it play — whether it is a basis without which 
there could be no ideal meaning.455  The charge is that Husserl slips into erroneous 
speculation when he begins to identify the phenomenologist’s “transcendental 
subjectivity” — a subjectivity that is reflectively described by “starting from the world 
and myself qua human being” —456 as a necessary condition of all objective meaning.   
 On Ingarden’s reading, Husserl in his Logic rejects his early view of “word 
meanings, sentences, and higher units of meaning”.457  Whereas Husserl had previously, 
in the Investigations, attributed a “strict ideality” to objective meanings, he resigns this 
view by making all ideal objectivities out to be “formations” dependent on the 
subjectivity he describes.458  He effectively trades in much of his Bolzanian view for “a 
universal extension of transcendental idealism”.459  It is at this point that Ingarden cannot 
follow the course of his teacher’s thinking about meaning.  Ingarden’s objection, then, is 
that the “subjective operations” out of which ideal meanings are said to “arise”, in 
Husserl’s Logic, are not operations on which all such meanings actually depend.460 
 Ingarden offers little explicit attempt to justify this objection in his preface to The 
Literary Work of Art.  He does briefly allude, in support of his criticism, to his account of 
what aesthetic literary products essentially are.461  We need not subscribe to Ingarden’s 
                                                 
455 Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, trans. George Grabowicz (Evanston: Northwestern, 1973), p. lxxiv. 
456 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 96a. 
457 Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, p. lxxiv. 
458 Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, p. lxxiv.  
459 Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, p. lxxiv. 
460 Ingarden, The Literary Work of Art, p. lxxiv. 
461 Given the results of Ingarden’s study, there is a difference in kind between publically available but 
modifiable literary creations, such as novels, and strictly invariant and determinate “ideal objectivities”, 
such as “ideal concepts” (The Literary Work of Art, p. lxxiv).  Our fictional literary products would be 
jointly founded on acts of authorship and reading, on the one hand, and on ideal concepts that give such 
products their “intersubjective identity” and “ontically autonomous mode of existence”, on the other hand 
(The Literary Work of Art, p. lxxiv).  The ideal meanings that works of fiction presuppose, in contrast, 
would be independent of our conscious acts.  If Ingarden is right that (a) our fictional literary works depend 
on our conscious acts while (b) ideal meanings do not, and correct too that (c) the later Husserl ascribes 
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ontology of literary works of art, however, in order to have some basis for his objection 
to Husserl’s later semantics.  Instead, the strongest case for Ingarden’s objection emerges 
from his 1963 large-scale assessment of Husserl’s later thought.462  
 Among the questions Ingarden’s 1963 text poses with respect to Husserl’s later 
philosophy is a “problem regarding the scope of transcendental phenomenology”.463  
There is, Ingarden writes, “a certain unconscious ambiguity of the role of the 
phenomenological reduction in Husserl’s works”.464  The transcendental aspect of 
Husserl’s method, in particular, seems to serve a problematically ambiguous function.  At 
first, the transcendental reduction’s sphere of application seems to be solely “in 
epistemology”.465  We study the structure of a dative of appearance, suspending (and 
reflecting on) the beliefs that are built into our natural attitude, in order to consider the 
nature and possibility of knowledge.  We put existing bodies of knowledge out of play, 
and consider how knowledge is possible, partly in response to skepticism regarding our 
epistemic faculties.  Eventually, however, the transcendental reduction’s scope seems to 
extend to certain questions in “ontology”.466  Husserl’s attempts to elucidate what 
knowledge is and how it is possible lead into questions regarding the type of being that 
knowledge and its conditions possess.  His epistemological inquiries raise “metaphysical 
problems” regarding the status that consciousness and reason have with respect to the 
                                                                                                                                                 
dependence on our conscious acts to all ideal meanings, it would follow that Husserl’s later semantics is 
mistaken.   
462 This work, first published in Polish, is translated as On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental 
Idealism (trans. Arnor Hannibalsson, The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975).  Ingarden there contends that 
Husserl’s turn toward a metaphysical transcendental idealism was perhaps initiated with methodological 
developments that occurred during Husserl’s years in Göttingen and was definitely solidified during the 
early 1920s.  Ingarden cites extensive conversations and correspondence with Husserl, specifically 
regarding the realism-idealism issue(s), in support of this contention. 
463 Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, p. 38. 
464 Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, p. 39. 
465 Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, p. 39. 
466 Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, pp. 40-41. 
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world.467  Is subjectivity a dependent part of an independent world?  Or does a different 
relation of dependence obtain?  Ingarden suspects that Husserl brings an originally 
epistemological reduction to bear on these metaphysical issues.468 
 We need not settle here the persistent and widespread debate regarding the 
reduction’s metaphysical implications.  What matters for present purposes is simply that 
Ingarden’s 1963 concern regarding the reduction’s ambiguous range of application can be 
raised specifically with reference to Husserl’s later semantics.  For there is a problem 
with the reduction’s scope — “a certain unconscious ambiguity of the role of the 
phenomenological reduction” —469 that occurs specifically in Husserl’s description of a 
transcendental origin of meanings.  The problem is that this description occasionally 
drifts, perhaps without sufficient notation that it is drifting, between two registers:   
1. In a first register, Husserl describes his own singular subjectivity — and invites 
his readers to similarly describe their own singular subjectivities.470  He 
differentiates his own transcendental ego, to which he has reflective access, from 
“other transcendental egos” — and invites his readers to do the same.471  Given 
                                                 
467 Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, p. 41. 
468 More precisely, Ingarden, together with Stein and others, suspected that Husserl derived a metaphysical 
idealism from his transcendental reduction.  Thus when Stein wrote to Ingarden of her belief in “an 
absolutely existing physical nature”, she added, “I have not yet had the chance to confess my heresy to the 
Master” (quoted in Sawicki, Body, Text, and Science, p. 159).  Does Husserl’s transcendental idealism in 
fact amount to a metaphysical idealism, as Hermann Philipse has recently argued again (see 
“Transcendental Idealism”, The Cambridge Companion to Husserl, ed. Barry Smith and David Woodruff 
Smith (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1995) 239-322)?  Or is Husserl’s transcendental idealism 
metaphysically realist, as per Karl Ameriks’ view (see “Husserl’s Realism”, Philosophical Review 86 
(1978): pp. 498-519)?  Or is Robert Sokolowski correct that Husserl, returning to a Platonic-Aristotelian 
mode of philosophical thinking, refused the representationalist presuppositions that underlie the modern 
realism-idealism controversy (cf. “Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse”, Husserl Studies 24 
(2008): pp. 167-75.)?  These are difficult and important questions, but the attempt to answer them, and to 
determine the founding relation between subjectivity and the real world, lies outside the bounds of this 
project.  My focus is confined to the founding relation between subjectivity and objective meaning. 
469 Ingarden, On the Motives which led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism, p. 39. 
470 Working within this mode of description, Husserl writes of transcendental subjectivity that “I myself am 
this subjectivity” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 95, p. 208). 
471 See, e.g., Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 96a, pp. 212-213. 
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this field of description, it is possible for each of us to make the following, almost 
tautological counterfactual claim regarding the transcendental basis of 
signification: “without my own ongoing conscious experience, there would be no 
objective meanings for me.”   
2. In another register, Husserl describes subjectivity more generally.472  This field of 
description supports another counterfactual claim regarding the transcendental 
basis of meaning, a claim broader and less obvious than the first.  It permits us to 
say: “if there were no experience, there would be no objective meanings at all”.   
The first of these counterfactuals has its importance exclusively within the theory of 
knowledge.  Though perhaps trivial at first glance, it is vital to Husserl’s pursuit of 
intellectual responsibility.  Husserl acknowledges that his own subjectivity is responsible 
for his concepts and judgments, and treats whatever transcends his conscious processes as 
a phenomenon the constitution of which needs to be investigated, in order “to uproot all 
prejudice”.473  The second counterfactual, in contrast, has a partly ontological bearing.  
Husserl identifies categorial acts (in general) as a condition for the possibility of 
objective meanings, in order to offer an alternative to logical psychologism.  He denies 
the (unavoidably ontological) claim that there would be no logical domain — no truths or 
other meanings — apart from contingent psychological processes, and affirms in its place 
                                                 
472 Working within the mode of description, Husserl identifies transcendental subjectivity — that the 
“explication” of which is the “task of transcendental phenomenology” — as “a universal constitutional 
Apriori, embracing all intentionalities” (Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 98, pp. 217-218) 
473 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 104, pp. 244.  Husserl instructively compares this constitutional 
questioning with that of Descartes, who engages in universal doubt, and considers the relation between his 
ideas and his own cogito, in order to subject his beliefs to a thorough assessment (Formal and 
Transcendental Logic, § 97).  Hume too practiced this type of questioning, by entertaining sweeping 
doubts, and describing how each person’s experience is the origin of that person’s ideas, in order to 
categorize and critique those ideas (cf. ibid., § 100, p. 227).  
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the (equally ontological) claim that it is rather transcendental subjectivity on which 
objective meanings depend.   
    The concern that we should raise, on behalf of the Göttingen circle, is that Husserl 
may not always have kept the first counterfactual separate from the second.  The concern 
is that the later Husserl may at points have taken some singular subjectivity like his own, 
which has importance in epistemology, and posited it as though it has the sort of 
ontological significance that he ought rather to have attributed only to subjectivity in 
general (or to some better qualified subject).  The concern is that Husserl may have 
slipped into the claim that there would be no objective meanings at all — in an 
ontological sense — apart from the singular subjectivity to which a given 
phenomenologist has reflective access.  In the terms of Ingarden’s broad objection 
regarding the reduction’s scope, then, the charge is that Husserl may have drifted too 
heedlessly between a theory of knowledge and an ontology of meaning.  More precisely, 
the charge is that Husserl may not have sufficiently distinguished this or that singular 
transcendental ego, the reduction to which is important only for epistemological ends, 
with transcendental subjectivity in general, the reduction to which has significance, in 
part, for the metaphysics of meaning. 
  While I do not believe that Husserl was ultimately heedless of this distinction,474 
there are nonetheless texts in Husserl’s Logic that can seem to speculatively attribute a 
grandiose primacy to singular subjectivities like the one on which Husserl is reflecting.  
In section 95, for example, Husserl writes the following: “First of all, before everything 
                                                 
474 Husserl was at least far from oblivious to the general distinction between metaphysical and 
epistemological primacy. In § 93a of Formal and Transcendental Logic, e.g., Husserl specifies that it is 
“from the standpoint of cognition” that his ego “precedes the being of the world” (p. 202).  It is perhaps 
more difficult to distinguish epistemological and metaphysical priority, however, when it is the being of 
meanings that we are considering. 
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else conceivable, I am.  This ‘I am’ is for me, the subject who says it, and says it in the 
right sense, the primitive intentional basis for my world” — including “for any ideal 
world that I accept”.475  This statement, as Husserl notes, “may sound monstrous”.476  
More exactly, it may seem to endorse a hybrid of “psychologism” and “solipsism” — it 
may seem to recommend that each subject understand himself or herself as the “primitive 
basis” for “logical principles” and other valid meanings that rather appear to hold 
independently of our thought.477  Unaccompanied by any clear distinction between each 
inquirer’s transcendental subjectivity, on the one hand, and transcendental subjectivity in 
general, on the other hand, does not such a text suggest that each singular subjectivity is 
the primitive productive basis, without which there would be no meanings at all? 
 This, in any case, is the first intra-phenomenological challenge to the later 
Husserl’s talk of transcendental subjectivity.  From the perspective of the Göttingen 
circle, it would have been better if Husserl had never attempted a transcendental 
resolution of his Brentanian and Bolzanian semantic insights.  Ideal meaning indeed 
essentially depends on the living experience of meaning; and ideal meaning is indeed 
                                                 
475 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 95, p. 209.  Along the same lines, Husserl writes: If I “go back and 
ask about the multiplicities of … meanings, … taking everything objective purely as a ‘phenomenon’, as an 
intentionally constituted unity, I … find myself qua transcendental ego” (ibid., § 96a, p. 211).   
476 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 95, p. 209.  
477 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 95, p. 209.  Husserl believes that intersubjectivity is necessary for 
objectivity; and so each transcendental subject would need to constitute others before he or she could 
constitute an objective meaning as objective.  Husserl opposes solipsism, moreover, in recognizing that the 
other can do a reduction that I do not experience originally: “the other psyche also points back to a 
transcendental ego, but, in this case, another’s, as the ego that someone else … would have to grasp in the 
‘phenomenological reduction’” (ibid., § 96a, p. 212).  Still, while Husserl thus grants that “the world is 
continually there for us”, he emphasizes that “in the first place it is there for me” (ibid., § 96a, p. 214, my 
emphasis).  It is unfortunately possible, though not advisable, to interpret this as a metaphysical solipsism.  
We could more charitably understand it as expressing only a methodological solipsism, according to which 
each of us must begin what Husserl called “sense-investigation” — any study of the nature and origin of 
meaning — through reflection on our own subjectivity.  Husserl also appears to endorse an epistemological 
solipsism that he attributes to Descartes: “this Ego — … I, understood as the ultimately constitutive 
subjectivity, exist for myself with apodictic necessity ...; whereas the world constituted in me … has and, 
by essential necessity, retains the sense of only presumptive existence” (ibid., § 99, p. 222). 
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nonetheless independent of contingent acts of meaning; but Husserl’s endeavor to explain 
this dyadic appearance of meaning by means of the reduction, by reference to 
transcendental subjectivity, was too ambitious.  He should not have presumed to display 
the basis of all meaning through his discipline of reflective description.  For, in doing so, 
his transcendental account of signification runs the risk of speculatively conflating each 
reader’s own reflectively accessed singular subjectivity with the basis of all objective 
meanings.  It risks identifying (a) each inquirer’s own subjectivity, as it is understood by 
way of the reduction, with (b) subjectivity in general, without which there could be no 
objective meaning at all.  Whereas Husserl alleges in his Logic that the Investigations 
remained in danger of psychologism, then, those who would defend Husserl’s 1900-01 
account of meaning claim that it is actually his 1929 semantics that faces the greater peril.   
 What can we say, on behalf of the later Husserl’s semantics, against this 
challenge?  First, we must reiterate that Husserl makes a “radical separation of 
psychological from transcendental subjectivity”.478  Thus, even if he did place his 
singular transcendental subjectivity at the basis of meaning, he would not have been 
referring to the contingent features of a particular mundane thinker who was born in 1859 
and died in 1938.  He would rather have been referring to the essence that he has as a 
singular dative of appearance.  Second, and much more important, we should emphasize 
that it is possible to read Husserl’s discussions of his own transcendental subjectivity as 
purely pre-metaphysical.  It is possible, that is, to think that Husserl discussed his own 
subjectivity merely because it was the example of subjectivity in general to which he had 
first-person access; and it is accordingly possible to interpret Husserl’s claims about the 
transcendental basis of all objective meaning as referring strictly to subjectivity in 
                                                 
478 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 99, p. 223.   
 204 
general.  Granted, Husserl may not be sufficiently explicit in his Logic about the 
distinction between singular and general transcendental subjectivity.479  Yet he does often 
operate as though that distinction is in play, and thus as though he is sensitive to the 
concern that I have raised on behalf of his Göttingen students.  For, although Husserl 
regularly describes his own transcendental subjectivity, he typically speaks of 
transcendental subjectivity more generally when he makes ontological claims about the 
basis of meaning in general.  So, to take the example that I have already cited above, 
when Husserl refers to his own transcendental subjectivity as the basis of ideal meaning, 
it is as the origin of “my world” — of “any ideal world that I accept”;480 when, in 
contrast, he refers to the necessary condition of any objective meaning whatever, he often 
uses general phrases, such as “structures of productive cognitive life”,481 and “the 
mind”,482 without indexing his references to a singular transcendental subjectivity.   
Husserl can thus be seen as going some way toward accommodating the concerns 
of his Göttingen students.  Does he go far enough?  The mere distinction between 
psychological and transcendental subjectivity, while undoubtedly important for the theory 
of knowledge, does not by itself suffice.  Transcendental philosophy excludes the 
reductionism that attempts to reduce consciousness to an object, but it is quite compatible 
                                                 
479 Husserl’s distinction between singular transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity performs almost 
the same function that we seek from a distinction between singular transcendental subjects and 
transcendental subjectivity in general.  Because transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity are 
originally epistemological concepts, however, they compel Husserl toward views on which every given 
subject’s ego has a primacy that it does not have within an ontological context.  In the latter context, any 
given subject’s limits make the distinction between singular subjects and subjectivity in general more 
important than the first-person access that we each have to our own experience. 
480 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 95, p. 209, my italics. 
481 In § 100 of Formal and Transcendental Logic, again, Husserl describes ideal meanings in general “as 
essentially products of the correlative structures of productive cognitive life” (p. 233).  He does not write, 
“my productive cognitive life”. 
482 In § 57b of Formal and Transcendental Logic, again, Husserl describes ideal meanings in general as 
“irreal formations produced by the mind”, and as “products of the mind” (p. 138).  He does not write, 
“products of my mind”. 
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with baseless speculation.  In particular, it is compatible with the “apriorist” 
psychologism that Husserl derided in 1900.483  So long as one does not bear in mind the 
difference between that for which there is appearance, in general, and the various singular 
egos for which there is appearance, it remains possible to mistake one’s own 
transcendental subjectivity as the “primitive” foundation for all meaning.  Is the later 
Husserl sufficiently observant of this difference?  Readers of his Logic can at least wish 
that he had made the distinction more explicit than he did.  If Husserl had made that 
distinction both clear and central, it would have tempered certain remarks that, as is, can 
seem “monstrous”.484   
  In the last analysis, however, what matters for the phenomenology of meaning is 
not whether Husserl’s Logic was in some respects a deserving target of an Ingardenian 
critique.  Indeed, given the admitted “provisionalness” of Husserl’s investigations of 
meaning, it would be foolhardy to venture any conclusive assessment of Husserl’s 
position — as though there were a finalized position to assess.485  What matters, instead, 
is simply that there is a genuine insight behind the concerns of the Göttingen circle.  
Husserl’s attempt to reflectively describe the subjective structures at the base of all 
objective meaning does face certain hazards.  There is a risk of confusing the features that 
are specific to one’s own, reflectively accessible subjectivity with the features of 
subjectivity in general.  There is even a risk of sliding from epistemological self-scrutiny 
into metaphysics, in a way that one conflates one’s own, singular living experience with 
the primal intentional origin of all meaning and truth.  These perils of speculative excess 
                                                 
483 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 38, p. 83. 
484 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 95, p. 209.   
485 Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 102, p. 239. 
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comprise a first chief danger to the phenomenology of meaning, and they serve to 
recommend the metaphysical restraint of Husserl’s 1900-01 semantics.  
 
6.2: Metaphysical diffidence? 
 While some of Husserl’s students suggested that his Logic was metaphysically 
reckless, others objected that his discussions of transcendental subjectivity were not 
ontological enough.  According to this second set of critics, Husserl proposed too abstract 
a resolution for his dyadic semantics.  He correctly recognized that objective meaning 
depends on intentionality, in general, but he did so without specifying the being(s) on 
which meaning so depends.  Husserl erred in his depiction of objective meaning’s 
intentional origin, then, less by commission than by omission: he erred by failing to 
identify and describe the concrete being(s) without which there could be no meanings.  
 The most influential objection of this sort is one of Heidegger’s.  I do not mean 
the objection that I have already considered (in section 5.5), according to which Husserl 
uncritically inherited his view of meaning.  Apart from that methodological charge, 
Heidegger also raises a distinct objection to the conclusions of Husserl’s semantics.  He 
objects, from a position within the two-sided approach to meaning that Husserl advanced, 
against Husserl’s later attempt to integrate the two sides of his semantics.  He objects that 
the two-sided character of signification should be explained not by reference to an 
abstract subjectivity, such as we find in Husserl’s “ideas of a ‘pure ego’ and a 
‘consciousness in general’”, but rather by reference to the concrete being that, according 
to Heidegger, makes objective meaning possible.486 
                                                 
486 Being and Time, § 44c, p. 229.  
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 In order to clarify this objection, it is important to begin by showing how 
Heidegger’s dissent emerges from within the phenomenological program that Husserl 
initiated.  For it may seem, initially, as though Heidegger’s complaints against Husserl’s 
semantic conclusions could only have come from a position wholly foreign to that of 
Husserl.  As we have seen, Heidegger rejected as uncritical Husserl’s mode of 
appropriating previous theories of meaning.  Moreover, such opposition to Husserl’s 
work was hardly an isolated incident within Heidegger’s writing.  Instead, Heidegger 
developed a philosophical project that was deeply antagonistic to that of his old teacher.  
In the years surrounding the publication of Being and Time, most of all, Heidegger 
conducted a sustained and often explicit critique of Husserl’s phenomenology.  While 
still acknowledging a debt to Husserl’s project, Heidegger privately called it “sham 
philosophy”,487 and publicly depicted it as negligent with respect to what Heidegger 
considered the fundamental philosophical question.  Likewise Husserl, after studying 
Being and Time, and attempting with Heidegger to jointly define “phenomenology” for 
the Encyclopedia Britannica, came to consider his former student an “antipode”.488  Are 
Husserl and Heidegger’s competing versions of phenomenology then wholly 
incompatible, such that mutual misunderstanding is unavoidable?  Or can the divergence 
of Heidegger’s philosophical project from that of his teacher be understood in terms of a 
more basic continuity of enacted aims and methods? 
                                                 
487 See Steven Crowell’s translation from Heidegger’s letter to Karl Jaspers of December 26, 1926 (Martin 
Heidegger, Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel, 1920-1963, p. 71), in his Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of 
Meaning (p. 265, note 3). 
488 See John Scanlon’s translation from Husserl’s letter to Roman Ingarden of April 19, 1931 (Briefe an 
Roman Ingarden, p. 67), in Husserl: Shorter Works (p. 313, note 6).  Husserl there names Heidegger as an 
“antipode” whose work he needs to study before delivering a lecture, “Phenomenology and Anthropology”.  
It was a lecture in which “the question under discussion” would be “how far … phenomenological 
philosophy can derive its method from ‘philosophical’ anthropology” (Husserl: Shorter Works, p. 316, 
trans. Scanlon). 
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 Happily, we have a case here of development from within.  Heidegger presents 
his critique of Husserlian phenomenology as an “immanent” one.489  He admits that his 
own project, following Husserl’s, consists in “the analytic description of intentionality in 
its apriori”.490  And he acknowledges that several Husserlian “discoveries” were 
“decisive” for his own procedure.491  Further, Heidegger’s early thinking about the topic 
of signification, in particular, overlapped with Husserl’s.  The historical development of 
Heidegger’s early view of meaning paralleled Husserl’s earlier path into phenomenology.  
Once this parallel development is clarified, we should then be in a position to see how 
Heidegger’s phenomenology of meaning departs from Husserl’s.  We should then be in a 
                                                 
489 Heidegger formulates his “immanent critique of phenomenological research”, for example, where 
precisely Husserl’s “determinations of pure consciousness” are at issue, in his History (§ 11).  That lecture 
course of 1925 came to make up much of Being and Time, where Heidegger’s description of his inheritance 
from Husserl would no longer be as extended and his critique of Husserl would no longer be as explicit. 
The lectures are an elongated version of Heidegger’s earlier lecture, “The Concept of Time”, which 
“Gadamer has called the ‘original form’ of Being and Time” (History, publisher’s foreword, p. xiv).  A 
“penultimate form” of Division I is already present in large part in the History lectures (ibid., p. xiii). 
490 Heidegger, History, p. 79. On this point, see Crowell’s Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning.  
Crowell does not depict the phenomenological method quite as I do: he does not present it as a two-step 
procedure that follows from Husserl’s two-sided theory of meaning.  But Crowell does extensively 
document how Husserl and Heidegger’s phenomenological projects alike essentially hinge on 
transcendental questions regarding “the space of meaning”, and thereby supplies much that has been useful 
for my analysis.  I have benefitted especially from Crowell’s translations of pieces of Heidegger’s 
dissertation; from Crowell’s arguments that Heidegger retains the transcendental and eidetic reductions (pp. 
123-28, 170, 195-202); and from Crowell’s discussion regarding Heidegger’s “metontology” and correlated 
view of the human role in truth (pp. 169, 172, 175-81, 201, 211, 214-221, 238-43).  While I am thus 
indebted to Crowell’s work, however, I cannot agree with him on all points.  Crowell ultimately holds 
(echoing Levinas) that Heidegger’s 1927 phenomenological ontology “represents the fruition and flowering 
of Husserlian phenomenology” (p. 160).  He acknowledges that Heidegger’s achievement in Being and 
Time would not be possible without, and cannot be understood as deeply without an understanding of, its 
Husserlian background — and yet he also contends that Heidegger’s understanding of “what the reduction 
accomplishes”, i.e. of the intentional origin of meaning and truth, is ultimately superior to Husserl’s (pp. 
201-02; see also pp. 5 and 169 for statements of Crowell’s ultimately Heideggerian response to the 
problems  he formulates).  For reasons to be supplied at the end of the present section, I do not wholly 
agree with that contention. 
491 Heidegger, History, p. 27. Perhaps most “decisive” was Husserl’s recognition that the intuition of 
something can be “categorial”, and more particularly “ideation” (History, p. 79). Where “the justified 
denial of the reality of universals in the same sense as the reality of a chair” had “also led to the denial of 
the objectivity of the universal”, for Heidegger “this spell was broken by the discovery of categorial 
intuition, in particular ideation” (History, p. 72). 
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position to understand and also to assess Heidegger’s objection to Husserl’s later 
semantic conclusions.   
 How, then, did Heidegger’s early philosophical route, in the years leading up to 
1930, parallel the path that Husserl had already taken before him?492  Essentially, 
Heidegger through these years performed what I have called Husserl’s “two-step”.  The 
development of Heidegger’s philosophical project, that is, involved the partly anti-
psychologistic, partly transcendental double movement that Husserl had already made.493  
To see how this is so, consider first Heidegger’s 1913 dissertation, The Theory of 
Judgment in Psychologism.  Heidegger there takes up the anti-psychologistic approach of 
Husserl’s Prolegomena, by opposing four purportedly psychologistic theories of 
judgment.494  He affirms, contra psychologism, the fundamental distinction of the 
Prolegomena: he writes that, whereas “psychical reality can be termed merely fleeting 
and insubstantial”, the ideal judgment is “identical”, and may be “valid”, across various 
acts of judgment.495  Consider next Heidegger’s 1915 Habilitation thesis, Duns Scotus’ 
Theory of Categories and Signification.  Heidegger there again follows Husserl’s 
Bolzanian step, through polemics aimed to clarify that ideal judgments and their 
constituent categories are not beings lying around the world.  Beyond thus undermining 
logical psychologism, however, Heidegger in 1915 also attempted to phenomenologically 
clarify what judgments are by inquiring into their origin.  Following the route that 
                                                 
492 I confine my attention exclusively to Heidegger’s works from the years 1914-30 in order to set aside the 
difficult issues surrounding the “turn” that occurred in Heidegger’s thinking ca. 1930. 
493 On this double movement see § 5.2.  Cf. also Husserl’s own brief history of his “long and thorny way” 
into transcendental phenomenology, in Ideas I, §§ 87 and 61. 
494 These theories of judgment are those of Brentano, Wundt, Heinrich Meier, and Theodor Lipps.  For a 
brief summary of Heidegger’s dissertation, see Logic, Truth and the Modalities: From a Phenomenological 
Perspective, J. N. Mohanty (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1999), pp. 88-91. 
495 Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 1:170, translated in Crowell, p. 99; and Heidegger, Gesamtausgabe 1:307, 
translated in Crowell, p. 94. 
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Husserl began in the fifth and sixth Investigations, Heidegger contends that the subject 
matter of logic can originate from no other source than a categorial (as opposed to merely 
sensuous) intentionality.  Thus we can see in Heidegger’s early philosophic trajectory 
two steps that run roughly parallel to Husserl’s course.  In the first, Heidegger clarifies 
the strangely invariant and (in some cases) valid nature that judgments possess; in the 
second, he considers what source logic’s strange objects can have.496 
 Moreover, Heidegger soon found it philosophically dissatisfying to merely locate 
the origin of the field of signification in categorial intentionality.  He expressed this 
“intellectual unrest” in the conclusion that he attached to his 1915 Habilitation thesis for 
its publication in 1916.497  In that conclusion, Heidegger writes that the clarification of 
the logical sphere cannot be accomplished when we engage in the “conscious suspension 
… of metaphysical problems”, such as he had practiced in his Habilitation thesis.498  A 
fuller understanding of what signification is, he claims, rather requires “a metaphysical 
solution”.499  It requires a metaphysical clarification of signification’s intentional origin.  
In this discontent with anything less than a metaphysical account of meaning, we can see 
a parallel to Husserl’s dissatisfaction with the semantics of the Investigations.  
Heidegger’s “intellectual unrest” is like that which Husserl felt after locating the origin of 
logical objectivity in an “intentionality” still so vaguely delimited that critics like Natorp 
                                                 
496 Heidegger was well-aware that Husserl had taken just these two steps before him.  He depicted the basic 
thrust of Husserl’s Investigations, e.g., as consisting in “a more radical conception of what was already 
advanced in Brentano’s descriptive psychology, as well as a basic critique of the contemporary confusion 
of psychological-genetic inquiry with logical inquiry” (History, p. 24).  
497 The Theory of Categories and Meaning in Duns Scotus, trans. Roderick M. Stewart and John van Buren, 
Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to Being and Time and Beyond (ed. John van Buren, SUNY Press, 
2002), p. 64. 
498 Heidegger, The Theory of Categories, p. 64.  Regarding his thesis’ ametaphysical discussion of 
categories, Heidegger writes in his conclusion that “philosophy cannot do for long without its true optics, 
metaphysics” (p. 65). 
499 The Theory of Categories, p. 64. 
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could confuse it with the real psychological processes that are so important in 
psychologism.  We can also see, as Steven Crowell rightly claims, Heidegger’s “future 
trajectory … adumbrated” in his unrest — and much as we could see Husserl’s later 
trajectory adumbrated in the tension resultant from his cumulative Investigations.500  For 
Heidegger, as for Husserl before him, a need arose to further clarify the intentional origin 
of significations, and this need announced the task pursued in subsequent, less 
metaphysically restrained investigations.   
 The historical parallel between Husserl and Heidegger’s philosophical 
developments does not reside only, then, in that Heidegger takes an anti-psychologistic 
first step, parallel to Husserl’s; nor does it consist only in this first step taken together 
with the further indication that signification and validity have their basis in categorial 
intentionality.  The historical parallel extends beyond this, as far as the second of these 
early steps also pre-delineates the later trajectory of each thinker.  The partly anti-
psychologistic, partly transcendental two-step leads to more metaphysical, and 
purportedly more adequate, transcendental investigations regarding the basis of 
meanings. 
 Whereas Husserl came to identify this basis as “transcendental subjectivity”, 
however, Heidegger was not satisfied with such a general designation.  Heidegger partly 
pursued Husserl’s phenomenological, two-sided approach to the topic of meaning;501 and 
Heidegger recognized that Husserl’s program remained “in flux”, lacking a finally settled 
                                                 
500 Crowell, p. 206. 
501 In his more amicable and open comments, Heidegger suggests that his project and Husserl’s were not 
only parallel, but also mutually informative.  In History of the Concept of Time, for example, Heidegger 
writes the following: “Husserl is well aware of my objections from my lecture courses … and is essentially 
making allowances for them, so that my critique no longer applies in its full trenchancy.  But it is not really 
a matter of criticizing for the sake of criticizing but criticism for the sake of laying open the issues and 
bringing understanding.  It almost goes without saying that even today I still regard myself as a learner in 
relation to Husserl” (p. 121, my italics). 
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conclusion;502 but Heidegger still felt compelled to make a definite break from Husserl’s 
path.  For what reason, then, did Heidegger prefer the phenomenological analysis of 
Dasein503 to Husserl’s description of the structures of experience?  In particular, why did 
Heidegger think it best not to say, following Husserl, that transcendental subjectivity is 
the basis of objective meaning and truth?  
 A first statement of Heidegger’s objection to the later Husserl’s semantic 
conclusions may be found in History of the Concept of Time.  In that 1925 lecture course, 
Heidegger indicates why he cannot follow the phenomenological procedure to the 
position at which Husserl arrived in his later account of meaning.  After tracing how his 
way of doing philosophy is importantly guided by Husserl’s “breakthrough” 
Investigations, Heidegger explains why he nonetheless deviates from Husserl’s course.   
 The explanation, in short, is that Heidegger finds Husserl’s descriptions of 
transcendental subjectivity insufficiently ontological.  Heidegger alleges that such 
descriptions suffer from a “neglect” of that which should be the basic focus of 
phenomenological research.504  He claims that Husserl’s choice to study transcendental 
subjectivity betrays a failure to “ask about the being of consciousness”.505   
 This is not to say, of course, that Husserl neglected the study of consciousness.  
What Heidegger contends, instead, is that Husserl’s failure to ask about the being of 
consciousness can be seen in precisely those “determinations of being which Husserl 
gives to pure consciousness” — determinations that Heidegger ascribes to a Cartesian 
                                                 
502 “It is characteristic of Husserl”, Heidegger acknowledges, “that his questioning is still fully in flux, so 
that we must in the final analysis be cautious in our critique” (History, p. 121).  
503 In the opening pages of Being and Time, Heidegger stipulates that it is “(the human being’s) kind of 
being” that “we are defining … terminologically as Dasein” (p. 11). 
504 Heidegger, History, p. 115. 
505 Heidegger, History, p. 102. 
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inheritance, and not to ontological questioning.506  What are these determinations?  First, 
according to Heidegger, Husserl supposes that being-conscious means being-included in 
that (“reell”) region of lived experience that we can access by reflection.  But, Heidegger 
objects, this inclusion does not inform us about the being so included, for it does not tell 
us what “the whole of this region” is.507  Second, Husserl views consciousness as 
“absolutely given” to reflection —508 given to reflection, e.g., in a way that no object of 
(always-perspectival) “external perception” can be.  But this determination, Heidegger 
objects, is only a specification of the first: it tells us only how “consciousness” or “lived 
experience” is an object for our living experience, while “the entity in itself”, 
consciousness “in itself”, “does not become a theme”.509  Similarly, Husserl understands 
consciousness as having “priority … within the order of constitution” over “every 
objectivity”, on the basis that everything transcendent is given whatever sense it has 
within living experience.510  Consciousness thus regarded could even be understood as 
“absolute”, “in the sense that it is the presupposition of being on the basis of which 
reality can manifest itself at all”.511  But here too, Heidegger objects, Husserl “does not 
determine the entity itself in its being”, and in this case instead merely “sets the region of 
consciousness within the order of constitution”.512   
 Husserl might raise peripheral defenses for each of these peripheral jabs.  He 
might respond to the last objection, e.g., by arguing that his reduction does not arbitrarily 
place its subject matter “within the order of constitution”.  It is not as though this order is 
                                                 
506 Heidegger, History, pp. 101, 103. 
507 Heidegger, History, p. 103. 
508 Heidegger, History, p. 101. 
509 Heidegger, History, p. 104. 
510 Heidegger, History, p. 105. 
511 Heidegger, History, p. 105. 
512 Heidegger, History, pp. 105-06. 
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merely a curiously privileged frame of reference, which we might just as well exchange 
for another (trading Husserl’s more epistemological standpoint for, say, a more 
mechanistic one, and attempting to explain consciousness primarily in terms of efficient 
causes and effects).  Rather, the reduction’s claim to neutrality stems from the insight that 
all other orders in terms of which we understand are themselves constituted.  Such 
responses, however, would only prompt the crux of Heidegger’s critique.    
 The central point in Heidegger’s 1925 objections concerns the peculiarly abstract 
or general character of the subjectivity that Husserl studied.  Heidegger perceives that 
Husserl’s study of subjectivity attempts to be one in which consciousness is “no longer 
regarded in its concrete individuation and its tie to a living being”.513  He understands that 
this study of consciousness aims to consider intentionality not as “real and mine, but 
instead purely in its essential content”.514  And he claims that this choice to study “pure” 
subjectivity exposes that Husserl is concerned only with “the determination of the being 
of intentionality” — and not with “the determination of the being of the entity which has 
the structure intentionality”.515   
 On this point Husserl need not disagree.  For Husserl had concluded by 1900 that 
the being of the entity that psychology and anthropology examine — what is “real” as 
well as perhaps “mine” — was such that it could not be the origin of logic’s objects.  He 
accordingly took the phenomenological reduction to be an accomplishment not despite 
that, but because, it directs us to general intentional structures (which structures Husserl 
thought could plausibly be characterized as the basis of objective meaning), rather than to 
the concrete being that is studied by the positive human sciences.  
                                                 
513 Heidegger, History, p. 106.   
514 Heidegger, History, p. 106.   
515 Heidegger, History, p. 106. 
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 From Heidegger’s perspective, however, the accomplishment of the 
transcendental and eidetic reductions is far from unambiguously positive.  Heidegger 
would prefer that Husserl had not studied quite such a generic essence of transcendental 
subjectivity.  He would prefer that Husserl had not abstracted away from those 
characteristics that are specifically human, and that Husserl instead had analyzed the 
concrete being that serves as our starting point when we practice the phenomenological 
reduction.  It is thus unfortunate, on Heidegger’s view, that Husserl’s determinations of 
transcendental subjectivity “are in no way drawn from the entity itself” to which we have 
reflective access.516  It is unfortunate that Husserl is concerned with human being only 
“to the extent that it is placed under scrutiny as apprehended, given, constituting, and 
ideating taken as an essence”.517  Whereas Husserl employs the reduction in order not to 
study a kind of contingent being in the world, then, Heidegger thinks that 
phenomenology ought to study precisely “the being of the concrete entity called man”.518  
For human being, according to Heidegger, is “the being of the entity in which 
consciousness and reason are concrete”.519 
                                                 
516 Heidegger, History, p. 106, my emphasis. 
517 Heidegger, History, p. 106. 
518 Heidegger, History, p. 107. 
519 Heidegger, History, p. 107.  We might hope that these orientations are not basically incompatible.  Is it 
not possible to have more concrete and more abstract programs of phenomenological research at work 
alongside of one another?  Heidegger at one point comes close to recognizing a peaceful difference of 
compatible approaches.  After suggesting that Husserl has failed to consider what is purported to be the 
most fundamental philosophical question, namely the question of the sense of “being”, Heidegger briefly 
considers hedging that initial assessment: “Perhaps here [in the case of distinctively Husserlian 
phenomenology], we merely need to determine consciousness as a region, the way in which it is a field for 
a particular consideration, but not the being of the entity itself, which can [also] be set apart as a possible 
field of consideration” (Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 107).  Heidegger even considers that 
“perhaps precisely here”, in the case of a phenomenology that proceeds “with a view to working out the 
context of lived experience as a region of absolute scientific consideration”, “the question of the being of 
the entity should be left out” (ibid, my italics).  This comes close to Husserl’s account of his own project, as 
an attempt to temporarily put metaphysical questions regarding individuals out of play, and as something 
other than what Husserl calls a regional ontology (a straightforward eidetic analysis) of the being of human 
beings.  Might we thus achieve an irenic resolution, by which Husserl’s phenomenology explores the 
region of consciousness in general, while Heidegger provides a transcendental (rather than straightforward) 
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 This dissent from Husserl’s semantic conclusions is elaborated further in The 
Metaphysical Foundations of Logic.  In that 1928 text, Heidegger explicitly and focally 
returns to the problems of transcendental logic that he, following Husserl, had 
investigated in his earliest works.520  Heidegger’s goal in the text is to clarify what is at 
issue in Husserl’s transcendental account of logic, namely “the essential connection 
between truth and ground”.521  His “point of departure”, moreover, coincides with 
Husserl’s eidetic and anti-psychologistic account of logic: he begins from the “traditional 
definition” of truth as a “characteristic of propositions” (namely the characteristic of 
stating something as it is).522  Heidegger seeks to surpass this understanding of truth — in 
terms of which Bolzano and Husserl had sought to demonstrate an independence of 
various truths from our acts of knowing — by appropriating it “in the right way”.523 
 This “right way” is, at first, Husserl’s.  Heidegger thus proceeds by asking what a 
proposition is, phenomenologically.  He notes: in encountering a proposition, we are not 
directed to “signs” or to an “internal” representation, but to what the proposition is 
about.524  On these grounds, Heidegger infers that propositions are essentially directed to 
                                                                                                                                                 
analysis of the being of human being, a phenomenological anthropology?  Might we attribute Heidegger’s 
published attacks and self-promotions solely to his provocative style, explaining their tendency to devalue 
Husserl’s project and exalt their own as nothing more than the modus operandi of a “man of insight and 
power” — the animus appropriate to “the arrogance of thinking”, by which Heidegger thinks “the joyful 
science” must proceed? (Heidegger, Essence, p. 77, and History, p. 80.)  Or would this reading accomplish 
a too easy “peace” that actually does violence to Heidegger’s understanding of his own approach?  These 
questions are decisively answered in Heidegger’s discussions of meaning and truth in and after Being and 
Time.  
520 The 1928 text additionally offers Heidegger’s own “external presentation of [Being and Time’s] guiding 
principles”, positioning these principles within a transcendental project and explicitly treating their 
continuity with, and divergence from, Husserl’s transcendental phenomenology (The Metaphysical 
Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984 [1928]), p. 136).   
521 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 123.  His goal, in other words, is to clarify the connection by 
reason of which we “demand … that true statements be grounded” (ibid.). 
522 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, pp. 124-25. 
523 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 125. 
524 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, pp. 125-26. So, to take Heidegger’s example, if we “suppose 
someone here in the classroom states the proposition: “the board is black””, we typically direct our minds 
not to a mental image of a blackboard, nor to the words spoken, but rather “to the blackboard itself” (ibid.). 
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some object: “making statements about X is only possible on the basis of having to do 
with X”.525  From this character of propositions, moreover, Heidegger then concludes that 
truth, understood as a possible character of propositions, is also “only possible on the 
basis of having to do with X”.  He concludes, in other words, that objective truth is only 
possible because of what Husserl would call a (evidential) type of intentionality — 
because of the strange kind of being wherein being is “disclosed”.526  So far, so 
Husserlian: Heidegger shows, through transcendental analysis, that the “being true” of 
statements is “primordially rooted” in what Husserl would call a fulfilled kind of 
intentionality and what Heidegger calls “being disclosive”; and Heidegger affirms the 
Brentanian insight, according to which the totality of truths originates in intentionality, 
and “being disclosive” is “the genuine sense of being true”.527 
 Yet Heidegger is eager, as he writes in 1928, to distinguish his concept of “being 
disclosive” from Husserl’s concept of fulfilling intentionality.  After applauding Husserl 
for recognizing intentionality as “the essence of being conscious as such”, and for thus 
bringing intentionality out of psychology, Heidegger reproaches Husserl for not going far 
enough beyond Brentano: “just as Brentano leaves the concept of the psyche itself 
untested, so too, in his idealistic epistemology, Husserl does not further ask the question 
about the being constituted as being conscious”.528   Again, then, Heidegger’s charge is 
that Husserl neglects ontological study of the being that is intentional and disclosive, in 
                                                 
525 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 126. 
526 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, pp. 127-28. 
527 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 127. 
528 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 133. 
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which being the “being true” of statements is “primordially rooted”.529  Might we explain 
this “neglect” merely as a difference of interests? 
 On the contrary, as Heidegger further clarifies, he sees his own view of being 
disclosive, and his study of “the entity” or “being in the world” that is so disclosive, as 
surpassing Husserl’s study of intentionality in concreteness as well as in motivation and 
scope.  Consider first the difference in motivations.  We have seen some reason to think 
that the picture of Husserl as a-metaphysical epistemologist is overdrawn,530 yet 
Heidegger would still find little contest in claiming that he and Husserl have different 
motivations for asking similarly transcendental questions about meaning and truth.  It is 
clear at least that where Husserl raised these “problem[s] of intentionality”, at least 
initially, “for the purpose of explaining knowledge”, Heidegger is motivated to examine 
this “phenomenon of transcendence” by the goal of “clarifying Dasein and its existence 
as such”.531  Heidegger foils the hope, however, that we might locate his divergence from 
Husserl only in this difference of purpose and not exactly in a disagreement.  To be sure, 
we might trace the difference of scope that Heidegger sees between his own researches 
and Husserl’s back to this difference of purpose: Husserl is said to have a “contracted 
conception” of intentionality just insofar as he thematizes the directedness of 
consciousness within an epistemological project.532  But, however important differences 
                                                 
529 It should be noted that Heidegger at times plainly overstates what Husserl has not done.  Consider, for 
example, Heidegger’s sweeping claim that, with intentionality, “we have a term and concept taken so much 
for granted that no one lingers with it for long” (Metaphysical Foundations, p. 133, my italics).  Whatever 
Husserl’s failures may have been, he tirelessly devoted himself to “lingering with” intentionality — and, at 
least to that extent, to clarifying the being of consciousness.  
530 Again, as noted in section 6.1, Husserl’s later account of logic is admittedly metaphysical.  See, for 
example, Formal and Transcendental Logic, § 102.  While Husserl is thus not entirely opposed to 
metaphysics, however, it remains true that he is perhaps primarily interested in studying the structure of 
experience and in identifying the conditions that make knowledge possible. 
531 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 135.   
532 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 134. 
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in purpose may be, Heidegger accentuates that his break from Husserl is still more 
severe, a case not only of differently oriented, but also of incompatible, approaches.   
 This incompatibility surfaces in Heidegger’s argument that his phenomenology is 
the more concrete.  According to this line of argument, Husserl’s decision not to identify 
“the being constituted as being conscious” as human being has the consequence that 
Husserl cannot discern the “central philosophical significance” of that which he 
investigates under the title of “intentionality”.533  Husserl is incapable of grasping 
intentionality’s significance, then, because he stops short of “the radical formulation of 
the intended phenomenon [namely, intentionality] in an ontology of Dasein”.534  His 
study of intentionality is deficient next to Heidegger’s existential analytic because he 
does not understand intentionality, and the entirety of truths and other propositions based 
upon it, as rooted in the “kind and mode of being of Dasein”.535  Heidegger’s underlying 
contention, then, is that Dasein is the concrete foundation of intentionality and truth.  
Given that contention, it would follow that Husserl’s choice not to take meaning as 
dependent on human being, and not to subsequently investigate meaning primarily in the 
context of a study of human being, is a failure to philosophize concretely.536   
 The same contention resonates in Heidegger’s designation of intentionality as 
“being in the world”.  For whereas Husserl regards intentionality, through his reduction, 
as prior to any factic beings in the world, Heidegger contends that Husserl’s “absolute” of 
                                                 
533 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 133. 
534 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 134. 
535 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, pp. 127.  Cf. Heidegger’s claim that intentionality is “grounded 
in existence”, where “existence” signifies the “kind and mode of being of Dasein” (ibid., pp. 127, 134)  
Existence, in this sense, is a mode of being that Heidegger denies to other beings that we could consider 
intentional, like cats: “a cat does not exist” (ibid., p. 127).   
536 In case it is not yet clear that Heidegger suggests a dependence of truth on Dasein, consider this related 
claim regarding being: “being is there only when Dasein understands being.  In other words, the possibility 
that being is there in the understanding presupposes the factical existence of Dasein, and this in turn 
presupposes the factical extantness of nature” (Metaphysical Foundations, p. 156). 
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intentionality would depend on, and so would not be apart from, one type of the beings 
that are contingently in the world.  Recall that, in one sense, Husserl’s aim in his 
reduction was neutrality.  He sought, by his method, not to invoke at the outset the very 
transcendent beings (or beings in the world), the possible appearing of which it is the task 
of a transcendental philosophy to explain.  He hesitated to identify intentionality with the 
being of human beings, or with any other beings in the world, because this apparently 
would have required making those contingently existing beings into a necessary 
condition for all categories and propositions and truths.  Against that position, Heidegger 
suggests that “being disclosive” requires that “Dasein is in a world”.537  He contends that 
truths and meanings presuppose that “factually existing humans happen to be among 
other beings, within the totality of other beings”.538  He claims that the “essence of man” 
is the basis of all truths and other meanings, such that any appeal to a more general 
subjectivity is needlessly abstract.  Whereas Husserl sought to remain metaphysically 
neutral through a silence about which being or beings are the primitive basis of objective 
meaning, then, Heidegger replies that “neutrality is in no way identical with the fuzzy 
concept of a ‘consciousness as such’”.539  
 Having reached this point of incompatibility, we may see in summary that both 
Husserl and Heidegger are bound by phenomenology to accept a certain “Platonism”, and 
to reject a different so-called “Platonism”, but also bound thereby to decide on issues on 
which they part company.  Both crucially accept the variety of “Platonism” discussed in 
                                                 
537 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 168. 
538 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, pp. 168-69. 
539 Heidegger, Metaphysical Foundations, p 140.  Here we find what Crowell calls “the very issue over 
which the [Encyclopedia Britannica] collaboration… collapse[d]”, and the breaking point in two otherwise 
structurally aligned phenomenological projects: where for Husserl, “as I reflect within the reduction, I 
grasp a subjectivity which cannot ‘be taken as I, this man’”, Heidegger objects, “yet certainly [it must be 
taken] as humanity (understood as the essence of man)” (Quoted in Crowell, p. 172). 
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Heidegger’s History of the Concept of Time: they both recognize the eidetic, and with it 
at least an “indifference” of objective meaning “to subjectivity”.540  Both also crucially 
reject that variety of so-called “Platonism” according to which truth is fundamentally 
“correctness”, or the being true of a statement, and instead see intentionality as necessary 
for this form of truth as correctness.541  But this phenomenological agreement prompts 
both to address the difficult transcendental question of how the objects of our thinking 
and knowing — including truths and other meanings — transcend our thinking and 
knowing.  It is here that an incompatibility emerges from a shared methodology.  For 
Heidegger saw Husserl as neglecting to ask the fundamental question of what being he 
actually disclosed, especially in Husserl’s claim to achieve insight into “consciousness as 
such” by reflecting, as an individual human being in the world, on his own living 
experience.  Against Husserl’s semantics, accordingly, Heidegger objects that the general 
transcendental subjectivity purported to be the basis of meanings is only an abstraction.  
While the general structures of intentionality that Husserl describes may be based in 
some concrete subjectivity, Heidegger insists that Husserl in any case needs to identify 
which intentional being is actually under description.   
 How then should we assess Heidegger’s objection?  It is easy to grant that many 
of the intentional structures that Husserl describes may actually be structures of 
specifically human experience, rather than of a “pure” transcendental subjectivity than 
has been stripped of all human particularities.  It is indeed questionable to what extent an 
                                                 
540 Heidegger, History, pp. 74-75.  In this sense, as Heidegger writes, “there is some warrant for speaking of 
Platonism within phenomenology itself” (ibid., p. 75). 
541 In The Essence of Truth: On Plato’s Cave-Allegory and Theaetetus (trans. Ted Sadler (New York: 
Continuum, 2002), p. 12), Heidegger finds the “transition … to truth as correctness”, a transition by which 
“Western philosophy takes off on an erroneous and fateful course”, in Plato’s allegory of the cave.  When 
Heidegger later spoke of a “banal Platonism”, he meant the view of truth as mere correctness.  
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eidetic analysis that begins from reflection on human conscious functions can identify 
structures that must hold in general, of any intentional being.  Perhaps the only meaning-
constituting functions that phenomenology can describe in any detail are specifically 
human constitutive functions.  But what of Heidegger’s more contentious claim that 
human being is the basis of logical objects, and that there is thus no need to appeal to 
generic subjectivity in order to account for the intentional origin of objective meanings 
and truths?  This question hinges on a metaphysical issue that is importantly distinct from 
any epistemological problem concerning the phenomenological method’s reach.  To say 
that there would be no meaning or truth if not for human existence is to make a 
metaphysical claim that stands in need of support. 
 According to Husserl, Heidegger’s claim regarding the basis of meanings and 
truths is “anthropologistic”.542  Heidegger’s “anthropologism” is of an eidetic and 
transcendental sort,543 and does not presuppose any results from the discipline of 
anthropology.544  Yet it still counts as anthropologism in Husserl’s sense, because it holds 
                                                 
542 In his 1931 lecture, “Phenomenology and Anthropology”, Husserl speaks of a “philosophical 
anthropology” which “maintains that that true philosophy should seek its foundation exclusively in man 
and, more specifically, in the essence of his concrete worldly existence” (“Phenomenology and 
Anthropology”, trans. Richard G. Schmitt, p. 315).  When Husserl says that this anthropologism has 
“affected the so-called phenomenological movement”, he is referring, in large part, to Heidegger’s work 
(ibid.; see also note 5, p. 313, in Scanlon’s “Introduction”). 
543 John Scanlon is no doubt correct that a “philosophical anthropology” like Heidegger’s, based as it is on 
“Dilthey’s emancipation of the human sciences from the domination of the physicalistic model”, “is neither 
empirically factual nor naively objective, but eidetic and reflective in its approach to human existence” (“A 
Transcendentalist’s Manifesto: Introduction to ‘Phenomenology and Anthropology’”, Husserl: Shorter 
Works (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), p. 311).  Heidegger’s anthropologism is 
accordingly safe from “the formal fallacy of founding ideal sciences like logic upon factual, empirical 
sciences like psychology or anthropology (“naturalizing ideas”), and the material fallacy of construing 
elements of consciousness as reducible ot physical elements and principles (“naturalizing consciousness”)” 
(ibid.). 
544 Heidegger, of course, would likely refuse to characterize his existential analytic as any kind of 
anthroplogy, even as a philosophical anthropology.  In a 1943 text, for example, Heidegger writes that his 
“questioning concerning the essence of man precedes all pedagogy, psychology, anthroplogy, as well as 
every humanism.  This questioning grows from, and is in no way different from, the questioning 
concerning the essence of truth, with which question there is coupled, under a yoke, the question of the 
essence of being” (Essence, pp. 83-84). 
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that the logical sphere is contingent upon the being in the world that is human being.  
Against this thesis, Husserl in his “Prolegomena to Pure Logic” gives the Bolzanian retort 
that I represented in section 4.2.  For example, he asserts that “the formula expressed in 
the law of gravitation” appears to have been “true before the time of Newton”;545 that 
truth in general appears to be “eternal, or … beyond time”, in such a way that “it makes 
no sense to give truth … a duration which extends throughout time”;546 and that the “law 
of contradiction” and other “propositions of pure logic” do not depend on the existence or 
“nature of our thought”.547  Unless we operatively presuppose this invariance and 
independence of truths, Husserl suggests, we cannot engage in discussion or inquiry. 
 What reason does Heidegger offer, then, in support of his contested claim that 
“truth is only because and as long as Dasein is”?548  Heidegger makes his case in the 
closing, climactic section of Division One of Being and Time.  In what we can now 
surmise is a direct response to Husserl’s claims, Heidegger there writes:  
“Newton’s laws, the law of contradiction, and any other truth whatsoever, are true 
only as long as Dasein is.  Before there was any Dasein, there was no truth; nor 
will there be any after Dasein is no more”.549   
Against the claim that inquirers must operate as though truth is independent of our 
inquiry, he replies: “we do not presuppose [truth] as something ‘outside’ and ‘above’ us 
to which we are related”.550  What grounds does Heidegger give for these positions? 
                                                 
545 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 39, p. 85. 
546 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 39, p. 85. 
547 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 39, p. 84. 
548 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44c, p. 230. 
549 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44c, p. 226. 
550 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44c, p. 227. 
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 Heidegger’s case that truths depend on Dasein involves both negative and positive 
moves.  Negatively, he disparages the claim that there are “eternal truths” as a 
“fantastical assertion”.551  He places the burden of proof onto his opponents, and asserts 
that the only evidence that will do is a “proof” that “Dasein has been and will be for all 
eternity”.552  Positively, Heidegger offers a model of the “kind of being of truth” 
according to which the discovering “manner of being of Dasein” is the “foundation” of 
the “being true of statements”.553  He shows by reflective means (more precisely, by the 
same, Husserlian descriptive argument that he employs in The Metaphysical Foundations 
of Logic) that the truth of propositions depends on a kind of intentionality, and he 
suggests that this intentionality occurs only in the sort of being to which we have 
reflective access — only in human being. 
 But it is precisely this suggestion that stands in need of support.  Husserl would 
not dispute that truths and other propositions depend on intentionality.  The point of 
contention is whether truths depend specifically on human existence — whether “there is 
truth only insofar as Dasein is and as long as it is”.554  Why should we believe that the 
disclosive being at the basis of objective truths must be specifically human being?  On 
this point, Heidegger does not supply reason that I can see.  Moreover, Heidegger 
occludes evidence suggesting that the truthful being at issue cannot be specifically 
human, by excluding all arguments for the independence of truths that are not proofs of 
the perpetuity of human existence.  What does Heidegger make, for example, of his 
                                                 
551 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44c, p. 227. 
552 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44c, p. 227. 
553 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44a-b, pp. 218-220. 
554 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44c, p. 226. 
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teacher’s argument that the “anthropologistic” thesis reduces to absurdity?555  The 
argument, published in 1900, begins from what is, in all relevant respects, the same 
position that Heidegger affirmed in 1929: “If, as anthropologism says, all truth has its 
source in our common human constitution, then, if there were no such constitution, there 
would be no truth”.556  Focusing on the counterfactual that I have italicized, Husserl 
reasons as follows: 
• The consequent of the counterfactual in question, by itself, “is absurd”.  For “the 
proposition, ‘There is no truth’ amounts in sense to the proposition, ‘There is a 
truth that there is no truth’.”  And it is “logically impossible” that there be “a truth 
that there is no truth”.557  
• In contrast, the antecedent of the counterfactual in question “admits of falsehood, 
but not of absurdity”.  It “represents the negation of a valid proposition, having 
factual content”, but nothing that is “logically impossible”: “No one has in fact 
ever thought of rejecting as absurd those geological and physical theories which 
give the human race a beginning and end in time”.558 
• A counterfactual comprised of an absurd consequent and a merely false antecedent 
is absurd as a whole.  For what is necessary cannot depend on what is contingent; 
what might not have been the case cannot be a necessary condition for what must 
be the case.  (As a corollary, what is logically necessary cannot depend on an 
existent, unless that existent exists necessarily.) 
                                                 
555 I have already sketched a version of this argument, albeit one that is somewhat less closely based on 
Husserl’s, in section 4.3.2. 
556 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 80, my italics.   
557 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 80. 
558 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 80. 
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• “The stigma of absurdity therefore taints the whole hypothetical statement”.559  
The counterfactual absurdly makes what is logically necessary depend on the 
contingent state of affairs that human beings happen to exist.  
How does Heidegger reply to such a challenge?  To my mind, at least, this remains 
unclear.  Heidegger does, to be sure, offer a blanket genealogy that might explain away 
any argument suggesting that there are eternal truths.  He writes: 
“The contention that there are ‘eternal truths’, as well as the confusion of the 
phenomenally based ‘ideality’ of Dasein with an idealized absolute subject, 
belong to the remnants of Christian theology within the philosophical problematic 
that have not yet been radically eliminated”.560  
All arguments that purport to show truth’s independence of human being, then, are 
dismissed as more or less inadvertent expressions of theistic belief, perhaps from theists 
who have not quite managed to keep their theism out of their philosophy.561  And so we 
might dismiss, without further attention, much of Husserl’s Prolegomena.  Absent any 
closer engagement with the actual lines of reasoning that claim to display truth’s 
independence, however, this genealogical dismissal can only function as a kind of 
sweeping ad hominem.  Again we are left without any reason for the supposition that 
truths must depend on a specifically human disclosive intentionality.  
 Still, Heidegger’s objection to Husserl’s later semantic conclusions is not without 
reason.  Even if we lack grounds for supposing that human being is the basis of objective 
                                                 
559 Logical Investigations, Prolegomena, § 36, p. 80. 
560 Heidegger, Being and Time, § 44c, p. 229. 
561 Why Heidegger names Christian theology, in particular, is uncertain.  Abrahamic monotheism, in 
general, does seem compatible with the intellectual need (if indeed there is one) for necessarily existent and 
intentional, truthful being.  But why name Christianity especially, among the Abrahamic faiths, as the 
historical source for the view that truth is independent of human being?  If anything, on the contrary, does 
not the Christian belief in the incarnation make it more susceptible than, say, Islam, to the view that the 
basis of truth is human?   
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meaning, there is nonetheless cause, given Husserl’s premises, for metaphysical 
questioning about concrete individuals.  Given that there would be no meanings without 
intentionality in general, it follows that some concrete intentional being(s) must serve as 
the basis for meanings.  If transcendental subjectivity in general is necessary for objective 
meanings, this can only be because one or more singular subjects are necessary 
conditions for objective meaning.  The phenomenology of meaning thus prompts us to 
ask which singular intentional being(s) could serve in this role — even if phenomenology 
does not have the resources to answer this question.  
 Of course, as Heidegger recognizes, there is value in dealing with the “arid 
problems” of logic’s foundations in the general, non-metaphysical terms that Husserl 
preferred in his Investigations.562  Yet, as Heidegger saw, these “arid problems” are 
inevitably related to metaphysical issues.  Husserl too was forced to recognize this fact, 
thanks to those who attributed a particular metaphysical orientation (namely, a regress 
into psychologism) to the parts of the Investigations that concern the intentional basis of 
meaning.  Once the metaphysical domain is broached, moreover, would it not be 
negligent to think only of generalities, and not of the singular being(s) tacitly at issue in 
general claims?  This threat of metaphysical negligence comprises a second chief threat 
to the phenomenology of meaning, and serves to recommend the metaphysical ambitions 
that drove the development of Husserl’s later semantics. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
562 Heidegger, History of the Concept of Time, p. 25. 
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7: Conclusion 
The study above allows us to draw two kinds of conclusions.  On the one hand, it 
provides grounds for certain conclusions about Husserl’s intellectual history — his 
context, his influences, and the basis and development of one aspect of his thought.  On 
the other hand, it offers grounds for certain conclusions concerning the nature and origin 
of logical objects.  In this chapter, I distill a few of the most important conclusions of 
each type. 
With respect to the history of Husserl’s thought, we are now able to conclude (a) 
that the discrepancy apparent in Husserl’s 1900-01 account of meaning can be attributed, 
above all, to his inheritance of selected descriptions from Brentano’s “empirical 
psychology” and arguments from Bolzano’s “theory of science”; (b) that the discord 
between Husserl’s Brentanian and Bolzanian accounts propelled him to develop the 
philosophical method that he famously presented in 1913; (c) that Husserl then employed 
that two-step method, in 1929, to reinforce, to revise, and to integrate his two-sided view 
of meaning; and (d) that the later Husserl’s attempted integration of his semantics raised 
at least two sorts of objections from students who had accepted the dyadic schema of 
their teacher’s method and theory of meaning.   
With regard to (a), I have shown how Husserl’s “breakthrough” work affirms two 
nearly incompatible views of signification — how it presents meaning, first, as an 
independent stratum through which we categorially intend the world, and, second, as a 
dependent aspect of intentional experience which is founded on categorial mental acts.  I 
have shown how these discordant views of meaning accompanied similarly dissonant 
accounts of logic’s relation to psychology, both of which accounts were hotly disputed at 
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the time when Husserl affirmed them.  I have confirmed what I have called Benoist’s 
thesis: by first recognizing how Stumpf, Frege, Lotze, Cantor and Weierstrass contributed 
to Husserl’s semantics, I have been able to demonstrate how those contributions are built 
onto a partly Brentanian and partly Bolzanian substructure. I thus have shown how 
Husserl was compelled to accept both psychological and logical accounts of meaning, 
despite their prima facie incompatibility, primarily by the descriptions and arguments that 
he inherited from Brentano and Bolzano.  And I have displayed how Husserl selectively 
appropriated and bolstered the lines of reasoning that he found in those two influences’ 
accounts of meaning.  
With regard to (b), I have illustrated how the phenomenological method that 
Husserl articulated in the first decade of the twentieth century and announced to a broad 
readership in Ideas I essentially responds to challenges that he had confronted through his 
attempt to account for meaning in the Logical Investigations.  I have clarified how 
Husserl’s method exposes a difference between psychology and phenomenology, and 
how it would thereby vindicate his 1900-01 semantics from charges of incoherence.  
Further, I have charted how the eidetic and transcendental steps within Husserl’s method 
answer to demands that had been imposed by his Bolzanian and Brentanian semantic 
insights. 
With regard to (c), I have explicated how Formal and Transcendental Logic 
proceeds according to a partly transcendental, partly eidetic method, and have noted how 
Husserl’s Logic reinstates his Brentanian and Bolzanian conclusions by means of that 
method.  Against the worry that Husserl’s method and theory of meaning together 
comprise a vicious circle, I have assembled a collection of cases in which Husserl used 
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his method to revise his semantics.  And I have presented how Husserl’s notion of 
transcendental subjectivity, which results from his two-step method, functions as his 
proposed resolution to the strain within his two-sided view of signification. 
Finally, with regard to (d), I have depicted how both the Göttingen circle and 
Heidegger adopted at least the dyadic skeleton of Husserl’s method and semantics, and 
how they still found fault with Husserl’s resolution of the discord between his Brentanian 
and Bolzanian insights.  I have noted how it is possible, within the phenomenology of 
meaning, to think that Husserl’s proposed resolution was too metaphysically ambitious.  
And I have observed how it is also possible, within the same approach, to believe that 
Husserl’s attempt at a resolution was metaphysically negligent.      
 The interest in Husserl’s work, however, is not primarily an interest in what a 
given man happened to think and say.  The hope is rather that, by critically taking up 
certain directions of Husserl’s thought, we might get to the things themselves.  Have I 
been able to find anything of epistemic worth, then, in and through Husserl’s approach to 
meaning?  What has my critical and developmental analysis of Husserl’s dyadic 
semantics turned up with respect to meaning itself? 
Positively, my critical analysis has found some reason to affirm Husserl’s 
contention that signification is essentially two-sided.  On the one hand, we have seen a 
strong Bolzanian case that there is a field of reiterable and commonly available meanings, 
which field is largely independent of human thought and expression.  On the other hand, 
we have seen a cogent Brentanian case that there could be no truths or other ideal 
meanings apart from categorial intentionality.  In this way, moreover, my assessment has 
also provided some reason to appreciate Husserl’s two-step approach to the intentional 
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basis of objective meanings.  For that approach was designed to be one in which we take 
our own conscious experiences merely as examples, and direct our attention exclusively 
to the general intentional structures without which there could be no phenomena or 
objective meanings at all.   
Negatively, however, my analysis has provided some cause for caution 
concerning the phenomenological attempt to uncover an intentional basis of meaning.  
More precisely, I have offered reason to suspect that any self-enclosed phenomenology of 
meaning — any phenomenological account of signification that refuses all other modes 
of inquiry concerning the same subject — is essentially prone to be either (a) negligent 
with respect to its metaphysical implications or (b) profligate in its speculation.  Insofar 
as Husserl, after determining that a type of intentionality is necessary for objective 
meaning in general, then refused any study concerning the being(s) at the basis of all such 
meaning, he was negligent with respect to what his semantics implies; yet, to the extent 
that Husserl sought to investigate the being(s) at the basis of all objective meaning solely 
through his reflective procedure, he was almost bound to attribute undue importance to 
the idiosyncratic, variously conditioned sort of mind to which he had reflective access.  
Thus, while Husserl’s Brentanian and Bolzanian insights together motivate a line of 
inquiry regarding the intentional basis of objective meaning, the study of intentionality in 
general appears to be as far as phenomenology can go. 
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